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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effect of corporate governance practices on cost of 
capital in listed companies. In particular, this study examines: 1) the relationship 
between corporate governance practices and cost of capital in large listed 
companies in New Zealand and Singapore. 2) The effects of corporate governance 
on cost of capital in an open economy like Singapore which is well-known as the 
financial hub of its region and a more isolated commodity export economy such 
as New Zealand. 3) The pattern between each corporate governance variable and 
cost of capital. 4) The best method of calculating cost of capital in New Zealand 
and Singapore market. 
Attempts at developing corporate governance in New Zealand go back to 1970s. 
The first set of rules and regulations regarding corporate governance practices 
were implemented in 1988 under the Securities Act of 1988 in New Zealand. 
Primary attempts in Singapore took place in 1980s by Security Industry Act of 
1986. Continues efforts led to enactment of Companies Act of 1990 which was 
one of the effective acts regarding corporate governance. The main purpose of 
these mandatory corporate governance rules are promoting transparency, 
accountability and overall efficiency in corporate governance practices.  
This thesis makes a number of contributions to corporate governance practices 
and cost of capital in several ways. First, the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and financial performance is investigated in prior studies but 
the relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital is largely 
missing. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by filling this gap. 
Second, the majority of corporate governance studies focus on large mature 
economies such as US and UK and other European markets. Smaller markets such 
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as NZ with significant agriculture based industries may differ. Analyses based on 
NZ and Singapore play an important role in adding to the generalizability of the 
understanding of corporate governance relationships. Third, the impact of the 
global financial crisis may differ between industrial markets and protein supply 
based economies. This difference and corporate regulatory changes as response to 
the financial crisis again inform a broader understanding of the corporate 
governance sophistication and foci. Fourth, an open economy like Singapore 
which is well-known as the financial hub of its region has different experiences in 
corporate governance and cost of capital rather than a more isolated commodity 
export economy such as New Zealand. Fifth, one major concern of academics and 
practitioners alike is finding the best method of calculating cost of capital. 
Developing a more about method of calculating cost of capital in New Zealand 
and Singapore is the major contribution this study makes to the finance literature.  
Data needed to test various hypotheses are sourced from the NZX company 
research (NZX Deep Archive), Singapore Exchange Market website (SGX), and 
Datastream and Thomson one banker databases. Required data collected from 
large listed companies in New Zealand (NZX50) and Singapore (STI Constituent) 
during 2006-2010. Care is taken to clean the data reviewing missing data, outliers 
and distributional properties. The focus of this thesis is on the corporate 
governance variables that have been supported in the literature and related 
theories as providing an appropriate structure for the institutions in the 
environment in which they operate. Because of causality test, Generalized Least 
Square method in pooled data estimations to explore the role of corporate 
governance variables on cost of capital. Careful diagnostic testing is under taken 
iv 
 
related to multicollinearity, endogeneity and heteroskedasticity employed in this 
study to check hypotheses relevant in this study.  
The findings indicate that there is negative relationship between corporate 
governance and cost of capital and this means that complying corporate 
governance guidelines help companies to control their cost of capital. However, 
the process by which corporate governance affects cost of capital is different in 
New Zealand and Singapore. Different characteristics of corporate governance in 
these countries led to different recommendations made by this thesis. Larger 
companies need higher levels of control and that is the reason of having larger 
boards in Singaporean companies. Findings of this thesis indicate that large 
boards in New Zealand and smaller boards in Singapore could help companies to 
control their cost of capital. Recommendations of this thesis indicate that less 
outside directors required in Singapore while the level of outside directors in New 
Zealand seems effective. Findings of this thesis about ownership structure indicate 
that the present level of insider ownership in both countries needs modification. 
Higher levels of insider ownership in both countries could help companies to 
control their cost of capital. Recommendation of this thesis about block ownership 
was slightly different in two countries. While higher levels of block ownership in 
Singapore recommended, the present situation of block owners in New Zealand 
seems to be ineffective. The findings of this thesis recommend that the level of 
block ownership in New Zealand should whether increase or decrease in order to 
help companies control their cost of capital. Various recommendations made by 
this thesis indicate that it is important to further develop the corporate governance 
code incorporating country specific characteristics. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
1.0 Introduction 
This research investigates the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and cost of capital in large publicly listed companies. There are many theories of 
corporate governance and their link with shareholders’ wealth is a common 
theme. The Stewardship theory for example suggests governance is about 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. This might be too narrow a view to be currently 
popular but nevertheless, emphasizes that governance and shareholder’s wealth 
are linked. Cost of capital is a key component of wealth creation. Discussions 
about optimal capital structure link capital structure with cost of capital and 
shareholders’ wealth. To date the relationship between corporate governance and 
cost of capital has not been adequately explored.  
This study empirically investigates this question by using data from companies in 
New Zealand and Singapore. New Zealand is selected for study as this is where I 
live and empirical studies of corporate governance are relatively sparse. Singapore 
has a similar population to New Zealand but differs in terms of industrial 
structure, providing an opportunity for meaningful comparative analyses of 
similarities and differences of governance in relation to cost of capital. 
This study builds on prior studies in a number of ways:  
1) The relationship between corporate governance practices and financial 
performance is investigated in prior studies but cost of capital and governance is 
largely missing. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by filling this 
gap.  
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2) The majority of corporate governance studies focus on large mature economies 
such as US and UK and other European markets. Smaller markets such as NZ 
with significant agriculture based industries may differ. Analyses based on NZ 
and Singapore play an important role in adding to the generalizability of the 
understanding of corporate governance relationships.  
3) The impact of the global financial crisis may differ between industrial markets 
and protein supply based economies. This difference and corporate regulatory 
changes as response to the financial crisis again inform a broader understanding of 
the corporate governance sophistication and foci.  
4) An open economy like Singapore which is well-known as the financial hub of 
its region has different experiences in corporate governance and cost of capital 
rather than a more isolated commodity export economy such as New Zealand. 
5) One major concern of academics and practitioners is finding the best method of 
calculating cost of capital. Developing a more about method of calculating cost of 
capital in New Zealand and Singapore is the major contribution this study makes 
to the finance literature.  
Corporate governance focuses on board characteristics in companies and 
according to Castellano (2000) board of directors plays an important role in 
monitoring and controlling managers’ performance. The importance of this role 
has been emphasized in many different debates and conferences (Erkens, 2012; 
OECD, 2009). Although importance of corporate governance practices has been 
investigated over the last four decades numerous controversies and debates 
suggest that it’s not working in its present form. (Gugler, 2001). Numerous 
suggestions have been made and spates of corporate failure have been held up as 
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evidence of poor governance. The issue of policy concerning cost of capital has 
not received attention in the prior discussions.  
In companies that rely primarily on domestic resources for capital, good corporate 
governance practices will help in different ways: 1) improving the confidence of 
domestic investors, 2) reducing the cost of capital, 3) underpinning the good 
functioning of financial markets and ultimately inducing more stable sources of 
finance (OECD, 2004). Companies that rely on international flow of funds have 
access to a larger pool of investors. If companies want to enjoy the advantages of 
working in larger capital markets and have the ability to attract more long-term 
patient capital (lower cost of capital), corporate governance arrangements must be 
credible, well understood across borders and have internationally accepted 
principles (Stulz, 2007).  
Based on a general definition, corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of funds assure themselves of getting a return on their investment 
(Shleifer, 1996). Thus, exploring corporate governance as an effective factor in 
improving companies and its role in cost of capital seems an important issue. 
Different aspects of corporate governance are explored in different theories. As a 
brief background, the assumptions, year of origin and key issues of these theories 
are presented in Table 1.1. These theories help academics and practitioners to 
understand the situations and improve their decisions. Similarities and differences 
between these theories make the investigations more interesting. Emphasis on the 
importance of shareholders’ wealth is the central issue in these theories.  
Agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency 
theory and managerial hegemony theory have emphasis on the importance of 
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shareholders’ wealth. Agency theory suggests that shareholders’ wealth should be 
protected while shareholders and managers might have different interests. 
Shareholders’ wealth is the central issue of stewardship theory as it indicates that 
similar interests of managers and shareholders will lead to higher firm value. 
Stakeholder theory maintains that boards of directors will focus on increasing 
stakeholder’s wealth rather than the company’s wealth; thus, with this theory, a 
higher level of control on boards of directors is required. Resource dependency 
theory and managerial hegemony theory propose that boards of directors require 
more control in order to perform better and protect shareholders’ wealth.. This 
study tries to cover the issues raised by these theories through employing different 
variables related to corporate governance and assess their role on controlling cost 
of capital. 
However, at the same time, the difference between assumptions and functions of 
these theories make them more confusing. The difference between agency theory 
and stewardship theory is an example. Agency theory suggests that owners and 
managers have different interests while stewardship theory states the opposite. 
Agency theory suggests that CEO and chairman of the board should be separate 
entities in order to increase the control level, while stewardship theory indicates 
that duality of CEO and chairman will facilitate the company’s decisions. 
Therefore, one of these theories recommends a higher level of control while the 
other one relies on the board’s honesty and loyalty.  
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Table ‎1.1: Corporate Governance Theories 
THEORY Assumptions Year of Origin Board member role Main board function Key issues 
Principal-Agent theory Owners’‎interests‎may‎
differ from‎managers’‎
interests 
From 1930s onwards Supervisor 
(Chosen to represent 
owners interests, and be 
independent of 
management) 
Conformance: 
- Safeguard owners  
  resources and interests 
- Supervise  
  management/staff 
Emphasis on control may stifle 
innovation and risk taking, and 
reduce staff motivation 
Stewardship theory Owners and managers 
have similar interests 
From 1990s onwards Partner 
(Chosen for expertise) 
Improving Performance: 
- add value to top  
  decisions/strategy 
- partner  management 
Management proposals and 
systems may not be given 
adequate scrutiny. 
Stakeholder theory Different stakeholders 
have legitimate but 
different interests in the 
organisation. 
From 1970s onwards Represent different 
stakeholder views 
Political: 
- represent  and balance 
  different stakeholder  
  interests 
- make policy 
- control executive 
Board members may promote 
stakeholder interests rather 
than‎the‎organisation’s‎
interests. May be difficult to 
agree objectives. 
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THEORY Assumptions Year of Origin Board member role Main board function Key issues 
Resource dependency 
theory 
Organisational survival 
depends on maintaining 
coalition of support to 
obtain resources and 
legitimacy 
From 1970s onwards Supporter 
(Chosen for influence or 
resources they may bring.) 
External influence: 
- secure resources 
- improve stakeholder 
  relations 
- bring external  
  perspective 
External focus of board 
members may mean internal 
supervision is neglected.  
Board members may lack 
expertise. 
Managerial hegemony 
theory 
Owners and managers 
have different interests, 
but managers control 
main levers of power. 
From 1980s onwards Symbolic Legitimacy: 
- ratify decisions 
- support management 
- give legitimacy 
 
Management may pursue its 
own interests at the expense of 
owners. Managers gain little of 
value from board. 
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Within the literature a wide range of variables relating to governance are used. 
Often the choice of variables seems to be driven by availability of data rather than 
relationship to an underlying theory. Consequently a gulf appears between the 
normative and positivists research in corporate governance. Agency theory has 
clear finance implications and provides a useful umbrella for the consideration 
and filtering of variables. 
Board size, board independency, board diversity, block ownership, managerial 
ownership, CEO duality and CEO tenure are some of the most important variables 
considered by agency theory. In agency theory managers’ characteristics and 
shareholders’ characteristics should be in a way that support shareholders’ wealth. 
This research will employ all of these variables to clarify their role on cost of 
capital of companies in New Zealand and Singapore.  
Two important limitations that prior studies faced with will be covered in this 
research. The first limitation is the relevance of data. Performance values  
employed in prior studies might have been manipulated by managers in order to 
portray a better performance by their companies (Isa, 2011; Tilden, 2012). Some 
companies may desire to manipulate the data related to performance values, which 
are employed in almost all the assessments inside and outside the companies. In 
this study, cost of capital values will be used instead of performance values in 
order to overcome this shortcoming. Although cost of capital may not represent 
the performance of companies, it can be used to assess companies’ situations 
(Exley, 2006). Employing cost of capital will protect this study from using 
manipulated data because there is less intensive to manipulate the cost of capital 
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data. Thus, a better picture of corporate governance can be presented in this 
research.  
Empirical evidence indicates that good corporate governance improves the 
companies’ financial performance (Brown, 2006a, 2006b; Chahine, 2004; 
Klapper, 2003; MacAvoy, 2003). Better corporate governance helps managers and 
shareholders to forecast the future of their company in two ways: 1) Better 
corporate governance practices lead to a higher cash flow for shareholders rather 
than expropriation of shareholders’ wealth by company managers (Jensen, 1986; 
La Porta, 2002). 2) Good corporate governance  reduces the cost of monitoring 
and auditing and helps companies to efficiently reduce costs (Beiner, 2004). 
Burton (2000) believes that monitoring managers’ behaviour, in order to limit 
their managerial discretion, results in controlling agency costs.  
This study will investigate the effect of corporate governance components on cost 
of capital. The first step in achieving this is to investigate the direction of effects. 
Direction of effects should be studied through causality test. Causality test 
determines whether good corporate governance reduces the cost of capital or 
whether lower cost of capital leads to better corporate governance. Results of 
causality tests show that there is a significant causality from corporate governance 
to cost of capital. No reverse causality of corporate governance to cost of capital 
detected. Results of causality tests are reported in Appendices A and B. 
In the pursuit of improved corporate governance countries promulgate new rules 
and regulations to improve corporate governance practices. The United States in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 implemented new regulations regarding special 
aspects of corporate governance. Other countries such as New Zealand, UK, 
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Canada and Australia used similar rules and regulations. These countries believe 
that companies that implement these rules and guidelines have a specific 
governance structure that helps them to enhance efficiency. Nowadays corporate 
governance codes and practices that emphasize accountability and conformity 
have spread all around the world (Edwards, 2005).  
Different institutions and organisations have released a variety of codes and 
principles for corporate governance. Some of these institutions are: “OECD 
corporate governance principles”, “Cadbury code” in the UK, “New Zealand 
corporate governance principles and guidelines” and the “Commonwealth 
Association for Corporate Governance” (CACG) in Singapore. These institutions 
(among others) try to guide companies to implement the most up-to-date 
corporate governance codes and principles in order to improve their performance 
(Edwards, 2005). These codes and principles are very similar in some parts. Some 
of the most common emphases of these codes and principles are separation of 
chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board, employment of 
independent directors and independent sub-committees such as audit, 
remuneration and nomination.  
Weakness of corporate governance practices and poor financial performance made 
local and international investors assume that lack of good governance led 
companies to confront the latest financial crisis. Other research had the same idea 
regarding the role of corporate governance. Johnson et al.(2000) point out that the 
behaviour of companies in emerging markets, like Singapore, during the financial 
crisis of 1997-98 is more understandable when the corporate governance factors 
are employed instead of macroeconomic variables. Johnson et al. (2000) believe 
that the behaviour of companies can be predicted by assessing corporate 
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governance variables. Although financial crisis had different effect on countries, 
the unique geographic and economic situation of New Zealand protected its 
market in the latest financial crisis to some extent. But, a highly internationalised 
country like Singapore got more affected by financial crisis. The financial crisis 
and collapse of large companies acted as a sign for New Zealand and Singapore to 
promote their market efficiency by enhancing higher standards of corporate 
governance. 
The following section provides a brief discussion on corporate governance in New 
Zealand and Singapore. 
1.1 Corporate governance environment in New Zealand 
The primary attempt at implementing governance rules and guidelines in New 
Zealand was the Companies Act 1955. This act was a copy of the United 
Kingdom Act of 1948. This act emphasized the requirements of boards of 
directors, not corporate governance practices. After that collapse of major 
companies in the mid-1970s persuaded authorities to develop corporate 
governance practices in New Zealand. Attempts at developing corporate 
governance practices in New Zealand go back to the introduction of the Securities 
Act 1978. New Zealand authorities tried to enact rules and regulations that protect 
investors’ interests.  
The first set of rules and regulations regarding corporate governance practices 
were implemented after the 1988 stock market. These rules sat under the 
enactment of the Securities Act 1988 in New Zealand (Hossain, 2001). These sets 
of rules and guidelines evolved through time. For example, rules and guidelines 
regarding directors’ duties were enacted in the Companies Act 1993. New 
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Zealand authorities outlawed insider trading in the late 1990s after some cases of 
takeovers and market manipulation took place. Equiticorp, Chase and Fortex are 
some examples of takeovers.  
The poor quality of corporate governance caused serious problems for some big 
companies such as Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) and Air New Zealand. These 
companies were examples of companies who lost shareholders’ wealth due to the 
poor quality of corporate governance (Healy, 2003). McKinlay (2003) indicates 
that financial failure of the public and not-for-profit sectors was due to poor 
quality corporate governance. These shortcomings damaged New Zealand’s 
international image in the eyes of investors. Local and international investors 
wanted protection but these collapses and shortcomings persuaded them that they 
lacked protection in New Zealand. These failures encouraged academics, 
practitioners and policy makers to focus on improving corporate governance. 
Other incentives that motivated New Zealand’s authorities to work harder on 
corporate governance practices and that led to change are: 
1) Improvement in countries that implemented better corporate governance 
practices, especially when they had economic relations with New Zealand; and 2) 
Deregulation of the economy in 1984. 
New legislation in New Zealand sought three main goals: (1) promoting investor 
protection; (2) safeguarding and developing the efficiency of New Zealand’s 
capital market; and (3) and attracting more international attention by introducing a 
cost effective securities regulation. Good corporate governance is not the only 
solution for corporate failure, though implementing corporate governance rules 
and regulations will help companies to achieve higher shareholder wealth. This 
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implementation of rules and regulations should be accompanied by continuous 
monitoring and updating in order to control fraud and opportunistic behaviour.  
The New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC) has published a report on the 
nine high level principles and guidelines of corporate governance in New Zealand. 
The principles are intended to contribute to high standards of corporate 
governance practices in New Zealand. Principles that are mentioned in this 
research are:  
1. Ethical standards 
Directors should observe and foster high ethical standards. 
2. Board composition and performance 
There should be a balance of independence, skill, knowledge, experience, and 
perspectives among the directors so that the board works effectively. 
3. Board committees 
The board should use committees where this would enhance its effectiveness in 
key areas while retaining board responsibility. 
4. Reporting and disclosure  
The board should demand integrity both in financial reporting and in the 
timeliness and balance of disclosure on entity affairs. 
5. Remuneration 
The remuneration of directors and executives should be transparent, fair and 
reasonable. 
6. Risk management 
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The board should regularly verify that the entity has appropriate processes that 
identify and manage potential and relevant risks. 
7. Auditors 
The board should ensure the quality and independence of the external audit 
process. 
8. Shareholder relations 
The board should foster constructive relationships with shareholders to encourage 
them to engage with the entity. 
9. Stakeholders’ interests 
The board should respect the interests of stakeholders within the context of the 
entity’s ownership type and its fundamental purpose (Securities Commission New 
Zealand, 2011). These guidelines and recommendations are for listed companies 
but at the same time these guidelines provide good recommendations for other 
companies. 
Companies need to control their cost of capital in order to protect shareholders’ 
wealth. All of the operational and development plans in companies rely on the 
amount of accessible money and cost of capital play a critical role in this issue. 
Controlling the cost of capital is an important issue, especially in small markets 
with restricted access to money such as New Zealand. This study is going to 
investigate the important role of corporate governance practices on cost of capital. 
1.2 Corporate governance environment in Singapore 
In Singapore, just like New Zealand, most corporate governance practice reforms 
took place after different crisis; the most important was the Asian financial crisis 
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in 1997-1998. A brief history of corporate governance reforms reveals different 
stages: 1) financial misreporting and collapse of corporates in the United States in 
the 1970s, which led authorities to emphasize the role of outside directors and 
audit committees; 2) Corporate collapse in the United Kingdom in the 1980s 
which led to the Cadbury Report;  3) The Asian financial crisis in 1997 which led 
to regulatory changes; and 4) the Enron fraud in the US in 2002 which led to 
reformed company-auditor relationships, better accountability for financial 
reports, greater board oversight and stronger internal controls.  
One effective act regarding corporate governance practices in Singapore was the 
Companies Act of 1990. This act considered the registration of companies and 
protection of shareholders’ rights. Regulations regarding higher disclosure rates in 
companies are pointed out in the Companies Act 1990 and Securities Industry Act 
of 1986. Share options are also covered in the Companies Act 1990 covering 
compensation for directors, managers and employees. 
The Post-Asian crisis era was indeed the period of rapid improvement in corporate 
governance practices and philosophy toward the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) promulgated standards (Phan, 2000). 
Compared with the accelerated speed of change in corporate governance rules and 
regulations in most parts of the world, Singapore didn’t experience huge changes. 
Significant factors that prevented the Singapore market from implementing high 
standard corporate governance guidelines can be summarised in five categories. 1) 
Ownership structure, 2) disclosure regime, 3) structure of the board of directors, 
4) government ownership and 5) employment of share option schemes. 
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The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) also 
identifies some important factors for Singapore’s corporate governance principles. 
1. Board issues 
Some factors such as accountability to shareholders or stakeholders, disclosure of 
director, independency, audit committee and term limits are mentioned in this 
section. 
2. Remuneration 
Disclosure of the firm is mentioned in this part. 
3. Role of shareholders 
Shareholder voting and general meetings are mentioned in this section. 
4. Financial reporting, transparency and audit 
Financial reporting, transparency and internal control are the components of this 
section. 
5. Ethics 
Listed issuers should devise their own codes of best practices 
6. Source 
Stock Exchange of Singapore “Listing Manual (as amended) and best practices 
guide”: Singapore, 1999. 
7. Table format 
Adapted from Investor Responsibility Research Centre, “Global corporate 
governance – codes, reports and legislation”, IRRC, Washington D.C. 1999 
(Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance, 1999).  
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Cost of capital is another important economic issue in the Singapore market. 
Singapore is an open economy and is well-known as the finance hub of the region. 
Better access to financial resources helps Singaporean companies to experience a 
different situation regarding cost of capital. As the role of corporate governance in 
Singapore is improving based on guidelines and principles and Singaporean 
companies are experiencing better access to financial resources, investigating the 
role of corporate governance on cost of capital in this market will reveal different 
outcomes in compare with New Zealand market.  
1.3 Governance Structures 
Importance of corporate governance in companies is the base for many empirical 
studies (La Porta, 1998, 1997). Researchers believe that good corporate 
governance not only affects private companies but also affects the quality of 
institutions (North, 1990). A good quality corporate governance mechanism is 
assessable from different angles: 1) political stability, 2) voice and accountability, 
3) government effectiveness, 4) rule of law, 5) control of corruption and 6) quality 
of regulation (Kaufmann, 2006).  
As different companies working in economies, each sector of the economy needs 
its unique considerations. To understand the purpose and nature of companies, 
prior studies highlighted different characteristics. These characteristics can be 
summarised as below: 1) Level of shareholders’ control, 2) Degree of ownership, 
3) Characters of affective shareholders, 4) Board accountability, 5) Legal and 
regulatory environment and 6) Competition level of company in markets (La 
Porta, 1998; Maher, 1999; Shleifer, 1997). Companies have different situations 
regarding each of these characteristics. Difference in these characteristics reveals 
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the difference in corporate governance situations that can be successful in 
companies. 
Therefore, it is clear that no single governance structure can suit all companies. 
Each company should have a particular governance structure that best suits its 
situation. Not only may particular governance structures vary among companies, 
but in particular periods, these structures need to be reconsidered. For example, 
market-based systems have strong recognition of minority shareholders’ rights 
while bank-based systems normally prefer a concentrated ownership structure  
Singapore is part of the global drive toward adopting better corporate governance 
practices. The publication of Organisation of Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD) is a sign of global convergence in corporate governance 
practices and Singapore plays its role as part of this convergence. Different factors 
that lead to this convergence can be summarized as below: (a) Globalization and 
liberalization that lead to integration of financial markets, (b) Convergence of 
laws and regulations in companies and securities all around the world, (c) 
Activities of inter-governmental bodies such as OECD, World Bank and IMF that 
push companies for corporate governance reform and (d) Technology. 
Technology offers the opportunity to publish corporate information that could 
accelerate the convergence of corporate governance practices. Singapore 
corporate governance standards and practices are heavily under the effect of 
global convergence of corporate governance because Singapore is an international 
financial centre and its companies are becoming increasingly international.     
Importance of corporate governance is supported by different theories. These 
theories, which are summarized in Table 1.1, are: agency theory, stakeholder 
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theory, resource dependency theory etc. The fundamental issue that proves the 
importance of good governance structure is agency problems that arise from the 
separation of ownership and control in each company. Therefore, the perspective 
of agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory etc. will be the 
framework of this research in order to assess the role of corporate governance in 
companies. The model of corporate governance in New Zealand and Singapore is 
related to market-based or outsider systems of governance, which is typical in 
Anglo-Saxon countries like Australia and Canada. The law points out the role of 
boards of directors in these countries. 
1.4 Objectives of this study 
This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand and Singapore. New 
Zealand represents a more isolated economy and Singapore represents a widely 
open economy. Results of this investigation reveal the differences in the two 
economic structures. By contributing to the pool of knowledge the bigger picture 
of what is generalizable is promoted through achieving the different objectives 
listed below. 
1. To determine which method of estimating cost of equity is preferable in 
these countries: CAPM, Fama-French three factor model or Fama-French 
four factor model. 
2. Whether an economy with light engineering sector and restricted access to 
money can work better in the field of corporate governance and cost of 
capital than an economy that relies heavily on export and import and easy 
access to money. 
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3. To determine the causality relationship between corporate governance 
variables and cost of capital in two different countries. 
4. To determine the relationship between corporate governance practices of 
New Zealand’s large listed companies and cost of capital measured by 
Fama-French four factor model. 
5. To determine the relationship between corporate governance practices of 
Singapore’s large listed companies and cost of capital measured by Fama-
French four factor model. 
6. To determine the critical value of corporate governance in large listed 
companies in New Zealand and Singapore.  
1.5 Significance of this study 
One of the most significant objectives in any country is to improve the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate (Smith, 1776). In order to increase GDP 
growth rate, each section of the economy should work efficiently. Among these 
sections business sector, which includes companies and enterprises, is one of the 
important sectors that should work efficiently. The performance of the business 
sector is a big concern for authorities and policy makers. Different methods are 
employed to estimate the performance of this sector. Two important ones are: 
share prices and financial benefits of the businesses. The potential power of each 
firm to produce benefits and raise the share price indicates that the firm will 
perform well in future. This potential power is what investors take into account 
when making investment decisions. 
Quality of control and management in companies is evaluated by/through their 
corporate governance practices. Better corporate governance practices could help 
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companies to increase shareholders’ wealth. Besides the importance of corporate 
governance, cost of capital in each company indicates the efficiency of that 
company in working with capital. Therefore, a good firm performance reputation 
allied with reputable corporate governance and cost of capital structure is 
important for companies. Good reputation means more satisfied shareholders, 
which will guarantee the future financial flow of the company. 
Firms should have good financial performance in order to increase shareholders’ 
wealth. Therefore, managers and shareholders should take care of running issues 
in firms in order to establish a good performance reputation. Sometimes managers 
prefer to manipulate the performance data to cap the inefficiencies and enjoy the 
remunerations. Although firm performance plays a critical role in shareholders’ 
wealth, cost of capital has its own importance. The difference between firm 
performance and cost of capital is that companies have less incentive to 
manipulate data related to cost of capital rather than firm performance. The 
significant role of corporate governance in companies can be summarized in two 
categories: 1) corporate governance is significant because it reflects the quality of 
a firm’s governance. Corporate governance indicates topics that are related to the 
present and future of the firm and that is important for managers, shareholders and 
investors. 2) Corporate governance is significant because it affects the 
performance of the firm. Corporate governance is related to running issues of the 
firm including firm’s financial performance and cost of capital.  
Most studies on corporate governance and cost of capital are carried out in large 
developed economies like the US and UK. Some studies focused on small 
economies and clarified the relationship between corporate governance practices 
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and cost of capital (Andjekovic, 2002; Hossain, 2000). But, the shortcoming of 
these studies was the various economic structure and economic development plans 
in different countries. This difference prevents the results of previous studies to be 
easily adapted to small countries.  
U.S. and U.K. based studies indicate that value creating projects are more 
probable in companies with the best governance structures (Shleifer, 1997). Easier 
access to financial resources, lower cost of capital and better financial 
performance are some of the most important benefits of establishing efficient 
corporate governance practices in companies. Weak corporate governance 
practices lead to poor financial performance and consequently higher cost of 
capital. On a large scale, weak corporate governance leads to macroeconomic 
crisis. This could be due to pursuing riskier patterns in companies with weak 
corporate governance (S. Claessens, Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L, 2003). 
Ashbaugh (2004) indicates that agency costs rise when investors cannot determine 
the true value of the firm. These agency costs could occur because management 
quality is unclear. This situation leads to information asymmetry that creates an 
adverse selection problem. Therefore, shareholders will face higher information 
risk when there is lack of transparent financial information. Rational investors will 
implement different policies such as price-protecting against expected agency 
costs when there is lack of control, lack of effective monitoring and lack of 
transparent financial information. This investor behaviour will effectively raise 
the firm’s cost of capital. Corporate governance encompasses a broad spectrum of 
mechanisms intended to mitigate agency problems. These mechanisms increase 
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the monitoring of managers’ actions, limit managers’ opportunistic behaviour and 
reduce the information risk that shareholders face.  
Outcomes of this study become more significant when the present situation of 
corporate governance in New Zealand and Singapore are explored briefly. 
Singapore’s economy is dominated by larger companies compared to New 
Zealand’s economy which is dominated by small and medium sized companies. A 
small pool of directors is available in New Zealand. Lack of directors in New 
Zealand gives established directors the opportunity to serve on different boards. 
Keown (2009) indicates that some directors are engaged in four to ten different 
boards in New Zealand. When directors are on different boards, they can’t 
allocate sufficient time to each of them.  
In Singapore, 79% of companies have dual leadership structures while the average 
board size is about 7 (Y. T. Mak, Kusandi, Y, 2001). Different issues affect the 
outcomes of corporate governance practices such as: duality, relatively small 
board size, difficulties in removing ineffective directors because of their large 
ownership equity, family members’ involvement in the company and passive 
shareholders. These issues affect corporate governance in different ways that will 
be clarified in this study. 
Healy (2003) reports that foreign institutions and corporations hold 54% of equity 
in New Zealand listed companies while local institutions hold 15%. Bhabra 
(2007) indicates that this much foreign ownership will not lead to effective 
monitoring. International funds are more accessible in companies with higher 
international relations and this can positively affect cost of capital. Mak et al. 
(2001) reports block ownership in Singapore of 63%, which is relatively high in 
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comparison with many developed Western economies. Absence of banks in 
Singapore’s block ownership makes it different from block ownership in other 
economies. Absence of banks in Singapore companies is due to the Banking Act 
of 1970. According to this act, banks are not allowed to own a significant 
proportion of shares in Singapore companies. Mak et al.(2001) indicates that 
block holders in Singapore are mainly wealthy individuals, the government, and 
multinational and large domestic corporations. Ownership structure in Singapore, 
which includes a high proportion of government ownership, is one of the 
characteristics affecting the results of studies on corporate governance practices.   
Full disclosure of companies’ information is required in New Zealand based on 
the Companies Act 1993, especially information related to corporate governance. 
This information is accessible through a company’s annual report. Availability of 
such information makes this study possible and makes the results of this study 
more reliable. While the Companies Act of 1993 in New Zealand forces 
companies to have a higher level of disclosure, the Singapore market suffers from 
disclosure of a relatively less detailed nature.   
One of the criticisms of East Asian economies during the 1997 crisis was the low 
quality of disclosure and accounting standards. Singapore has one of the highest 
levels of disclosure in the region. But its disclosure and enforcement of 
accounting standards are not similar to most developed countries such as the US, 
UK and Australia (Phan, 2000). Investors are not interested in investing in 
companies with low level of disclosure quality. Therefore, low quality of 
disclosure restricts the accessible money to the company and increase the cost of 
capital. One of the main reasons for this shortcoming is that professional 
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accounting bodies set standard and enforcement in Singapore and they don’t face 
scrutiny from regulatory agencies. Another reason is the weakness of the 
Singapore Stock Market (SGX) in enforcing its own disclosure and listing rules 
because it has limited experience of being market regulator and market maker.  
Comparing large listed companies in New Zealand and Singapore is a good proxy 
to achieve interesting results about the role of corporate governance practices on 
cost of capital in different situations. Codes and principles for better corporate 
governance were introduced in 1992 and revised in 2004 in New Zealand. 
Enactment of these codes and regulations in Singapore goes back to post Asian 
Crisis era in 1997 when significant attempts were made to improve corporate 
governance practices in Singapore. Corporate governance dynamics in these 
economies is not well understood and needs further clarification.  
The role of corporate governance practices on cost of capital should be assessed 
periodically because of 1) enactment of new rules and regulations, 2) new 
situations that businesses and investors face and 3) new methods of calculation 
that promote continuously specially in calculating cost of capital. Study on the 
relationship between corporate governance practices and cost of capital in two less 
developed countries will help the investors, managers and policy makers to have a 
better understanding of the corporate governance role in companies. Each of these 
economies represents a unique economic situation.  
1.6 Organisation of this study 
The remainder of this thesis is organised in the next five chapters in the following 
manner. A review of corporate governance variables, their importance in New 
Zealand and Singapore along with cost of capital literature is undertaken in 
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chapter 2. As investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and cost of capital is not well developed in prior studies, this thesis 
builds on the platform of previous studies that focused on corporate governance 
practices and financial performance. The literature that does address aspects of the 
relationship between corporate governance practices and cost of capital are 
reviewed in chapter 2. Methods of measuring variables and data along with 
methodology undertaken for empirical analysis are explored in chapter 3. The 
metrics applicable to both explanatory and dependent variables are discussed. 
Chapter 4 examines the empirical results relating to the link between corporate 
governance practices and cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand. 
Chapter 5 is similar to chapter 4 covering material relating to Singapore. Chapter 
6 rounds out the thesis with coverage of the main conclusions drawn from the 
research, the contributions made to new knowledge, limitations, policy 
implications and future directions for governance research in the area of corporate 
governance and cost of capital. 
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
For many years academic members focused on the assessment of corporate 
governance practices on companies’ value. Adam Smith who cited as the father of 
modern economics indicates his concerns about separated ownership and control 
in 1977, as below: 
The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, 
being the managers rather of other people’s money than of 
their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from 
having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of 
such a company (Smith, 1776 & 1939 cited in Jensen & 
Meckling(1976)). 
Adam Smith believes that it is inefficient to have separate owners and managers. 
Smith indicates that in the case of separation between ownership and management, 
professional managers will not be interested in running the company efficiently. 
Smith indicates that owners of a company should employ control mechanisms to 
track managers’ behaviour to be sure of their performance. Berle and Means 
(1932) also focused on the separation of ownership and control. Berle and Means 
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believe that diffused ownership structures in modern and large corporations allow 
managers to take control of companies. Each shareholder in large corporation 
holds a relatively small proportion of the corporation’s value. These shareholders 
don’t have enough incentive to monitor the managers effectively. Different causes 
of this problem are: shortage of knowledge, lack of time and money. Small 
shareholders tend to ignore their monitoring role because of the costs of 
monitoring. Small shareholders prefer to pass the monitoring role to large 
shareholders and enjoy the benefits of large shareholders’ monitoring as free-
riders. Consequences of this attitude lead to uncontrolled managers and allow 
managers to focus on their own interests  (Berle, 1932).  
Adam Smith and Berle and Means indicate that separate owners and managers 
make the corporation less sustainable. Therefore, the main issue for companies is 
to find mechanisms that allow the owners to monitor the managers’ performance. 
These mechanisms are necessary so that companies can maintain a value 
maximizing attitude. Different approaches exist in finding the best control 
mechanism for dealing with separated owners and managers. Two of the most 
important ones are: 1) Some studies believe that tighter regulations lead the 
managers to be more responsible (Cary, 1974; Ruder, 1965). 2) New-classic 
economists rely on competition and believe that competition address shortcoming 
in the market. They believe that no interference is required in a competitive market 
situation. Thus, no more action is required by authorities. 
However there are some shortcomings prevent companies from reaching wealth 
maximising equilibrium. Different characteristics of the competitive market for 
disciplining managers to remind them take care of owners’ interests were 
highlighted by extant literature as follow: 1) product market competition (Stigler, 
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1958), 2) the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) and 3) labour market 
pressure (Fama, 1980). Competitive markets include shortcomings such as 
principal-agent problems and asymmetric information. These shortcomings are 
more important in some countries such as New Zealand and Singapore. These 
shortcomings reduce the available mechanisms for disciplining managers. Berle 
and Means (1932) believe that opportunistic behaviour of managers leads to 
expropriation of shareholders’ wealth. Expropriation of shareholders’ wealth may 
occur due to deficiencies in product, factor and capital. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that competition will reduce managers’ expropriation but is not sufficient to 
achieve better financial performance. 
Berle and Means (1932) and Williamson (1970) indicate that competition by itself 
cannot solve the problems of modern corporations in regard to managers’ 
performance, financing and corporate control. Academics and practitioners try to 
address market failure caused by competitiveness by implementing some degree of 
corporate control and regulations of company practices. Some studies believe that 
a strong regulatory and legal environment improves the market competitiveness 
(Shleifer, 1997). Therefore, other research focused on employment of other 
mechanisms to control managers’ behaviour. Agency-theoretic studies identified 
different internal and external mechanisms to control managers such as corporate 
governance. Shareholders can control the managers’ behaviour and agency costs 
through these tools and mechanisms (Becht, 2002; Shleifer, 1997).  
Corporate governance is the main topic that includes all company related issues. 
Different factors such as: laws, regulations, the companies’ own constitution and 
people who own the company and who are served by the company affect the 
governance principles and frameworks (Cadbury, 2003). Governance frameworks 
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vary widely from country to country. For example, large companies in Singapore 
have 11 board members on average but this figure in New Zealand is 7. Singapore 
is a larger market with more international relationships while New Zealand is 
relatively smaller and more local. Block owners in Singapore hold an average 
ownership of 72 per cent of the company while block owners in New Zealand hold 
49 per cent (Afkhami Rad, 2013). These statistics illustrate that the internal 
situation (history and culture) of each country affects the corporate governance 
situation (Cadbury, 2003). Therefore, factors such as: legal and financial 
environment determine the corporate governance characteristics. New Zealand as a 
more isolated economy with limited access to global financial resources is 
experiencing different corporate governance situation in compare with Singapore 
as a highly internationalised economy which well-known as the financial hob of its 
region.  
2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory concerns the difficulties in motivating one party (agent), to act in 
the best interests of another (principal) rather than in his own interests. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) demonstrate that shareholders(principals) and managers (agents) 
have different interests tend to focus on different issues. This divergence of 
interests leads to agency problems. Williamson (1970) introduced adverse 
selection and moral hazard as aspects of company practices that can lead to agency 
problems. Adverse selection problems create a gap between shareholders 
(principals) and managers (agents). This gap holds the shareholders back from 
knowing whether their managers work properly or not. Moral hazard problem 
indicates the opportunistic behaviour of managers. Managers tend to use their 
power to satisfy their own interests which are not necessarily in line with the 
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company’s interests. Thus, in order to control the agency problems, corporations 
will face higher costs and therefore shareholders are going to have wealth loss. 
One of the main reasons for increased agency costs in companies is that managers 
tend to abuse their power (Jensen, 1976). Denis (2001) believes that when 
managers have control over the company, they figure out procedures for 
expropriating company’s wealth. Divergence of interests between manager and 
shareholders let the manager focus on his/her interests. Denis (2001) indicates four 
sources of agency costs which are caused by lack of adequate contracts. These 
sources are: 1) managerial shirking and consumption of perquisites, 2) desire of 
managers to stay in power, 3) risk aversion of managers and 4) free cash flow.  
Therefore, agency costs limit the companies in maximising shareholders’ wealth. 
If a company is not performing well and weak management is the reason for this 
weakness, then the manager should be replaced. But, because of divergence of 
interests as noted above these managers are not interested in leaving the company. 
These shortcomings impose agency costs on the company that can limit the ability 
of the company in increasing wealth. Risk of investment is one of the 
shareholders’ and managers’ concerns. Shareholders require maximum return from 
their well-diversified portfolio; thus, they will invest in risky projects in order to 
have higher expected returns (Brealey, 1995). Managers impose higher costs to the 
company by ignoring shareholders’ interests in higher returns. Therefore, these 
kinds of managers are not the type of managers that shareholders prefer. And 
finally, managers control and allocate the company’s cash flow. Shareholders 
expect managers to invest free cash flows of the company in projects with positive 
net present value (NPV). But managers do not think exactly the same as 
shareholders. Prior studies indicate that managers are more concerned about the 
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size of the company than the return (Murphy, 1985). Most of the compensation 
plans of companies rely on the size of the company. Also managing a bigger 
company is more preferable for managers. Thus, this divergence of interests 
constrains agency costs in the company (Chalmers, 2006; Murphy, 1985; Shah, 
2009). 
It is evident that companies need to control their agency problem in order to 
manage their costs and operate more efficiently. They can do this by managing the 
principal-agent problem through different mechanisms. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) believe that shareholders can control managers’ performance by 
mechanisms that are either internal, such as insider ownership and board 
characteristics, or external, such as block holders ownership and legislation 
(Barnhart, 1998; Gedajlovic, 1998). The role of these internal and external 
mechanisms in companies’ value and cost of capital will be discussed in following 
sections. 
2.1.1 Ownership 
Studies on the relationship between ownership structure and performance of firms 
go back to 1932, when Berle and Means released the results of their study on US 
firms. They indicate that insider managers are less likely to perform well in 
companies with many small shareholders and diffused ownership. Following their 
study, in (1976), a more classical owner-manager agency problem was identified 
by Jensen and Meckling. They document that the presence of managers who own 
shares in a company will lead to an alignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Managers who own shares in a company are less likely to 
expropriate shareholders’ wealth, or to engage in external activities that harm 
companies’ profit.  
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Further studies conducted by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that large equity 
holders have strong incentives to monitor managers’ performance and 
consequently cut agency conflicts. Prowse (1994) also supports prior studies by 
stating that concentrated ownership in companies will mitigate the agency 
problems and cut agency costs. However ownership is not the only factor 
affecting corporate governance other determinants create the ownership structure. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) identify these determinants as: Value-maximizing size, 
control potential and systematic regulation. 
Value-maximizing size 
Larger firms have higher capital resources and consequently a given fraction of 
these firms have higher value. So by having a specified amount of money each 
shareholder will have a lower percentage of ownership in large companies 
compared to smaller companies. Large companies have a lower degree of 
concentrated ownership. So an inverse relation between firm size and ownership 
concentration exist in these companies. 
Control potential 
Control potential refers to the profit that is accessible through monitoring of 
managers by shareholders. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) point out that noisiness of 
the firm’s workplace environment directly affects the control potential of that 
firm. They assert that noisier environments require owners to maintain tighter 
control. Hence, noisier environments lead to more concentrated ownership 
structures. 
Systematic regulation 
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Systematic regulation will restrict the owners’ options by affecting the profit 
instability of the firm. In regulated firms some subsidized monitoring and 
disciplining are imposed on management through regulation.  These regulation 
effects reduce ownership concentration.  
The relationship between ownership structure, firm performance and cost of 
capital is not well documented yet because ownership structure, firm performance 
and cost of capital vary among countries. Some studies indicate that there is a 
direct relationship between ownership structure and firm performance (S. 
Claessens, Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L, 2003; Y. Hu, Zhou, X.,, 2008; Shleifer, 
1986). Other studies indicate a non-monotonic relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance (Davies, 2005; McConnell, 1995; Morck, 1988) 
and some other research indicates no relation between ownership structure and 
firm performance (Demsetz, 1985, 2001; Himmelberg, 1999). Lack of consensus 
in this area clarifies that the relationship between ownership structure and cost of 
capital needs to be more thoroughly investigated.  
In contrast to the literature on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance (Himmelberg, 1999; Morck, 1988), investigation of the 
relationship between ownership structure and capital structure has remained 
largely unexplored. In recent years, Brailsford et al. (2002), Short et al. (2002) and 
King and Santor (2008) investigated the relationship between ownership structure 
and capital structure in Australia, the UK and Canadian firms respectively. They 
find that family firms and firms with more block ownership have a higher 
leverage level. Among different types of ownership, insider ownership and block 
holder ownership are employed in this study. These types of ownership are more 
related to corporate governance issues. 
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2.1.1.1 Insider ownership 
Managers will behave differently when they own large portions of the firm. In this 
situation managers, shareholders and the whole firm have similar interests 
(Gugler, 2008). In companies with widely dispersed ownership, none of the 
outside shareholders have strong incentives to monitor managers. The same 
problem exists when managers do not own large proportions of the firm. These 
managers don’t have the same goals as shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
indicate a method to mitigate agency problems which arises from separation of 
ownership and control. They suggest that unified interests of shareholders and 
managers could cut agency problems. Jensen and Meckling believe that the 
creation of either financial or non-financial incentives for managers will unify the 
interests of managers and shareholders. In other words, they suggest that 
allocating shares to managers will align their interests with shareholders’ interests. 
Jensen and Meckling indicate a linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm financial performance.  
Mehran (1995) in his study of the US market reports a positive linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance. Different studies in 
different parts of the world support the linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. Welch (2003) in the Australian Stock Market 
(ASX) and Oswald and Jahera, Jr. (1991) in the New York and American Stock 
Market also found positive linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance as well. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) believe that there is a 
positive relationship between present value of shares owned by managers and 
companies’ performance. Hossain et al. (2001) report a positive linear relationship 
between proportion of shares owned by managers and financial performance in 
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the New Zealand market. Gelb (2000) indicates a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. 
Demsetz (1983) finds that there is a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and companies’ financial performance. He attributes this to the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers (entrenchment effect). Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) document a negative relationship between proportions of shares owned by 
managers and financial performance in the US market. Reddy et al. (2008a) find 
negative relationship between insider ownership and financial performance in 
New Zealand small cap companies. 
Beside studies that indicate a linear relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance, some studies express in the presence of non-linear 
relationships. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find two conflicting effects for 
insider ownership: (1) an alignment effect, (2) an entrenchment effect. The 
alignment effect indicates the alignment of financial interests between insiders 
and firm. This leads to a positive relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. The entrenchment effect deals with the likelihood of replacement 
through a proxy fight or takeover. This effect shows that higher insider ownership 
provides the incentive for managers to pursue their own goals. Entrenchment 
effect demonstrates that alignment of the managers and shareholders’ interests is 
not accessible because of the expropriation of minority shareholders (Johnson, 
2000; Shleifer, 1997).   
Some studies have found a negative relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance because of entrenchment effects (Demsetz, 1983; Fama, 1983b). 
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These studies indicate that entrenchment effect can increase the opportunistic 
behaviour of management at the expense of outside investors.  
However some studies indicate the presence of linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and performance (Demsetz, 1983; Jensen, 1976), other 
studies have different views. Some studies demonstrate that there is a quadratic 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance (Han, 1998; 
McConnell, 1990). These studies show that interests of managers and 
shareholders are aligned in primary levels of managerial ownership. In this view 
managers with low level of ownership are not interested in engaging in non-
maximising projects (alignment effect). Therefore, low insider ownership 
positively affects firm performance. However with high level of managerial 
ownership, managers become more interested in collecting private benefits and 
entrench they at the investors’ expense (entrenchment effect). At a higher level of 
insider ownership, the entrenchment effect prevents the alignment of interests 
between managers and shareholders and firm performance will decrease (Chen, 
1993; Griffith, 1999). McConnell and Servaes (1990) support this view in their 
empirical study by showing a curvilinear relationship between insider ownership 
and firms’ performance. They document that firm performance increases when 
insider ownership rise up to 40% – 50% (alignment effect). For managerial 
ownership of more than 40% – 50%, firm performance starts to decrease because 
of the entrenchment effect. However, Hossain et al. (2001) in New Zealand found 
no evidence of a curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance.  
A cubic relationship between insider ownership and firm performance is reported 
by prior studies (De Miguel, 2004; Short, 1999). These studies believe that 
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increasing insider ownership at primary level, converge the interests of managers 
and shareholders and consequently firm performance increases (alignment effect). 
This positive relationship exists up to the level where entrenchment effects 
mitigate managers’ performance. Divergence of interests between managers and 
owners happens at this point and consequently firm performance decreases. At 
higher levels of insider ownership interests of managers and shareholders align 
again and this overcomes the entrenchment effect and firm performance increases. 
So, managers will positively affect firm performance when they own a high 
proportion of a company. 
There is no clear relationship documented by prior studies of insider ownership, 
firm performance and cost of capital. Empirical studies provide some guidelines 
for this relationship. For instance, prior studies that document a cubic relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance introduce different values 
for this relationship. Two limits (values) where the directions of this cubic 
relationship change are different in each country and economy. For example these 
limits (values) are 5 per cent to 25 percent of insider ownership in the U.S. 
(Holderness, 1999) and 12 percent to 41 percent in the U.K. (Short, 1999). This 
means that in the US market, insider ownership of less than 5 percent negatively 
affects firm performance but insider ownership of more than 5 percent up to 25 
percent increases firm performance simultaneously. This happens because of the 
alignment effect. Insider ownership of more than 25 percent leads to the 
entrenchment effect that makes managers less concerned about shareholders’ 
wealth. That is the reason that insider ownership of more than 25 percent 
negatively affects firm performance in the US market. Insider ownership of less 
than 12 percent and more than 41 percent negatively affects UK firms’ 
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performance. But insider ownership between 12 per cent and 41 per cent 
positively affects firms’ performance.  
Agency theory suggests that firms with a low level of managerial ownership who 
operate on behalf of external shareholders may suffer from principal-agent 
problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). This low level of ownership gives managers the 
incentive to make decisions that maximize their own benefit at shareholders’ 
expense (Jensen, 1976). There are two reasons that would motivate managers to 
reduce shareholders’ wealth. 1) Engaging in short-run cost augmenting activities 
to reach the non-salary income. 2) Incentives to respond to their own needs, like 
power and prestige, by concentrating on maximizing the firms size or growth 
instead of profit (Gedajlovic, 2002). Brailsford et al. (2002) report that higher 
level of debt is employed at low level of managerial ownership because of agency 
conflicts. But a lower level of debt is employed in higher level of managerial 
ownership because of entrenchment effect. So, there is a nonlinear relationship 
between managerial ownership and leverage. In contrast, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) find no relation between insider ownership and leverage. In contrast to 
Anderson and Reeb, King and Santor (2008) report that family firms and firms 
that are controlled by financial institutions employ a higher level of debt.  
As the average of managerial ownership differs in different countries and in 
different periods its role on companies should investigates all the time. For 
example Phan (2000) documents a significant insider ownership in Singapore. He 
documents 21 per cent insider ownership in the Singapore market. This much 
insider ownership with regard to the high proportion of government presence in 
the Singapore market seems to be significantly high (Y. T. Mak, Li, Y, 2001). 
Average managerial ownership was 12 per cent in New Zealand in 2010. 
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2.1.1.2 Block holders 
Different elements affect the ownership structure of a firm. Capital market 
situations and regulations are two important issues that affect ownership structure. 
For instance, weak capital market, lack of anti-takeover regulations and weak 
protection rights for minority shareholders lead to a more concentrated ownership 
structure (Anderson, 2007; Gunasekarage, 2008). More concentrated shareholders 
can affect their companies in different ways. 
Different ideas exist about the relationship between ownership and firm 
performance. Berle and Means (1932) indicate that more diffused ownership 
negatively affects firm performance. in their support Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
document a positive relationship between block owners and firm performance. 
They believe that block holders have the incentive to collect information and 
monitor managers. Block owners can also affect firm performance through the 
voting control they hold. La Porta et al. (2002) also support prior studies by 
documenting a positive relationship between equity concentration and firm 
performance. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) indicate a positive relationship 
between block ownership and financial performance in Japanese firms.  
Grossman and Hart (1982) document a strong incentive for external block holders 
to control the opportunistic behaviour of managers. Besides, the positive role of 
block holders in firm performance that arise because of strong monitoring 
incentives and voting control, some issues prevent block holders from improving 
firm performance. The first one is the cost of monitoring. Monitoring managers 
and firm’s information has a cost for block owners and create a free riding 
situation for other shareholders. The second one is entrenchment Effect. Block 
owners can use their power to persuade managers to act for their benefit rather 
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than for other shareholders’ benefit. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate that 
block holders receive benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.    
Despite the large number of studies in this area, the literature does not document 
an obvious relationship between block holders ownership, firm performance and 
cost of capital. Cable and Yasuki (1985) document a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance in Japanese firms except keiretsus. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) also show a 
positive relation between firm performance and ownership concentration. 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) in Japan and Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) in the 
U.S. also support prior studies by demonstrating a positive linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. They believe that the 
monitoring role of block holders will control the managers’ behaviour and 
consequently improve the firm performance.  
In contrast some other studies indicate no relationship between block ownership 
and firm performance. Prowse (1992) finds no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and financial performance of Japanese firms either 
keiretsus or non-keiretsus. But in contrast to studies mentioned above Mudambi 
and Nicosia (1998) in the U.K. and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) in Germany 
found a negative linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. They believe that expropriation behaviour of block holders 
negatively affects the firm performance because block owners will try to have 
benefits at minority shareholders costs.  
Some studies document a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) in the U.S. and Miguel, 
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Pindado and La Torre (2004) in Spain predict a quadratic relationship between 
firm performance and ownership concentration. They indicate that when block 
owners hold a small amount of shares, there is a positive relationship between 
block holders and firm performance. Monitoring the role of block owners 
positively affects firm performance. In this case, block ownership will control the 
cost of capital. When block owners own a large amount of shares, there is a 
negative relationship between block owners and firm performance. The negative 
effect of block owners on firm performance is because of expropriation effect 
(entrenchment effect). 
Some studies document a cubic relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance. These studies indicate a cubic relationship which is an 
up/down/up relationship between performance and ownership concentration 
(Gugler, 2004; Short, 1999). Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) document that 
when block owners own low proportion of shares, there is a positive relation 
between block holder ownership and firm performance. This is because of block 
holders’ incentives to monitor managers’ performance. When the ownership of 
block owners passes a specific level there is a negative relationship between block 
ownership and firm performance. Expropriation behaviour of block holders 
(entrenchment effect) affects their performance negatively and as a consequence, 
their role in firm performance becomes negative. This happens because the 
ownership is not high enough to make block owners highly concerned about firm 
performance. But they still have the costs of monitoring. In high levels of block 
holders’ ownership, there is a positive relation between block holders and firm 
performance. In this situation they have more incentive to monitor firm 
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performance because their wealth is highly tied to the firms’ performance. So they 
will accept the costs of monitoring in order to protect their wealth. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) show that firms with large external block holders tend 
to have a higher debt ratio to the point that the risk of bankruptcy forces them to 
stop. Anderson et al. (2003) find this also to be the case for family firms. They 
believe that family firms employ debt to a level that they perceive to be less risky. 
If managerial block holders decide to protect non-diversifiable human capital and 
firm’s wealth, there will be a negative relationship between leverage and insider 
ownership (Friend, 1988). Although expropriating minority shareholders may still 
exist in family firms (S. Claessens, Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang, L, 2003; 
Villalonga, 2006), family firms with large personal share ownership perform 
better than non-family firms (King, 2008; Maury, 2006; Villalonga, 2006). 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) show that family firms perform better during crisis and 
their tendency to bankruptcy is less than other firms (s. Claessens, Djankov, S., 
Leora, Klapper.,, 2003). 
Singapore has more concentrated ownership and significant government 
ownership (Y. T. Mak, Li, Y, 2001). La Porta et al. (1996) indicate a high 
proportion of block holders ownership in Singapore. They document that block 
owners own almost 60% of companies in Singapore. One of the biggest block 
holders in Singapore is the government which owns more than 20% of the 10% of 
listed firms in Singapore (Y. T. Mak, Li, Y, 2001). Previous studies indicate that 
the positive relationship between block holder ownership and firm performance is 
because block owners have better monitoring of managers’ performance (Kaplan, 
1994; Shivdasani, 1993). Mak and Li (2001) argue that because of  the absence of 
hostile takeovers in Singapore, block holders hardly improve corporate 
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governance and firm performance by facilitating takeovers.  Thus, block holders 
can improve monitoring by acquiring better information about managers and 
excluding poor managers.  
2.1.2 Corporate Governance 
Companies employ different control mechanisms to minimise the problems of 
divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. The private sector 
employs control mechanisms in capital markets,  product and factor markets, legal 
systems, political and regulatory systems, and boards of directors as internal 
control systems (Jensen, 1993). But different mechanisms are employed in the 
public sector. Dyck and Wruck (1999) found three areas  need these mechanisms 
in the public sector. These three areas are: allocation of decision rights, 
performance measurements and reward systems. 
In contrast to prior studies, Fama and Jensen (Fama, 1983a, 1983b) believe that 
separation of management and control in a company helps the company in 
controlling the agency costs. They believe that the management section 
implements the decisions while the control section is involved in monitoring the 
decisions. Thus, while managers are implementing the various decisions, the 
board of directors monitor the managers’ performance and replace poor managers. 
The board of directors is also responsible to shareholders. This method of 
governance is the best method among other internal and external mechanisms in 
aspects of costs and efficiency. A brief summary of corporate governance 
characteristics will be discussed in the following lines. 
Different studies investigate the effectiveness of the board of directors in 
companies but lack of consensus still exists in this area. Most of these studies 
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found a positive role of outside directors in increasing a firm’s value (Fama, 1980, 
1983b). Talmor and Wallance (2000) support this idea by demonstrating that 
outside directors seek to enhance their own reputations through cutting the CEO’s 
compensation. In contrast, the alternative opinion is that outside directors are not 
as independent in their own monitoring as it seems due to managers overseeing 
the selection or reappointment of them (Hermalin, 1998). Other studies points out 
the high tendency of removing poor performed CEOs by outside directors in 
comparison with inside directors (Weisbach, 1988). Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
show that a board of directors which is dominated by outside directors give more 
benefit to shareholders in tender decisions, management buyouts and poison pill 
adoptions (Brickley, 1994; Lee, 1992). Beasley (1996) supports prior studies by 
showing an inverse relationship between fraud and number of outside directors. In 
contrast, some studies have rejected the relationship between outside directors, 
long-term performance and firm value (Agrawal, 1996; Hermalin, 1991; Klein, 
1998). A number of highlighted characteristics of boards of directors will be 
discussed in the following parts.  
2.1.2.1 Board Size 
Prior studies demonstrate that the number of directors in boards is an important 
factor in corporate governance (Jensen, 1993; Lipton, 1992; Reddy, 2008a), while 
some other studies reject the relationship between board size and firm 
performance (Juran, 1966). Although it is difficult to find an optimal size for 
every company, Jensen (1983) suggests that seven to eight board members is the 
effective size for each board.  
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) believe that larger board size decreases the productivity 
of firms, because agreement with the CEO becomes more difficult when boards 
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are large. Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Hackman (1990) support Lipton and 
Lorsch by demonstrating that large boards are difficult to coordinate and free 
riding is common among these boards. They also believe that large boards have a 
problem with making value-maximizing decisions. Yermack (1996) asserts prior 
studies by indicating a negative relationship between board size and firm value. 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) support Yermack’s result in their study of 
Finnish firms.  
In contrast, some articles propose that larger board size will increase firm 
performance. Supporters of large boards believe that larger boards are more 
capable of monitoring  top management’s performance, because it is more 
difficult for CEOs to dominate a larger number of directors (Zahra, 1989).. Singh 
and Harianto (1989) also believe that unifying the boards’ ideas is difficult for a 
CEO when difficult decisions regarding shareholders wealth are being made. 
Proponents of larger boards employ the resource dependency theory in their 
discussions. Based on resource dependency theory larger boards organise a 
greater pool of expertise and environmental linkage that the company requires for 
growth (Dalton, 1999; Hillman, 2000). Zahra and Pearce (1989) also demonstrate 
that large boards will monitor the managers more effectively. They believe that a 
CEO cannot control large boards easily. Fox (1995) also shows that there is a 
positive relationship between board size and the financial performance in New 
Zealand firms. He indicates that larger boards display a better financial 
performance. 
Adding to this line of thought, Pfeffer and Salancick (1978) and Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) found a significant relationship between capital structure and board 
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size. In their support Berger et al. (1997) believe that firms with more board 
members have low leverage or debt ratios. They assume that larger board size 
translates into strong pressure from the corporate board to make managers pursue 
lower leverage to increase firm performance. Wen et al. (2002) also show that 
there is a positive relationship between board size and capital structure. Anderson 
et al. (2004) show that in firms with larger boards, the cost of debt is lower 
because these firms have more effective monitors of the financial processes.  
In contrast to proponents of large board size, some studies show that small boards 
have the ability to make timely strategic decisions (Goodstein, 1994; Judge, 
1992). Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) demonstrate that the role of board 
size is assessable through two different perspectives, the first one is resource 
dependence and the second one is strategic decision-making. Results of their 
study in these two perspectives indicate that larger boards benefit from the 
resource-dependence perspective while they are not efficient in strategic decision-
making perspective. Thus Goodstein suggests that small boards are more effective 
than large boards. Yermack (1996) also finds a negative relationship between 
board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large US firms over the period 1984-
1991. Eisenberg et al. (1998) find a similar relationship in their study. Hossain et 
al. (2001) support prior studies by finding a negative relationship between board 
size and firm performance in New Zealand. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998) find the same results in small and medium sized companies in Finland.  
Beside the studies that demonstrate the relationship between board size, 
companies’ performance and cost of capital some studies suggest that an optimal 
board size should exist for companies (Jensen, 1993; Lipton, 1992). They 
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recommend that seven to eight people on the board is the optimal board size. Both 
of these studies document that it is easier for a CEO to control a large board, and 
such boards can become less effective. Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) 
and Linck, Netter and Yang (2006) also demonstrate that the skills of directors 
along with the skills required by the company should be considered in selecting 
directors. They believe that there is an optimal board size for each company 
according to its nature and situation. Reddy et al. (Reddy, 2008a, 2008b) in their 
study in New Zealand find that the average board size ranged between six to eight 
members. Singaporean companies also accept this type of board and mention that 
effective boards have seven or eight members (small boards). Singaporean 
companies believe that large boards are easier for CEO’s to control (Phan, 2000). 
2.1.2.2 CEO Duality 
CEO duality means that the same person has the CEO hat and is chairperson of 
the board and non-duality implies different people hold these positions. Baliga, 
Moyer and Rao (1996) document that regarding the limited empirical evidences, 
CEO duality is the reason for poor performance and failure of firms. They 
summarize the results of their study in three points: (1) firm’s duality status is not 
important to the market; (2) duality status doesn’t affect the firm’s operating 
performance; (3) weak relationship exists between CEO duality and long-term 
performance after accounting for other affecting variables on firm performance. 
Different studies indicate that a board can’t perform its legitimate governance role 
when it is dominated by the CEO (Dalton, 1985; Molz, 1988). 
Different studies indicate different relationships between duality and firm 
performance and lack of consensus exists in this area. Mallette and Fowler (1992) 
find that firms with separate CEO and chairperson have perform better in the US 
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market. Previous studies point out that firms with higher agency problems tend to 
employ more outside directors, dual leadership and have larger boards (Goodstein, 
1994; Judge, 1992; Mak, 2000). But, Kesner, Victor and Lamont (1986) find no 
statistical relationship between leadership duality and commission of illegal acts 
by Fortune 500 companies. 
In contrast, supporters of duality argue that superior firm performance is the result 
of CEO duality. They believe that CEO duality cuts leadership strategy 
formulation and implementation purposes (Anderson, 1986). Baliga, Moyer and 
Rao (1996) report four positive points for CEO duality as below: (1) non-duality 
situation dilutes CEO’s power to effectively lead the firm and increase the 
discrepancy between actions and decisions of management and board; (2) duality 
prevents the creation of competition between CEO and board chairperson; (3) in 
non-duality situations, firms could suffer from the existence of two public 
spokesmen; (4) if a CEO feels that the board will perennially second guess his 
actions it can limit innovation and entrepreneurship.  
One possible reason of lack of consensus is that performance measurements differ 
between studies. For example, Pi and Timme (1993) and Rechner and Dalton 
(1991) employ accounting as a measure of performance like return of investment 
or return on equity and find a positive role for non-duality. But, Changati, 
Mahajan and Sharma (1985) employ firm bankruptcy/survival as firm 
performance and find a positive role for duality in firm performance. None of 
these studies control industry effects or other offsetting governance factors and 
this can be another reason for having mixed results. 
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Most articles argue that separation of CEO and chairman can improve the 
performance of the firm by clarifying the CEO behaviour. Fama and Jensen 
(1983b) show that decision management (CEO) has the right to initiate and 
implement new proposals for the expenditure of the firm’s resources. And 
decision control (chairman) has the right to confirm and monitor those proposals. 
Preventing an insider from having decision management and decision control 
authority over the same proposal, leads to a series of checks and balances in the 
firm. These checks and balances make the situation more difficult for insider 
managers to engage in any type of opportunistic behaviour. Boards of directors 
should not be under the control of the CEO because boards have the highest level 
of decision control in a firm. As the chairman has the greatest influence on the 
board’s actions, separation of decision management and decision control is 
compromised when the chairman of the board is also the CEO. Fama and Jensen 
(Fama, 1983a, 1983b) also demonstrate that separation of management and 
control in the decision-making process reduces the agency cost. Management 
refers to initiation and implementation of decisions while control refers to 
ratification and monitoring of the decisions. According to Fosberg (2004), firms 
with a separated CEO and chairman should be more likely to employ the optimal 
amount of debt in their capital structure than firms with the same CEO and 
chairman. 
Having the same person with too much control over the board and managers 
creates different problems, for example: lower levels of effort, lower level of 
conflicts and lower level of usage of knowledge and skills on the board and in 
management (Wan, 2005). Opponents of duality believe that: (1) duality in a firm 
negatively affects board independence and prevents the board from monitoring 
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and establishing governance roles (Fizel, 1990; Millstein, 1992); (2) surviving in a 
competitive environment requires separation of decision management and control 
management (Fama, 1983b); (3) duality leads to long term organisational drift by 
affecting the honesty of insecure directors in evaluating firm performance (Carver, 
1990).  
In contrast, supporters of duality argue that duality leads to better firm 
performance as it permits clear-out leadership for purposes of strategy formulation 
and implementation (Anderson, 1986). CEOs who support this position indicate 
that non-duality would: (1) reduce their power to provide effective leadership in 
the company. This could happen through increasing the possibility that actions 
and expectations of management and the board are at odds with each other 
(Alexander, 1993); (2) create the potential for competition between chairperson 
and CEO; (3) create confusion as a result of the existence of two public 
spokesmen, the chairperson and the CEO; (4) limit innovation and 
entrepreneurship if the CEO feels that the board will perennially second guess his 
or her actions (Baliga, 1996). 
There are some other ideas in this area that indicate there is no relation between 
CEO duality and firm performance. Kesner, Victor and Lamont (1986) document 
no relationship between CEO duality and performance of board. Evidence from a 
study of short-run performance of firms in the US market also shows that these 
firms are indifferent to changes in a firm’s duality status (Baliga, 1996). Chen et 
al. (2008) support this idea by documenting that although firms may change their 
leadership structure (from duality to non-duality or vice versa), there is no 
evidence of improvement in performance. Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) also find 
no evidence that CEO duality is purposely chosen to optimise firm performance.  
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2.1.2.3 Board Composition 
The main purpose of boards is monitoring. Empirical studies indicate that the 
degree of effective monitoring is directly related to the degree of independency of 
boards (John, 1998). Based on this fact independency of boards becomes 
increasingly important and the number of outside directors plays a significant role 
in boards’ performance (Zahra, 1989). Outside directors have enough incentive to 
monitor managers because their own reputations depend on it and also improve 
their human capital. Prevost, Rao and Hossain (2002b) also find an inverse 
relationship between the proportion of outside board members and commitment to 
capital expenditure (a proxy for growth). They also find a positive relationship 
between the proportion of outside board members, firm performance and board 
size. Provest, Rao and Hossain demonstrate that the proportion of outsiders on 
boards in the New Zealand market increased after the passage of the 1993 
Companies Act and related legislations. In this regard the New Zealand Securities 
Commission (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004) published principles 
and guidelines for all New Zealand companies to have a high proportion of 
outside directors on their boards. This commission asked the companies to 
allocate one third of their board to outside directors.  
In support to prior studies, Wan and Ong (2005) indicate that outside directors are 
more likely to show independency in their roles and duties. They indicate that 
outside directors are willing to improve effort norms of the board, because they 
prefer to show that the board is doing a good job. A high proportion of outside 
directors on the board presumed to be more conducive to the firm’s mission, goals 
and strategies. Wan and Ong (2005) also believe that outside directors bring more 
skills and knowledge to the company, because unlike the insiders who are well-
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versed in their working relationships, outside directors have different backgrounds 
from different organisations and are unsure about the procedures and 
unacquainted with the inside directors. Mak and Roush (2000) also find a positive 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and growth opportunities 
of the firm.  
Different studies investigate the role of outside directors on financial performance 
and cost of capital. But the outcomes of these studies indicate mixed and 
inconclusive results about the relationship between outside directors, firm 
performance and cost of capital. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
argue that it is impossible to find a relationship between outside directors and 
performance when outside directors and inside directors are optimally weighted or 
if they reduce the agency problems to the same level. Different studies support the 
presence of outside directors in different aspects such as removing the CEO in 
poorly performing firms (Weisbach, 1988), substitution of takeover restrictions 
(Brickley, 1987), in tender bidding situations (Byrd, 1992) and in management 
buyout situations (Lee, 1992).  
In this regard, Ashbaugh et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between the 
cost of equity and the independence of a board, the percentage of the board who 
own stock, the proportion of shares owned by directors, and managerial power, as 
proxies for the shareholder rights level. Fama and Jensen (1983b) explain that a 
board should include inside and outside directors. While the insiders have 
technical capabilities and good knowledge about the firm, outsiders participate in 
the strategic decisions of the firm and may add value by offering relevant 
complementary knowledge.  
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Weisbach (1988) also reports that outside directors of the US firms play a more 
important role in monitoring management than inside directors. In his support 
Block (1999) suggests that outside directors can accomplish their duty as monitors 
in the market by reacting favourably to the appointment of outside directors. This 
could happen when strong monitoring practices did not exist previously. 
Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996) also find that outside CEOs increase 
shareholders’ benefit, but replacing them with insider CEOs will harm 
shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, a widely held view is that boards are more 
effective in monitoring management when there is a strong base of independent 
directors on the board (Fitchratings, 2004).  
In this regard, Dahya et al. (2008) report a positive relationship between firm 
performance and the proportion of outside directors. Wintoki et al. (2010) also 
find a strong positive relationship between board structure and past performance 
of the firm, while they find no significant relationship between board structure 
and current firm performance. Phan (2000) demonstrates that outside directors 
play a critical role in Singapore’s companies. He mentions that a larger proportion 
of outside directors could make the company work more efficiently. In New 
Zealand market, Fox (1995) suggests that a larger proportion of outside directors 
could lead to better financial performance. 
In contrast to prior studies, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no relationship 
between board composition and firm performance. They illustrate that there is an 
optimal weight between insiders and outsiders according to the particular situation 
of each firm. Thus, no relationship between board composition and performance 
could be detected in equilibrium. Baysinger and Butler (1985) also demonstrate a 
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weak relationship between outside directors, return on equity. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) also find a negative relationship between the number of outside 
directors and firm performance through a simultaneous estimation. They explain 
that board of directors may expand for different reasons such as political reasons 
(politicians, environmental activists, etc.), so these boards will not necessarily add 
value to the firm. Same situation exist in UK market. Outside directors in the UK 
have fewer obligations compared to the US. These directors primarily have an 
advisory role. So no evidence of relationship is detected between outside directors 
and firm performance (Franks, 1999). Another study by Lawrence and Stapledon 
(1999) also finds no consistent evidence that independent directors add to or 
detract firm value in Australian market. In this regard some studies indicate that 
firm-specific knowledge and expertise are unavailable to outside directors. Thus, 
inside directors who have this knowledge improve the firm performance and 
positively affect the firm (Baysinger, 1990; Hoskisson, 1994). 
Other studies demonstrate different views about outside directors. For example, 
Wagner, Stimpert and Fubrara (1998) find a significant correlation between 
outside directors and firm performance but they also find a positive relationship 
between inside directors and firm performance. They conclude that a higher 
presence of either outside or inside directors leads to better performance. In their 
empirical study, Dalton, Daily, Elstrand and Johnson (1998) find little evidence of 
any relationship between board composition and firm performance. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) also try to find the reasons for leaving and joining a board. They 
indicate that when a CEO nears retirement more inside directors join the board, 
maybe in order to prepare a wider range of choices for the new CEO. They also 
find that after appointing the CEO, insiders with short tenures depart from the 
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board and outside directors are more likely to join the board after a firm performs 
poorly.  
As expressed in previous paragraphs, there are different ideas about the 
relationship between board composition, firm performance and cost of capital. 
Inconclusiveness of prior studies about this relationship leads this study to work 
on the issue. The majority of literature on board composition is based on countries 
with unitary boards, while the role of board composition in countries with 
compound board structure remains mainly unexplored. 
2.1.2.4 Board Diversity 
Institutional investors and shareholders have increased the pressure on firms to 
increase the proportion of female directors. They believe that gender diversity on 
boards will improve the decision making process (Useem, 1993).  Some positive 
points of diversity on board are: 1) it creates an atmosphere that prompts 
divergent thinking, 2) it leads to change or expands the criteria used to evaluate 
strategic alternatives and 3) diversity leads others to rethink the assumptions that 
implicitly guide their reasoning (Hitt, 1991). In their support, Rosen and Lovelace 
(1991) report that boards with female directors have higher sales growth rates. 
Reddy et al. (2008a) also find a positive role for board diversity in small cap listed 
companies in New Zealand. 
In this regard Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have a 
significant positive effect on firm performance. They find that female directors 
have better attendance records than male directors and also more likely to join 
monitor committees. In particular, female directors are interested in being 
56 
 
assigned to audit, nominating, and corporate governance committees. They 
conclude that gender-diverse boards have better monitoring records.  
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) support prior studies by documenting a 
positive relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. They list the 
advantages of diversity in boards as follows: 1) improving the understanding of 
the market place, 2) increasing the creativity and innovation and 3) its effective 
role in solving company’s problems. Westphal and Zajac (1997) show that there is 
a growing trend towards employing female directors in US corporations.  
The most common responsibility of directors is to monitor management but they 
serve in resource-dependence roles as well. Essential resources, or secure 
resources, will be provided for the firm by directors through linkage to the 
external environment (Hillman, 2000; Johnson, 1996; Pearce, 1992).   
Four key benefits that arise from environmental linkage of the board are: 1) 
variety of advice because of variety of experiences and backgrounds, 2) 
connecting the information channel between firm and outside organisations, 3) 
providing commitment from important elements outside the firm, and 4) 
legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1978). Legitimacy plays an important role in selection of 
boards but it is not the only reason for choosing female directors on boards. 
Bilmoria and Piderit (1994) indicate that female directors are commonly 
employed on important board committees besides taking part on boards. So 
legitimacy is not the only reason for choosing female directors.  
But the present situation of board diversity is not satisfactory as Catalyst (2007) 
reports that the proportion of women on board is still low. Women held 14.8% of 
Fortune 500 board seats in 2007. The percentage of female directors in Australia, 
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Canada, Japan and Europe is similar at 8.7%, 10.6%, 0.4%, and 8% respectively 
((EOWA), 2006). Boards of directors and firms around the world are under 
increasing pressure to choose more female directors, therefore, the present 
situation regards female directors is likely to change.  
The British Department of Trade and Industry also documents that the presence of 
females on boards enhance board effectiveness (Higgs, 2003). Swedish authorities 
have threatened companies with enforced gender diversity as a legal requirement 
if firms don’t employ a minimum of 25% of females on their boards. Norway has 
the most extreme proportion of female employment which is about 40% since 
January 2008. Spain also passed a law stating that firms have to have 40% female 
directors on their board by 2015.  
This legislation and voluntary employment of women has happened based on a 
view that female directors positively affect the companies’ performance. One 
argument is that women directors do not belong to the “old boys club” so they can 
correspond to the concept of the independent director. Another argument is that 
boards can benefit from a bigger pool of talent by having diversity.     
In contrast, some studies indicate that greater gender diversity on boards can 
decrease firm performance. These studies believe that too much monitoring from 
female directors negatively affect firm performance (Adams, 2007; Almazan, 
2003). Thus, the positive effect of gender diversity occurs when additional board 
monitoring would enhance firm value (Adams, 2009). 
Based on the literature, suggestions about the relationship between board 
diversity, firm performance and cost of capital are inconclusive and mixed. This 
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study is going to investigate the role of board diversity in New Zealand and 
Singapore companies. 
2.1.2.5 CEO tenure 
CEO tenure refers to the years that the CEO remains in his or her position. 
Decisions of the CEO have an impact on the performance of the firm. So having 
more experience will help the CEO to perform better. A more experienced CEO 
will have a better understanding of the markets, firm, its employees and all issues 
surrounding company operations. Therefore, empirical evidence suggests a 
negative relationship between the tenure of CEO and leverage.  
But the important point is that CEOs may be interested in maximizing their own 
wealth and consequently focus on their private return. This may create conflict of 
interests between shareholders and CEOs. In particular, most researchers believe 
that CEOs are interested in establishing an empire by investing the cash flows in 
projects that yield returns below the cost of capital in order to increase the size 
and scope of their firms (Jensen, 1976).  
Simsek (2007) indicates that the relationship between CEO tenure and firm 
performance is much more complex than it was thought originally. Short tenured 
CEOs may negatively affect performance because they may suffer from lack of 
sufficient awareness to notice and assess strategic risks and also they are unknown 
and untested. Long tenured CEOs accumulate a track record, achieve more 
information and knowledge about the firm’s environment and acquire specific 
skills required for that job.  
But at the same time different circumstances enable long tenure CEOs to 
influence board members. CEOs normally nominate new board members and by 
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doing this they can replace troublesome members with new ones. So, new board 
members, who owe their position to CEOs, are more loyal to them rather than to 
other shareholders and consequently can’t evaluate the CEO’s performance 
effectively (Finkelstein, 1989). Another reason is that older CEOs are able to 
control the firms’ internal information systems. This helps them to withhold 
relevant information from compensation committee and board members and cover 
poor performances (Hill, 1991).  
In this regard, some studies mention the entrenchment of CEOs as the reason for 
weak relationships between firm performance and turnover (Hill, 1991; Morck, 
1988). Required period that boards take to learn about the CEOs true ability may 
be another reason for low turnover (Gibbons, 1992). In their support, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998) find that board independence declines over the period of a 
CEO’s tenure. This may lead to more entrenchment in the CEO’s behaviour. 
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) also argue that board members are more lenient 
regarding poor performance of new CEOs. Thus, a specific level of CEO’s 
performance which is acceptable in the primary stages will not be acceptable in 
later stages.  
Long tenured CEOs can negatively affect firm performance by becoming more 
committed to their paradigm, avoiding information that disconfirms this 
paradigm, losing interest in their jobs and ignoring calls for strategic changes 
(Hambrick, 1991). Besides that, long tenured CEOs have enough time to build up 
considerable human capital. Miller (1991) also finds a negative relationship 
between firm strategies, structures, environmental demand and long-tenured 
CEOs. He believes that long tenured CEOs cause strong inertia that can create 
serious problems in a firm. Shen and Cannella (2002) support prior studies by 
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finding a negative relationship between  a long-tenured CEO and post succession 
operational performance.   
But, Simsek (2007) finds an inverse U-shape relationship between CEO tenure 
and firm performance. He believes that in the primary stages of a CEO’s tenure, 
firm performance increases and in later stages a CEO can negatively affect firm 
performance. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) also document that new CEOs may 
have insufficient knowledge to run the firm perfectly but they learn about their 
jobs and firms steadily. Thus an inverted U-shape relationship exists in the 
relation between CEO tenure and firm performance. This means that in primary 
stages, lack of required knowledge may affect CEO performance, but in later 
stages achieving required knowledge compensates the loss in primary stages. 
Miller (1991) also argues that although CEOs get familiar with their environment 
during their early years, they lose their touch and become stale as their tenure 
endures. During time, CEOs surround themselves with like-minded executives 
who support the CEO’s entrenched ideas (Hambrick, 1995). In their support, 
Miller and Shamsie (2001) find that firm performance increases for the first 8-10 
years of CEOs tenure and declines after that. Henderson, Miller and Hambrick 
(2006) document an inverted U-shape relationship between CEO tenure and firm 
performance as well. They find that firm performance increases during the first 
ten years of CEO tenure but it declines in years after this point.   
Allgood and Farrell (2000) indicate that the effect of entrenchment and learning 
are different when the CEO is an outsider, insider or a founder. When outside 
CEOs are hired they do not affect the board but it is assumed that they need 
several years to become entrenched. In this case, firm performance decreases with 
CEO tenure. When CEOs are hired from within an organization they may already 
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have their relationship with board members and consequently, may be entrenched 
from the beginning of their tenure. But if the inside CEO is hired and does not 
affect the board positively, it is assumed that his/her tenure does not lead to 
entrenchment. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) also find that founder CEOs are 
more likely to get involved in director appointments. This implies that founding 
CEOs have more entrenchment characteristics in their early tenure.  
Among different points of views, Berger et al.(1997) and Wen et al.(2002) 
indicate that the tenure of the CEO is negatively related to leverage. But, 
Grossman and Hart (1983) indicate that the conflict between shareholders and 
CEO can be solved by tying the compensation of CEO to firm’s stock return 
through a contract. Empirical evidence of assessing this strategy document mixed 
results. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1985, 1986) document a positive 
relationship between stock return and CEO pay. But, Benston (1985) and Kerr and 
Bettis (1987) find no relationship between stock return and CEO pay. Hill and 
Phan (1991) argue that longer tenure CEOs make CEOs more entrenched and 
guide them to use their power to pursue their own interests. In particular, a longer 
period enables CEOs to dominate their board of directors and demand a 
compensation package that caters to their preferences more than shareholders’ 
preferences. 
Lack of consensus in prior studies about the role of CEO tenure in companies 
guides this study to investigate the relationship between CEO tenure and cost of 
capital in large listed companies in New Zealand and Singapore. 
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2.2 Corporate Governance in New Zealand 
New Zealand experienced a series of economic reforms during 1984-1990. These 
reforms took place in order to improve the unacceptable level of poverty, housing 
difficulties and health care (Dalziel, 2002; ESC, 1984). Dalziel (2002) 
demonstrates that New Zealand was successful in improving microeconomic 
efficiency, price stability and fiscal balance. But he believes that all reforms were 
not successful in New Zealand. Evans (2009) supports Dalziel’s idea and finds a 
decline in the domestic equity market to GDP growth in New Zealand during 
1996 to 2007 in comparison with other countries, such as Australia, Denmark and 
Singapore. Evans (2009) reports that the size of New Zealand listed companies 
was constant. But, companies in other countries kept increasing in size. 
La Porta et al. (1997) report that the size of capital market in countries with poor 
investor protection is smaller than countries with high investor protection. Evans, 
Quigley and Counsell (2009) indicate that New Zealand has the weakest private 
property rights among OECD countries. They indicate that lack of foreign owned 
companies in New Zealand could be the reason for this shortcoming.  
Choosing New Zealand as an example in this study provides the opportunity to 
examine the effects of new rules and legislations on companies. New legislation 
was designed in New Zealand to increase the monitoring efficiency in companies. 
This efficiency is achievable through increasing the responsibilities of board 
members. So, the passage of the 1993 Companies Act and related legislation 
caused an increase in the proportion of outside directors on boards. This means 
that the firms’ response to the legislation comes through increasing outside 
directors in order to enhance the monitoring efficiency. 
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In this regard, Prevost et al. (2002b) demonstrate that New Zealand’s companies 
suffer from lack of effective corporate governance practices. These effective 
practices are: majority of outside directors and separated CEOs and chairmen in 
New Zealand before late 1980s. Presence of large shareholders in New Zealand 
was another sign of inadequate protection rights in New Zealand (La Porta, 2002). 
These issues reflect the unsatisfactory situation of New Zealand in protection of 
investors, and corporate governance practices (Godfrey, 2003).     
Different aspects of good corporate governance, like presence of a majority of 
outside directors on boards and separated CEOs and chairmen are commonly 
accepted in big markets like the US, the UK and Australia. But, executive 
director-shareholder with a controlling ownership stake and CEO duality were 
characteristics of the New Zealand market before the 1987 stock market crash 
(Hunt, 1994; Mackey, 1993). After 1987 crash, a majority of non-executive 
directors were appointed to boards. In 1989 the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSE) initiated tougher disclosure and corporate governance listing rules. In this 
regard, the Companies Act 1993 asks for a majority of independent directors on 
New Zealand boards. However, decision about the number of outside directors is 
left to companies.  
The Securities Market Act in 1988 points out the eligibility of immediate 
disclosure of trades by company directors and officers. New Zealand companies 
understood the important role of proper governance practices after this reform. 
Some of these companies disclose their corporate governance practice in their 
annual reports voluntarily (Lindsay, 1998). Finally, The Financial Reporting Act 
of 1993 requires disclosure of financial information to shareholders. Thus, in the 
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1990s New Zealand experienced a notable evolution in corporate governance 
practices. Other countries had this evolution earlier (Prevost, 2002a).  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ), the Securities 
Commission (NZSC) and the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) published 
principles and guidelines concerning corporate governance practices for New 
Zealand companies after 2001. Nine high level guidelines and principles which 
were published by them are: balance of composition of boards, ethical behaviour, 
effective board committees, integrity in reporting, good remuneration policy, risk 
management processes, independence of auditors, constructive relationship of 
shareholders, and significance of other stakeholders in a governance context (New 
Zealand Securities Commission, 2004). Although these guidelines are not 
compulsory, all of the listed corporate entities are asked to implement the 
guidelines completely. 
A strong focus of corporate governance guidelines in New Zealand is on 
monitoring and control leaves critics to argue about the efficiency of these 
guidelines. The critics believe that this much focus on monitoring and control 
prevents the boards from focusing on value creating activities. Regarding the 
compliance of these guidelines in some companies little has been mentioned about 
the effects it has.  
Studies on corporate governance practices in New Zealand have focused on issues 
such as board composition, board size (Firth, 1987; Fogelberg, 1974) and CEO 
duality as well (Turner, 1985). Fox (1996) shows that the size of boards declined 
during the period from 1962 to 1993. Hossain, et al. (2001) assess the relationship 
between outside directors and companies’ financial performance before and after 
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the Companies Act of 1994. In their support, Prevost, Rao and Hossain (2002a) 
find that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors and debt leverage. They also find a relationship between the proportion 
of outside directors and profitability of New Zealand companies. In contrast to 
prior studies, Chin et al. (2003) find no statistical relationship between board 
composition, board size, ownership structure and corporate financial performance 
in New Zealand companies. 
Employment of different data, different variables and different performance 
measurements may be the reasons of lack of consensus about the role of corporate 
governance. Among these mixed results, the role of corporate governance 
practices in controlling cost of capital remains widely unexplored. Cost of capital 
plays an important role inside and outside the company. While insiders measure 
the effectiveness of their strategies and realized return of their performance, 
outsiders evaluate the past, present and future return of their investment through 
cost of capital. This study intends to fulfil the gap of theoretical and practical 
studies in this area.    
2.3 Corporate governance in Singapore 
Primary attempts at improving corporate governance practices standards in 
Singapore took place in 1996. The Singapore Stock Market issued new guidelines 
in its listing manual at that time. This new chapter was (Chapter 9B) on corporate 
governance which was related to the listing manual. After the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 and after consulting with listed firms in Singapore market, Chapter 
9B was replaced with the Best Practice Guide in 1998. After that The Monetary 
Authority implemented a new act in 2001 called The Securities and Futures Act 
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(SFA) in Singapore. This act aimed to improve the disclosure requirements of 
listed firms. According to this new act, non-disclosure or late disclosure of 
information would face either civil or criminal penalties.  
In order to improve the corporate governance practices, The Code of Corporate 
Governance (COCG) was issued by the Corporate Governance Committee in 
Singapore in 2001. These codes were about the best practices of corporate 
governance. These practices were in different areas such as remuneration matters, 
accountability, audit issues, communication with shareholders and composition of 
board members. These rules and guidelines are not compulsory currently, but 
listed firms in Singapore are asked to disclose their corporate governance 
practices at annual general meetings. The listed firms are also asked to explain 
their deviations from the codes to shareholders at annual meetings.  
But, Goodwin and Seow (1998) reported poor disclosure practice in Singaporean 
corporations in their study of Singaporean companies compared to the US and UK 
companies. Singapore’s financial reporting standards give more discretion in 
adopting accounting policies to companies. These standards are adapted from the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). Employment of these standards makes 
the acceptability of certain accounting policies uncertain. In this regard 
Chareonwong (2011) finds that the same directors in Singapore sit on several 
companies’ boards. This fact in Singapore not only increases the possibility of 
directors devoting insufficient time, but also raises the possibility of a conflict of 
interest in transactions of these related firms. 
Mak and Li (2001) also report a low rate of hostile takeovers that leads to 
replacement of inefficient management teams in Singapore. Explaining this, 
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Chandrasegar (1995) documents two reasons. First of all, there is an avoidance of 
aggression, bitterness and confrontation which is the characteristic of the Asian 
way of doing business. Secondly, merchant bankers in Singapore are more 
concerned about involvement in takeovers compared to counterparts in London 
and New York. Singaporean merchants do not get involved in takeovers without 
obtaining prior clearance with the government agency charged with 
administrating the Takeover Code in Singapore, the Securities Industry Council 
(SIC).  
La Porta et al. (1996) find that block ownership tends to be higher in Singapore 
and consequently the protection of minority stockholders’ rights is weaker. This 
high concentration of ownership, especially among government and family 
shareholders, makes it difficult to have a takeover without the support of these 
shareholders. That may be one reason for the low rate of hostile takeovers in 
Singapore.  
Companies controlled by the government in Singapore are under the Companies 
Act and governed the same as private companies. Although government-linked 
companies are governed the same as private companies, they are not eager to have 
outside directors. Government-linked companies are less concerned about 
accountability of financial performance. These companies have easier access to 
financing, and also have weaker monitoring by shareholders. Mak and Li (2001) 
find that it is more probable to have companies with higher block holder 
ownership, more unregulated, longer tenure CEOs and dual leadership.  
Results of prior studies on the relationship between corporate governance, 
company performance and cost of capital are mixed and inconclusive. 
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Employment of different data, different variables and different performance 
measurements by prior studies may be the reasons for this inconsistency in results. 
The unique situation in Singapore’s corporate control and ownership makes it 
necessary to explore corporate governance practices more sensibly. Among these 
mixed results, the role of corporate governance practices in cost of capital remains 
widely unexplored. This study intends to fill the gap between theoretical and 
practical studies in this area.    
2.4 Capital Structure 
Almost fifty years have passed since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, 1963). But the importance of capital structure and the question of how to 
finance fixed assets still remain inconclusive. The empirical evidence related to a 
firm’s optimal mixture of financing has been both voluminous and mixed 
(Bradley, 1983; Frank, 2008; Harris, 1991). Three competing theories have 
evolved with little consensus as below: 
2.4.1 Pecking Order Theory (POT) 
Pecking order theory was introduced by Donaldson in 1961. This theory was 
modified by Myers and Majluf (1984). They argue that equity is a less preferred 
means to raise the capital. It states that companies prioritize their sources 
according to the cost of financing. Companies prefer to raise equity as a financing 
means of last resort. Hence, internal funds are used first. When that is depleted, 
debt is issued, and when it is not sensible to issue any more debt, equity will be 
issued. 
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2.4.2 Trade-Off Theory (TOT) 
Trade-off theory refers to the idea that a company chooses the balance of debt and 
equity in its financing by balancing the costs and benefits. This theory was first 
presented by Kraus and Litzenberge (1973). They considered a balance between 
the dead-weight costs of bankruptcy and the tax saving benefits of debt. Agency 
costs are also included in this balance. This theory was employed to show that 
corporations usually financed partly with debt and partly with equity. It states that 
there is an advantage in employing debt, the tax benefits of debt, and there is a 
cost of financing with debt, the costs of financial stress including bankruptcy costs 
of debt and non-bankruptcy costs (e.g. staff leaving, suppliers demanding 
disadvantageous payment terms, bondholder/stockholder infighting, etc.). A firm 
that is optimizing its overall value will focus on a trade-off when choosing the 
balance between debt and equity. This occurs due to the decline in managerial 
benefits as the debt increases, while the managerial costs increase as well. 
2.4.3 Market Timing Theory (MTT) 
The market timing theory explains how firms decide whether to finance their 
investment with equity or with debt. The idea that firms pay attention to market 
conditions in an attempt to time the market is a very old hypothesis. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) argue that the first order determinant of a corporation's capital 
structure in employment of debt and equity is market timing. In other words, firms 
do not generally care whether they finance with debt or equity. They just choose 
the form of financing which, at that point of time, seems to be of more value in 
the financial market (Baker, 2002). 
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Market timing does not express the reason why firms explain the miss-pricing 
better than financial markets. This theory assumes that miss-pricing exists, and 
describes the behaviour of firms. Baker and Wurgler show that an index of 
financing that reflects how much financing was done during hot equity periods is 
a good indicator of firm leverage over long periods. A complete market timing 
theory has to explain the reason why some firms issue debt while other firms issue 
equity. This theory is one of the different corporate finance theories, and is often 
in contrast with the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. 
2.5 Cost of Capital 
Cost of capital plays a critical role in business decisions. Both academics and 
practitioners try to establish the full picture about cost of capital because 
consideration of the cost of capital leads to better understanding of the businesses. 
The existence of all businesses is tied to calculation of cost of capital. But, most 
existing research focuses on the US and European markets and investigates the 
effect of different factors on cost of capital in these markets.  
The financial sector of each business consists of two subsections, debt and equity. 
So in calculating cost of capital two elements should be mentioned, cost of debt 
and cost of equity. Cost of debt consists of interest that should be paid by 
businesses to borrow money, and cost of equity consists of the amount of money 
that should be paid to investors. 
2.5.1 WACC 
Correct estimation of investment costs and economic life of any investment is the 
main requirement of any business. Accepting or rejecting any investment is based 
on calculation of net present value and discounting of cash flows to the present, 
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by using cost of capital or firm’s discount rate. The behaviour of net present value 
(NPV) impacts on any decisions. If NPV>0, accept; if NPV<0 reject. Incorrect 
calculation of cost of capital leads to incorrect calculation of NPV, profit and 
EVA. 
Firms with more than one type of financial source require a weighted average cost 
of capital calculation in order to calculate the cost of capital (Farber, 2006). In this 
case, after tax cost of capital for each source of funding is calculated through the 
proportion of each source in the whole financing structure (Baker, 2005; Ross, 
2005). The WACC has obtained from Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and 
Miles and Ezzell (1980) studies, is arguably the most widely used method of 
calculating cost of capital in the real world (Ross, 1996).  
WACC equation for a firm which is using common share (equity) and bond (debt) 
financing is as below: 
WACC = r = wdrd (1-t) + were          (2.1) 
where, rd represents the market rate on the firm’s outstanding debt as cost of debt 
and re represents cost of equity which is frequently calculated through Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Wd is the proportion of debt in the firm’s financing 
and we is the proportion of equity in the firm’s financing. Proportion of debt is 
value of debt / value of debt plus value of equity. And proportion of equity is 
value of equity / value of debt plus value of equity. In this situation wd + we =1 
because debt and equity are the only sources of firm’s financing. In this equation t 
represents tax rate on corporate income. The standard treatment in WACC in 
order to reflect the deductibility of interest payments is (1-t). In this procedure the 
interest cost of debt will decline. The interest payments are not calculated in the 
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prospective cash flows in order to avoid calculating the tax advantage of debt 
twice. 
 
Despite the wide acceptance of WACC by prior researchers some studies have 
concern about its unrealistic assumptions like assuming a constant leverage ratio 
(Miles, 1980). Miles and Ezzell (1980) show that the WACC method assumes that 
capital structure proportions are stable. Thus, when future asset values are 
uncertain, the future debt tax shield is uncertain as well. Lewellen and Emery 
(1986) argue that the difference in predicting the of cost of capital increases 
because of the alternative characteristics of corporate debt management policy. 
They conclude that the best way to respond to evolving new information on 
expected future operating cash flows is to assume a periodic rebalancing policy 
for firm’s debt levels. 
Another shortcoming is the need to have correct calculation of the tax shield’s 
value. This value depends on the company’s debt policy. Miles-Ezzell’s 
assumption argues that the only way to implement debt policy is to maintain a 
fixed market value debt ratio (Cooper, 2006; Farber, 2006).   
Arzac and Glosten (2005) use a general formulation for arbitrary cash flows under 
a financial policy of constant leverage to propose a reconsideration of tax shield 
valuation. In support, Fernandez (2004) argues that the present value effect of tax 
saving on debt is not a simple calculation. He implies that although the capital 
market is complete, value-additively is violated. However, Cooper and Nyborg 
(2005) reject this argument by demonstrating that the value of debt tax saving is 
the present value of the tax saving from interest. Because of these problems some 
authors like Copeland, Koller and Murrin (2000) believe that the WACC equation 
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should be modified further. They believe that a growth factor can solve this 
problem, while some other authors like Ruback (2002) believe that appropriate 
discount rate for tax saving is the unleveraged cost of equity rather than the cost 
of debt financing.  
In this regard, Miller (2009) documents a shortcoming for WACC and suggests a 
modified WACC while Pierru (2009) rejects his argument and modified WACC 
by questioning the assumption of Miller’s calculation. Pierru (2009) argues that in 
Miller’s example, the debt ratio is assumed to be constant throughout the project’s 
life which is an incorrect assumption. Pierru (2009) suggests that debt ratio should 
be calculated in any year because it changes with respect to the economic value of 
the firm. Massari, Roncaglio and Zanetti (2007) also show that the WACC 
method is still widely employed all around the world especially in Europe, by 
banks and financial analysts.   
2.5.2 Cost of equity 
Two popular approaches exist in calculating the cost of equity capital: ex post cost 
of equity capital and ex-ante cost of equity capital. The least supported approach 
by literature is the ex-ante method. Growth potential and cash flows are the 
concerning aspects of this approach (Hail, 2006). Two important factors in this 
method which are earnings forecasts and stock prices calculated through different 
models. These models are: Claus and Thomas (2001) (RCT), Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) (RGLS), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) (ROJ), and 
Easton (2004) (RPEG). The base of these models is residual income model or 
dividend discount model. The differences between these models are forecasting 
horizons and future growth patterns. Existing evidence shows different ideas 
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about the effectiveness of the ex-ante approach in capturing variation in expected 
return.  
The relationship between the ex-ante cost of capital estimates and future realized 
returns have been evaluated in different studies. These studies indicate a positive 
correlation between future portfolio stock return and portfolio ranking based on 
the ex-ante approach (Gebhardt, 2001; Gode, 2003). In support, the relationship 
between future returns and implied cost of capital is estimated by Easton and 
Monahan (2005). Through the variance decomposition technique, Easton and 
Monahan find that the ex-ante approach has low explanatory power in realized 
returns after putting controls in place for cash flow news and discount rate news.  
However Botosan, Plumlee and Wen (2010) using the same method find that the 
relationship between the ex-ante approach and future returns is significantly 
positive. The relationship between the ex-ante approach and different risk proxies, 
like book-to-market ratio, firm size, growth and beta is investigated in different 
studies. (Botosan, 2005; Gebhardt, 2001; Gode, 2003). 
For example, Botoan (1997) and Gebhardt (2001) report significant positive and 
negative relation between the ex-ante approach and beta respectively. Gode and 
Mohanram (2003) and Gebhardt (2001) report significant positive and negative 
correlation between the ex-ante approach and short and long-term growth 
forecasts respectively. Botosan and Plumlee (2005) implement a general study 
about the relation between the ex-ante approach and risk proxies. They find no 
correlation between risk proxies and the ex-ante approaches based on Gebhardt 
(2001) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). But they find consistent 
correlation between risk proxies and other ex-ante approaches.  
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The measurement of error in analysts’ forecasts is one of the main problems 
associated with the ex-ante approach, a shortcoming acknowledged by Easton and 
Monahan (2005). Relying on analysts’ forecasts in cost of capital and expected 
return, makes most studies uncertain about their results (Guay, 2011). Some 
studies find no correlation between the ex-ante approach and future realized return 
(Guay, 2011) while some others find small correlation between them (Chen, 
2009). As the correlation between the ex-ante approach and future realized returns 
is not obvious it is hard to cover this problem. Thus, the discussions on finding a 
unique approach still exist. (Botosan, 2005; Easton, 2005; Gode, 2003; Guay, 
2011).      
The second approach in calculating cost of equity is ex post approach. This 
method is the most promoted method in literature but like ex ante method it has 
shortcomings. Recent studies have find that this method is a poor proxy for cost of 
equity (Elton, 1999; Guay, 2011) with regard to the high usage of this approach in 
related literature (Da, 2012; Grandes, 2010). The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and Fama and French Three Factor model are the prevalent methods in 
this approach which will be discussed in following sections (Fama, 1993).  
2.5.2.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)   
Literature related to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) goes back almost 50 
years. Primary attempts were undertaken by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). 
Their studies led to the introduction of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
which became one of the most famous methods and the base for further studies. 
The model assumes that the market has a comprehensive explanatory power and 
the market return fluctuations can reflect the behaviour of firms’ returns. Market 
fluctuations are considered risk factors and that these risk factors affect the 
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expected return. In this model, changes in expected market return illustrate the 
expected return. The CAPM model is as below: 
E (Ri) = Rf + [E (Rm) – Rf]βim                               (2.2) 
where E (Ri) is the expected return on asset i, Rf is the risk-free rate, E (Rm) is the 
expected return of market, [E (Rm) – Rf] is the market risk premium and βim is the 
proportion of risk of each dollar invested on asset i contributes to the market 
portfolio.  
The regression equation of this model is as below: 
Rit – Rft = αi + βiM(RMt – Rft) + εit                           (2.3) 
where αi is called the stock’s alpha (abnormal return) for stock i,  
βiM is the equity beta coefficient for stock i,  
and εit is a diversifiable or idiosyncratic risk (Fama, 2004). 
Alpha is a risk-adjusted measure of the so-called active return on an investment. It 
is the return in excess of the compensation for the risk borne and is commonly 
used to assess active managers' performances. 
A list of share returns and returns of the index (market) is required to estimate 
beta. These returns can be daily, weekly, or in any other period. The number of 
years employed in any study could be one, two, five or more. The most important 
part of this model is beta that describes the relationship between portfolio return 
and market return (Levinson, 2006). Correct estimation of firm-specific betas is 
crucial in all applications of modern finance theory, including asset pricing, 
corporate cost of capital calculation and risk management.  
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As noted by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001), firm specific betas are 
difficult to estimate and may well be unstable over time. A large body of 
empirical evidence suggests that betas vary across firms and over times (Ang, 
2009; Jagannathan, 1996; Sunder, 1980). Moreover, Ferson and Locke (1998) find 
that beta estimations have a substantial amount of time variation. This error only 
makes a small contribution to overall estimation error of cost of capital. 
Beside these shortcomings about beta there are two approaches to beta estimation. 
The first method sorts shares into portfolios based on characteristics to reduce 
measurement errors. This method assumes that all stocks within a given portfolio 
share have the same beta (Fama, 1973). However, when stocks in the same 
portfolio have exposure to other determinants of risk than the characteristics on 
which they are sorted, may manifest serious errors. The second method consists of 
estimating a separate time series for each firm to obtain individual betas (Brennan, 
1998). However, this method can lead to serious problems if either the period of 
time is too short or the number of observations is too small. 
There are possible estimation errors through time that are crucial in estimating 
cost of capital. Ferson and Locke (1998) indicate that analysts usually use 
historical average returns to estimate the risk premium on a market index and beta 
in CAPM. They indicate that correctness of cost of capital estimation will 
improve by improving the estimation of expected premium, even if the CAPM is a 
wrong model. They believe that improving the estimation of market premium is 
much more important than concerns about using the wrong beta when errors in 
cost of capital over time are the issue. Ferson and Locke (1998) report that the 
smallest overall errors are obtained when a regression model is employed and the 
largest errors occur when using the past historical average. Therefore, this study 
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will use regression models instead of historical average in order to minimize the 
potential errors in estimating the cost of capital.  
Some consideration in calculating beta could lead to better results. For example, 
Theil (1971) notes that a large number of observations are needed to reliably 
estimate beta. Cosemans (2009) observes that a limited number of observations 
will lead to poor estimations. Thus, a large number of observations, something 
like more than 300, is suggested by earlier studies (Sunder, 1980; Theil, 1971). 
More recent papers show that around 50 to 100 observation would be enough (Jin, 
2006). Data period is another important issue in calculating cost of capital. Too 
short a period lets the beta estimation be influenced by recent market behaviour 
(Hoberg, 2007) and thus leads to high standard errors in estimations. Although a 
longer period reduces some problems, it can also lead to other problems, like 
making data collection difficult or having to make more assumptions such as 
estimating investors’ tax positions. Relevancy of the market’s performance to the 
past may be irrelevant over longer periods (Jin, 2006). In this regard, some prior 
studies suggest that weekly data is more reliable compared to monthly data. This 
could be right because of the higher number of observations during the same 
period (DeJong, 1985). Although some articles employ daily data (Cosemans, 
2009) many articles mention a non-synchronicity problem that arises with daily 
data, because smaller firms may not trade every day (Scholes, 1977). Thus, 
weekly data for a period of two years which include almost 100 observations will 
be employed by this study. 
Another body of research suggests an alternative to beta which is Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (MacKinlay, 1995). Conner and Korajczky (1988) document that 
APT is a better approach for detecting the affecting factors on asset returns. 
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Ferson and Korajcyk (1995) indicate that the great fraction of predictability for all 
of the investment horizons can be captured by APT. Although prior studies 
suggest APT as a better model than CAPM, there are disadvantages associated 
with the APT approach.  
The APT theory faces some shortcomings as well. First of all the underlying 
factors and the required number of them are not indicated in arbitrage pricing 
theory. Secondly, unlike CAPM, pervasive and systematic influences on the asset 
price are ambiguous. Cheng (1995) categorized variables that explain the UK 
stock market into three economic factors. The first one involves market indices. 
The second comprises longer leading indicator, lagging indicator, money supply, 
interest rate and unemployment rate. The third consists of output measures 
variables such as GDP growth rate, consumer expenditures on durable goods, 
industrial production and short leading indicator. 
Despite the shortcomings of APT, the CAPM model which was developed by 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) implies that differences in market 
beta will completely explain the differences in expected returns for portfolios and 
securities. Many articles try to modify the primary version of CAPM and improve 
its explanatory power by expanding its covered variables. Supporters of the 
empirical failure of this version of CAPM can be categorized into two groups as 
below: 
The first group is the behaviourists. They believe that evidence proves that stocks 
with low book value to market value belong with growth firms, and high ratio of 
book value to market value is associated with firms enduring bad periods (Fama, 
1995; Lakonishok, 1994). 
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The second group believes that many simplified and unrealistic assumptions of 
CAPM, lead to empirical contradictions. For instance, assumptions like variance 
and the mean of one-period portfolio returns will be mentioned by the investors. It 
is logical that the relationship between issues like labour income or opportunities 
for future investment and portfolio return will be mentioned by investors. If so, 
market beta will not describe asset risk comprehensively. And differences in beta 
cannot explain the differences in expected returns.  
CAPM predicts that the cost of equity is positively associated with market beta. 
Regardless of criticisms of this method in literature, it is still the most preferred 
method in calculating cost of equity (Da, 2012). Some studies mention that almost 
75% of academics and practitioners still believe that CAPM has reasonable 
estimation (Graham, 2001; Welch, 2008). 
Differently managed portfolios earn different returns from those returns predicted 
by CAPM. This is one of the primary problems of this method. Different 
anomalies are found with CAPM. Firm size and book-to-market were two famous 
anomalies uncovered by Fama and French (1993). The third one is PE ratio that 
indicates that firms’ high PE ratio seems to be more profitable than firms with low 
PE ratio (Fama, 1996). Other problems are cash-flow to price (Afkhami Rad, 
2013; Lakonishok, 1994), past long-term returns (MacKinlay, 1995), past short-
term returns (Jegadeesh, 1993) and past sales growth (Fama, 1996). Other 
problems relate to firms with real options. A nonlinear relationship between firm 
return and risk factor requires additional risk factor as explanatory variables, so 
CAPM may have shortcomings in these areas. 
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These problems and convincing evidence of failure of CAPM prepared the 
situation for Fama and French (1993) to introduce their three factor model (Fama, 
1996, 1992, 1998).  
2.5.2.2 Fama-French Three Factors (FF3F) Model 
Fama and French published the results of their studies in 1992. Their model 
assumed that market fluctuation is not the only factor affecting firm’s return citing 
size and book-to-market value as two other risk factors. Although these variables 
are not state variables, they can reflect the effects of unidentified state variables 
that cause undiversified risks.  
Fama and French (1992) find a negative and positive correlation between firm 
size and firm returns and between book-to-market equity and firm return 
respectively. They also show that the small firms share returns and returns of 
higher book-to-market shares vary more with one another than returns of large 
firm’s shares and returns of low book-to-market shares. Fama and French (Fama, 
1996, 1993) suggest a three-factor model for expected returns:  
E(Rit) – Rft = βiM[E(RMt) – Rft] + βisE(SMBt) + βihE(HMLt)        (2.4) 
In this equation, E(Rit) is the expected return on asset i in time t, Rft is the risk-free 
rate of return, SMBt (small minus big) represents difference between the returns of 
diversified portfolios of small and big shares, HMLt (high minus low) is the 
difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low book to 
market ratio shares, and betas are the slopes of multiple regression of Rit-Rft on 
RMt-Rft, SMBt and HMLt. 
The time-series regression of this model is: 
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 Rit – Rft = αi + βiM(RMt – Rft) + βisSMBt + βihHMLt + εit        (2.5) 
In order to calibrate the sensibility of share prices to new information αi    is added 
to the model. Fama and French (1993), (1996) show that a model shaped by size, 
book-to-market ratio and other price ratios can explain most of the average return 
variation and will cover the shortcomings of CAPM. Cummins (2005) shows that 
applying the three-factor model has different outcomes for each business. For 
example, in the property-liability insurance industry, it shows higher cost of 
capital than CAPM. Thus it is reasonable to employ the Three Factor Model in 
this industry. 
Many empirical studies prove the important role of size and book to market equity 
in explaining most of the US share returns. But, some other work has been done to 
prove this issue in other parts of the world. For instance, Chui and Wei (1998), Ho 
(2000) and Lam (2002) indicate an important role for size and book to market 
equity ratio in reflecting the share returns in Hong Kong. Wong and Lye (1990) 
and Lau (2002) find that the firm size has an effective role in explaining 
Singaporean share returns. Drew and Veeraraghavan (2003) document an 
important role for the three-factor model in the Philippines, Malaysia, Korea and 
Hong Kong through some specific robustness tests. Shum and Tang (2005) show 
effective explanatory power for the three-factor model through their study in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.  
However, there are some shortcomings associated with this model. As mentioned 
by Fama and French (2004) the empirical motivation of the three-factor model is 
its main weakness. The small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) are 
not mentioned as state variables by investors. They are just means to capture the 
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reaction of share returns to size and book-to-market equity ratio and they are not 
risk factors. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) reject the three-factor model by examining the 
irrational pricing against the three-factor model. They mention that expected 
returns are not related to an asset’s covariance with any economic risk factor. 
Davis (2000) rejects their idea and indicates that HML of the three-factor model 
better explains the expected returns than the characteristic model of Daniel and 
Titman. Evidence presented by Martinez (2005) documents the limited 
explanatory power of the Fama and French three factor model in Spanish market. 
Charoenrook and Conrad (2005) show that size can be a risk factor and that 
employing size in calculation is reasonable but employing book-to-market ratio is 
not always accepted. Moskowitz’s (2003) study supports a similar idea about size 
and book-to-market ratio. He finds that book-to-market ratio cannot be assumed 
as a risk factor. Despite the studies that reject the accuracy of FF3F, academic and 
non-academic works still employ this method. Further studies that tried to 
improve this method led to the introduction of the momentum model which is 
described in the following part. 
2.5.2.3 Momentum Model 
Further studies focus on improving the three-factor model revealed another 
serious problem called the momentum effect (Jegadeesh, 1993). This effect is 
based on the assumption that well performed shares in the last three to twelve 
months tend to continue their good performance and shares that performed poorly 
in this period continue to perform the same. This effect has different effects on 
cost of capital compared to the effect of book-to-market equity and other price 
ratios on cost of capital. Carhart (1997) therefore added this variable (momentum 
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factor) to the three-factor model in order to enrich its explanatory power. This 
momentum variable states the difference between the returns on diversified 
portfolios of short-term winners and losers.  
E(Rit) – Rft = βiM[E(RMt) – Rft] + βisE(SMBt) + βihE(HMLt) + βiwE(WMLt)   (2.6) 
where, the βiw is the beta coefficient for the momentum factor (winner minus 
loser) for firm i. E(WMLt) represents the difference between the returns of 
diversified portfolios of winners and losers. 
Time-series regression of this model is: 
 Rit – Rft = αi + βiM(RMt – Rft) + βisSMBt + βihHMLt + βiwWMLt + εit      (2.7) 
The critical role of the momentum factor in cost of equity capital estimation has 
been demonstrated by many empirical studies (Barberis, 1998; Conrad, 1998; 
Hong, 1999). Liew and Vassalou (2000) documented significant roles for SMB, 
HML and WML in the Canadian stock market. Tien and Wang (2010) find that in 
some lines of business, applying FF3F and momentum model significantly 
increases the cost of equity capital, especially in property-liability insurers. So 
they suggest that the government should set up more strict regulations in property-
liability insurers.  
Frankel and Lee (1998) and Piotroski (2000) document another shortcoming for 
CAPM and the three-factor model. This shortcoming is that shares with higher 
expected cash flows tend to have higher average returns. They consider that lack 
of available information about the expected profitability by irrational share pricing 
being the reason for the shortcoming.  
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Some studies reject the role of momentum factor as a risk factor. These studies 
find that momentum factor is not a risk factor and therefore should not be 
included in cost of capital estimations (Charoenrook, 2005; Moskowitz, 2003). 
Charoenrook and Conrad (2005) document that the relation between conditional 
variance and conditional mean of momentum factor is in a manner that 
momentum factor cannot be assumed as a risk factor. Different ideas that support 
momentum factor (Barberis, 1998; Hong, 1999; Liew, 2000) or reject its role 
(Chen, 2003; Moskowitz, 2003) exist in prior studies. The idea of using 
momentum factor still exists because the arguments put forward were not strong 
enough to convince academics and practitioners to avoid this factor.  
Although Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is the most recommended method of 
estimating cost of capital in literature (Chen, 2009; Da, 2012), some studies 
suggests Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as a substitute method 
(Grandes, 2010). GMM supporting literature states that this method overcomes 
the shortcomings of OLS like normality or homoskedasticity. The size of market 
or exogenous factors can cause heteroskedasticity and affect the estimations of 
OLS. For instance, Garcia and Bonomo (2001) employed GMM in their studies 
because in the Brazilian market, high inflation rate is a significant issue which 
may cause heteroskedasticity and affect the OLS estimations. Although GMM is 
an appropriate alternative for OLS in special markets and OLS is the most 
recommended method in estimating cost of capital, assumptions of OLS will be 
checked in this study to identify which method is the best. 
The financial crisis in 2007-2008 affected the performance of firms around the 
world. Almost all countries experienced a recession period after this financial 
crisis. However, the level and depth of this effect was different in various 
86 
 
countries (Erkens, 2012; Liu, 2012). The structure of a particular economy 
indicates the volume of change that occurs in that economy. It is clear that New 
Zealand and Singapore have big differences in their geographical situation. 
Investigations of this study indicate different behaviour in the New Zealand 
market and the Singapore market when facing the financial crisis.  
2.6 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter surveyed existing literature pertaining to the relationship of corporate 
governance practices, company financial performance and cost of capital whilst 
also clarifying the contribution of this research. An overview of corporate 
governance practices and mechanisms in developed economies along with New 
Zealand and Singapore were presented in this chapter. Relevant empirical studies 
on corporate governance practices in New Zealand, Singapore and other parts of 
the world were also presented. This section also included a discussion on 
corporate governance acts, rules and guidelines in New Zealand and Singapore 
and stated the developments of corporate governance practices in these 
economies. 
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Chapter 3 RESEARCH METHODS: RESEARCH 
FRAMEWORK. HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the framework for this study. This chapter also develops 
hypotheses and presents empirical models of this research. The methods of 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital in 
large listed companies in New Zealand and Singapore are also presented. 
3.1 Research framework 
Improvement of transparency and accountability in managerial decision making is 
strongly related to good corporate governance practices in companies. This idea is 
supported theoretically and practically in prior research (Ingley, 2007; Psaros, 
2009). However, research on the interaction between corporate governance 
practices and firm performance shows inconclusive results investigation on the 
interaction between corporate governance practices and cost of capital in 
companies remain unexplored.  
Different features of corporate governance were employed by previous studies in 
order to evaluate the relationship between corporate governance, firm 
performance and cost of capital. Establishing the relationship between corporate 
governance, firm performance and cost of capital becomes more complicated 
when specific features are employed in estimations (Bauer, 2008).  
One important issue in assessment of corporate governance is the direction of the 
relationship between corporate governance practices, firm performance and cost 
of capital. Prior studies which reported a causal relationship between corporate 
governance practices (such as insider ownership) and firm performance were not 
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successful in considering the endogeneity effects of ownership (Y. Hu, Izumida, 
S, 2008) caused by internal relationship of corporate governance mechanisms 
leads to endogeneity. When financial performance affects the governance issues, 
it is called reverse causation. It may happen when privately informed insiders ask 
for bonus plans before unexpected earnings are reported. Different studies support 
the idea of rejecting the single equation methods when evaluating the ownership, 
performance and cost of capital relationships (Agrawal, 1996; Bhagat, 2002). This 
study will consider the endogeneity of ownership structure when assessing the 
relationship between ownership structure and cost of capital.   
This study extends the existing literature in different ways. 1) Employment of a 
wider range of corporate governance variables in comparison with prior studies. 
Employment of these variables leads to a better understanding of different 
corporate governance mechanisms which interacts with cost of capital. This 
approach allows academics, investors and managers to track the effective factors 
on cost of capital more efficiently. 2) Examining the effect of corporate 
governance practices on cost of capital clarifies the efficiency of corporate 
governance principles and guidelines implemented by authorities in New Zealand 
and Singapore. 3) Comparison of New Zealand and Singapore reveals many 
interesting issues regarding the difference in corporate governance practices, the 
economic situation and the nature of companies. The geographical isolation of 
New Zealand and its smaller companies constrains specific characteristics of 
corporate governance practice outcomes. Singapore experiences a different 
situation as a highly international economy with larger companies and different 
corporate governance characteristics such as ownership structure. 4) Large listed 
companies increase the possibility of implementing more corporate governance 
89 
 
regulations and guidelines. Thus, employment of large listed companies in both 
New Zealand and Singapore helps promote a better understanding of the corporate 
governance guidelines in these countries. Employment of large listed companies 
also prepares a better context for comparing the efficiency of corporate 
governance guidelines. 5) Most prior studies explored the relationship between 
corporate governance practices and corporate financial performance while 
evaluating the relationship between corporate governance practices and cost of 
capital remains highly unexplored.  
Cost of capital plays an important role in decision making either inside or outside 
companies. Therefore, revealing the potential role of corporate governance 
practices in cost of capital can help both academics and practitioners. This study 
examines whether or not corporate governance practices in large listed companies 
in New Zealand and Singapore affect the companies’ cost of capital. Companies 
listed in New Zealand’s top 50 companies (NZX 50) are used to showcase the 
New Zealand market, while 30 large companies that are listed as STI constituents 
in the Singapore market, will be the representative of the Singapore market. 
3.2 Conceptual Framework of this study 
The conceptual framework of this study is presented in Figure 3.1. The corporate 
governance variables which previous studies and authorities in New Zealand and 
Singapore indicated as important principles are listed on the left hand side. These 
variables are: Insider Ownership, Block Ownership, Board Size, Board 
Independency, Board Diversity, CEO Duality and CEO Tenure. Proxy of firms’ 
cost of capital is indicated on the left hand side. Fama-French Four Factor or 
Momentum Effect of Jegadeesh and Titman is employed as the proxy of 
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calculating cost of capital. Size and leverage of companies along with Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of countries are adopted as the affecting 
variables in the linkage between governance characteristics and companies’ cost 
of capital. 
 
Theoretical and empirical links between corporate governance mechanisms and 
cost of capital of firms are provided in the following section. 
3.3 Governance Mechanisms 
The main thrust of this study is to understand the potential relationship between 
corporate governance practices and cost of capital. In order to evaluate the role of 
corporate governance variables in cost of capital, this study employs different 
corporate governance variables which are identified in Figure 3.1. The 
Insider Ownership 
Block Ownership 
Board Size 
Board 
Independency 
Board Diversitry 
CEO Duality 
CEO Tenure 
Size 
Leverage 
GDP 
Cost of Capital 
(Momentum Effect 
Model) 
Figure 3.1: Possible Linkage attribute to Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Cost of Capital 
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Mechanisms of each of these variables are discussed and relevant hypotheses of 
the relationship between corporate governance practices and cost of capital are 
developed in this section.    
3.3.1 Block Ownership 
Different studies offer different measurement regarding block ownership. Some 
prior studies have consider the percentage of shares owned by the top five 
shareholders, whereas others consider the percentage of shares owned by the top 
20 shareholders. Ownership of 5% or more in a company is another method of 
considering block owners (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2006). There are 
limitations in employment of each of these measurements. Employment of 5% 
ownership or more poses a problem. Because in large companies with high 
defused ownership, it is hard to find shareholders with 5% of shares or more. 
Percentage of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders is also not a good proxy 
for block shareholders, because in most companies the percentage of shares held 
by the second 10 shareholders is not high enough and these shareholders do not 
play an effective role in companies. The top five shareholders in most companies 
are more effective shareholders (Prevost, 2002b). This study will consider the 
percentage of shares owned by the top five shareholders as block ownership.   
Various costs and benefits are associated with block ownership. Therefore, the 
effect of block ownership on firms is unclear as yet (Bohren, 2003). Positive 
effects of block ownership are due to the different characteristics of block owners. 
These characteristics include: 1) Good monitoring by block owners (Shleifer, 
1986). 2) Higher takeover premium (Burkart, 1995). 3) lower free-riding by 
dispersed shareholders (Shleifer, 1986). These characteristics positively affect the 
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firm. In this regards, Holderness (2003) shows that block owners have the 
opportunity to monitor and affect managers’ decisions.  
Besides these positive characteristics, some negative characteristics of block 
ownership can diminish the performance of companies and increase the costs. 
Some of these characteristics are: 1) Reduced market liquidity (Chordia, 2001). 2) 
Block owners are associated with lower diversification benefits (Demsetz, 1985). 
3) Block ownership reduces the management initiative (Burkart, 1997). 4) Block 
owners can increase the conflict between majority-minority. Presence of different 
ideas about the role of block ownership happens because of the uncertainty about 
the power of each of these positive and negative effects.  
In this regard, Morck et al. (1988) argue that when managers are block owners, 
some entrenchment problems may occur. They believe that block ownership of 
managers will increase the power of internal constituency. But some studies claim 
a non-linear role for block ownership. For example, Chahine (2004) believes that 
increase in block ownership of a firm first increases the firm’s value and then 
decreases the firm’s value. He shows that people who own a higher proportion of 
shares are more interested in monitoring the company. These investors are 
unlikely to be indifferent about the firm’s future. So in this case, the board should 
work clearly and efficiently to enhance its reputation in order to satisfy the block 
owners (Shleifer, 1986).  
Since block ownership is an important affective factor in each company and plays 
a significant role in New Zealand and Singapore, assessing the role of this kind of 
ownership becomes an important issue in this study. In order to address the issues 
regarding block ownership, the following hypothesis was postulated: 
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H0: Block ownership is positively related to cost of capital in the New Zealand 
market. 
H0: Block ownership is positively related to cost of capital in the Singapore 
market. 
3.3.2 Insider Ownership 
In the seminal work by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
they find that if top managers (officers and directors) hold a higher percentage of 
shares, they will try to maximize their own wealth. These managers will therefore 
make decisions consistent with stockholders’ wealth maximization because there 
is a better alignment of interests between insider (officers and directors) and 
shareholders.  
Morck et al. (1988) indicate that despite the evidence of a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm value, this relationship is weak at high 
levels of insider ownership. Stulz (1988) asserts that the value of a firm will 
decrease as managers become more dominant in the ownership structure. These 
varying views about the role of insider ownership can be categorized into three 
groups.1) Studies that document a positive linear relationship between insider 
ownership and firm performance.2) Studies that document a non-linear 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. 3) Studies that 
document no relationship between insider ownership and firm performance.  
The first group of studies which document a linear relationship between insider 
ownership, firm performance and cost of capital consists of studies that accept the 
convergence of interests. This convergence of interests happens because of 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These studies indicate 
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that decreasing the agency costs is achievable through convergence of interests 
(Elayan, 2003; Hossain, 2001; Welch, 2003). 
The second group of studies support the non-linear relationship. This non-linear 
relationship could be a quadratic relationship or a cubic relationship (Chen, 1993; 
Griffith, 1999). Convergence of interests and entrenchment effect both appear for 
insider ownership. These studies show that insider ownership has a positive effect 
on companies’ performance (convergence of interests) when insiders own less 
than a specific level of ownership. When insiders own more than that specific 
level, there is a negative relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. This is due to entrenchment effect.  
This group consists of two sub groups. One believes in the quadratic relationship 
(Johnson, 2000; Morck, 1988) and the other in the cubic relationship (De Miguel, 
2004; Short, 1999). Findings of studies that document a quadratic relationship 
support the convergence-of-interests hypothesis (alignment of interests) at low 
levels of insider ownership. These studies also indicate that entrenchment effect 
exists in higher levels of insider ownership.  
In the empirical study in the US McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that firm 
performance increases while insider ownership is increasing up to 40% - 50% 
(alignment effect). When insiders own more than 40% - 50%of a firm, firm 
performance starts to decrease because of the entrenchment effect.  
Morck et al.(1988) and Short and Keasey (1999) document a cubic relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance. Two limits exist in a cubic 
relationship and the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance 
changes at these limits. The two limits of the cubic relationship in the US market 
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are 5% and 25% (Holderness, 1999). These limits are completely different from 
those for a quadratic relationship which are 12% and 41% in the U.K.(Short, 
1999).  
The third group of research documents no relationship between insider ownership, 
firm performance and cost of capital (Demsetz, 1985, 2001). Researchers claim 
that insider ownership has no effect on firm performance and costs arguing that 
insider ownership cannot affect corporations because it is determined 
endogenously.  
In their view, the competitive capital market forces companies to choose a value 
maximizing ownership structure and that the ownership structures affect the 
insider ownership structure through company characteristics which are not 
necessarily determinants of performance and cost of capital. They identify 
company characteristics such as company size and return on asset affecting 
ownership structure (Demsetz, 1985).  
Lack of consensus about the role of insider ownership on company’s cost of 
capital indicates that each company needs its own optimal capital structure in 
order to maximize its value. Stulz (1988) finds that alignment of interests exist in 
low levels of insider ownership. As insider ownership increases, the managerial 
ability of pursuing non-value-maximizing activities increases and after a while 
this effect overtakes the effect of interest alignment. The costs of changing 
approaches to optimal form can mitigate by monitoring role provided by the 
capital market. A more efficient capital market leads to a better monitoring of 
companies.  
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The situation in New Zealand and Singapore are different. Insider ownership in 
New Zealand is less than the optimal level (Hossain, 2001; Reddy, 2008a). Thus, 
the increase in insider ownership will positively affect the performance and 
negatively affect the cost of capital. The high proportion of governmental 
ownership in the Singapore market restricts the opportunity for insider ownership 
to grow  to the optimal level (Phan, 2000). This leads to the two hypotheses. 
H0: Insider ownership is positively related to the cost of capital in New Zealand 
market. 
H0: Insider ownership is positively related to the cost of capital in Singapore 
market. 
3.3.3 Board Size 
Different ideas exist about the effect of board size on corporate performance. 
Jensen (1993) believe in an optimal size for boards, because bigger boards are 
easier for CEOs to control. In his view seven to eight board members is an 
effective board size. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) document that eight or nine 
members on the board will be effective. Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994) support 
Jensen’s (1993) idea about the effectiveness of smaller boards. They conclude that 
it is easier for smaller boards to reach consensus and for members to engage in 
genuine debates and interactions. In support, Hackman (1990) in his 
organizational behaviour research, suggests that larger board size diminishes 
productivity and return. 
In contrast, some studies believe that there is a positive relationship between 
board size and firm performance. Zahra and Pearce (1989) conclude that a larger 
board is more effective in monitoring managers. In their support, Goostein, 
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Gautam and Boeker (1994) and Psaros (2009) argue that larger boards benefit 
companies by 1) providing a larger pool of expertise; 2) having greater 
management overview,  and 3) providing access to a wider range of contacts and 
resources.  
However this view is challenged by Juran and Louden (1966) who argue that 
there is no relationship between board size and firm performance. Forbes and 
Milliken (1999), Yawson (2006) and Mak and Kusandi (2005) consider that it is 
difficult to coordinate and make value maximizing decisions with large boards 
(Yermack, 1996).  
New Zealand and Singapore experience different situations in regard to board 
size. The average size of boards in New Zealand is seven similar to that suggested 
by Jensen (1993) as an optimal board size in the US market.  However, Singapore 
experiences a completely different situation. Average board size is 11 in 
Singapore (Castellano, 2011). Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated 
in regard to board size: 
H0: Board size is positively related to the cost of capital in the New Zealand 
market.  
H0: Board size is positively related to the cost of capital in the Singapore market. 
3.3.4 Board Independence 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) show that boards with higher independency monitor 
managers more effectively compared with less independent boards. The outside 
directors can decide more independently and are better decision-makers over long 
periods. Cadbury (1992) suggests that the independency of managers will improve 
the board’s vigilance.  
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The financial independence of non-executive-independent directors is a strong 
point that helps them to monitor the company more efficiently and control any 
opportunistic behaviour of managers. A number of reforms have been undertaken 
in order to improve corporate governance practices regarding board 
independency. These reforms include: minimizing management’s control over the 
appointment of board and committee members; employing a larger number of 
non-executive/independent directors on the board; implementing standards in 
determining independent members; and encouraging reviews of the performance 
of the board and each board member individually (Gani, 2006). NZSC (2004) in 
its corporate governance recommendations and guidelines documents the 
necessity of employing a majority of non-executive/independent directors in New 
Zealand companies. NZSC asks for a minimum of one-third of independent 
directors on New Zealand boards.     
In contrast with the supporters of non-executive/independent directors some 
empirical studies document different results. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
believe that outside directors build careers on multiple boards, even though they 
may not effectively understand the company business. Gunasekarage, Locke, 
Reddy and Scrimgeour (2006) and Hutchinson (2002) document the negative role 
of board independency on the firm’s performance. Some other studies do not 
support board independency in companies (Chin, 2003; Prevost, 2002b; Young, 
2003). Chahine (2004) shows that firms with higher value tend to employ more 
outside directors compared with low valued firms. He expects to see a reverse U-
shaped relationship between the number of non-executive/independent directors 
and firm’s performance.  
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Non-executive/independent directors hold a majority on boards of directors in 
New Zealand and Singapore. It is argued that the lack of effective corporate 
control has convinced investors to rely on the internal control systems, such as the 
outside directors. The smaller pool of directors in New Zealand may be another 
reason for employing more outside directors; as the small pool of directors offers 
a more restricted pool of skills and companies try to overcome this problem by 
appointing more outside directors. The lack of conclusive results around the effect 
of board independency provides a reason for this study to investigate the 
relationship between outside directors and the cost of capital in the New Zealand 
and Singapore’s large listed companies. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to board 
independency: 
H0: Proportion of outside (non-executive/independent) directors is negatively 
related to cost of capital in New Zealand.  
H0: Proportion of outside (non-executive/independent) directors is negatively 
related to cost of capital in Singapore.  
3.3.5 Board Diversity 
Prior studies document mixed and inconclusive results about the effectiveness of 
board composition in corporations (de Andres, 2005). Board diversity and board 
independency are the two significant corporate governance issues (Milliken, 
1996). Prior research documents two main reasons to support board diversity in 
companies.  
First of all board diversity can increase discussions and the exchange of ideas on 
boards. Thus, board diversity can improve company performance and help the 
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company to control costs through providing wider insights and perspectives on the 
board (Carter, 2003; Knippenberg, 2004). Secondly, board diversity can help 
companies protect shareholders’ interests. This is because board diversity brings 
different gender, ethnicity and cultural background which provide different 
insights to board operations. The diversity helps the corporation to better protect  
shareholders’ interests (Arfken, 2004).  
A concern for achieving board diversity has led some countries to legislate or 
threaten companies to legislate higher diversity on boards (McGregor, 2008). For 
example, in Norway, the government asked companies to dedicate 40% of their 
boards to female directors voluntarily or the government will make this a legal 
requirement. Almost 15% of Fortune 500 companies in the US had female 
directors in 2007. In New Zealand almost 9% of NZX listed companies had 
female directors on their board (McGregor, 2008). Presence of female directors on 
boards is less than 1 in Singapore (Castellano, 2011). 
Prior studies document a positive relationship between female directors and firm’s 
performance. Reddy et al (2008a) document a statistically significant relationship 
between female directors and the performance of small cap companies in New 
Zealand. Brennan and McCafferty (1997) document two reasons in supporting 
female directors. First of all, female directors are not part of the “old-boys” 
network, so they are more independent. Secondly, female directors have a better 
understanding of customers’ behaviour and interests.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to board diversity: 
H0: Board diversity is negatively related to the cost of capital in the New Zealand 
market.       
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H0: Board diversity is negatively related to the cost of capital in the Singapore 
market. 
3.3.6 CEO Duality 
CEO duality means that the same person has the CEO hat and chairperson of the 
board hat and non-duality implies that different people hold each position. 
Separating decision management (CEO) and decision control (chairman) in a firm 
provides checks and balances that stop the managers from engaging in 
opportunistic behaviour (Abor, 2007). The importance of separating the chairman 
and the board in some countries such as New Zealand lead them to legally ban 
companies from having CEO duality. In Singapore, Tan et al. (2001) found that 
CEO duality decreased slightly from 43 percent in 1995 to 35 percent in 1997.   
In contrast, some studies argue that CEO duality can help the company work more 
efficiently. These companies don’t have to wait for the CEO and chairman of the 
board to reach the same decision. In this regard, Peng et al. (2007) document a 
positive role for CEO duality in the Singapore market. But, some studies suggest 
that there is no significant relationship between CEO duality, firm performance 
and cost of capital. Tan et al. (2001) finds that CEO duality had no impact on 
companies in Singapore during 1995-1996.  
Inconclusive results of prior studies on this issue and different situations of New 
Zealand and Singapore, guide this study to investigate the role of CEO duality on 
the cost of capital in these countries. 
The following hypotheses are formulated in regard to CEO duality: 
H0: CEO duality is positively related to the cost of capital in the New Zealand 
market.       
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H0: CEO duality is positively related to the cost of capital in the Singapore 
market. 
3.3.7 CEO Tenure 
Shareholders care about their firm’s performance and consider that CEOs should 
pursue strategies that maximize stock returns. However, CEOs may be more 
interested in maximizing their own wealth rather than the company’s wealth. So 
they focus on their own interests. This creates a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and CEOs. One of the factors affecting this behaviour of CEOs is 
their tenure in the company (Simsek, 2007). 
Simsek (2007) indicates that the relationship between CEO tenure and firm’s 
performance is a complex issue. Short tenured CEOs may negatively affect firm 
performance because these CEOs may suffer from lack of sufficient information 
to notice and assess strategic risks and also they are unknown and untested. Long 
tenured CEOs accumulate a track record; achieve more information and 
knowledge about the firm’s environment and acquire specific skills required for 
the job.  
Long tenured CEOs can negatively affect performance by becoming more 
committed to their way of working, avoiding information that questions this 
paradigm, losing interest in their jobs and ignoring calls for strategic changes 
(Hambrick, 1991). Long tenured CEOs also have enough time to build up 
significant human capital. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argue that the 
commitment between CEOs and strategic paradigms increases along with increase 
in CEO tenure. After a couple of years, the opportunistic behaviour of the CEO 
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may surface and that behaviour may reduce firm performance. After a long period 
the CEO may lose his/her incentive to work for the maximum benefit of the firm.  
Wen et al.(2002) suggests that companies which have CEOs with more 
background in the company have lower leverage. So the presence of these CEOs 
can improve the firm’s performance and reduce cost of capital. The more 
experience the CEO has in his position, the better the firm’s performance will be. 
Because the CEO has more experience in his career and also s/he is more familiar 
with the character of the firm, employees and market.  
Long tenure CEOs can influence board members for a number of reasons. CEOs 
normally nominate new board members and through this procedure can replace 
those board members who less supports them. So, new board members who owe 
their position to CEOs are more loyal to CEOs rather than shareholders. 
Consequently this affect the ability of new board members to evaluate the CEO’s 
performance effectively (Finkelstein, 1989). Another reason is that older CEOs 
are able to control the firms’ internal information systems and withhold relevant 
information from compensation committees and board members and cover any 
poor performances (Hill, 1991).  
The CEO tenure has almost the same situation in the New Zealand and Singapore 
markets. Average CEO Tenure in New Zealand and Singapore is six years. 
Inconclusive and mixed results of prior research lead this study to consider the 
effect of the CEO’s tenure on the cost of capital in New Zealand and Singapore. 
The following hypotheses are formulated in regard to CEO tenure: 
H0: CEO tenure is negatively related to the cost of capital in the New Zealand 
market.       
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H0: CEO tenure is negatively related to the cost of capital in the Singapore 
market. 
3.4 Data and Research Method 
The following section describes the methods used to test the research hypotheses 
and framework which are presented above. Data collection method and 
measurement of the variables along with empirical models and techniques of 
analysing data and exploring the data are described in the following section.   
3.4.1 Data 
Required data for the study were collected from the NZX company research (NZX 
Deep Archive), Singapore Exchange Market Website (SGX), Datastream and 
Thompson one banker databases. Data from the top 50 publicly listed companies 
(this top fifty constitute the NZX 50 index) in New Zealand and the STI 
Constituent (the large 30 companies which constitute STI constituent) in 
Singapore were collected for large listed companies in New Zealand and 
Singapore.  
The period of this study was originally from 2005 to 2010. However, lack of 
sufficient data in 2005 required this study to ignore 2005 in estimations. 
Therefore, the sampling period is five years from 2006 to 2010. Companies 
included in this study cover all sectors of the economy: energy, property, goods, 
primary services and investment.  
The sample of this study includes 50 large listed companies from New Zealand 
and 30 large listed companies from Singapore. 400 company-year observations 
were made in the sample period. Fourteen companies were excluded from the 
sample which means 70 company-year observations. The remaining 330 
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company-year (82.5% of the sample) observations are included in the pool data 
set of this study as the representatives of large listed companies.  
The exclusion of companies especially related to New Zealand companies. The 
small size of the New Zealand market caused some shortcomings that led to a 
shortage of data. The lack of every day trading in companies’ shares is one of the 
associated problems in the New Zealand market. This leads to missed information 
in some companies. Eleven large listed companies out of 50 large listed 
companies in the New Zealand market were excluded from the sample. This 
means 55 company-year (13.75% of New Zealand sample) observations. The 
Singapore market is relatively larger than New Zealand’s and consequently the 
exclusion of companies in this sample is less than for New Zealand. Only three 
companies were excluded from the Singapore market which means 15 company-
year (3.75% of Singapore sample) observations. 
Table ‎3.1: Number of Large Listed Companies' data included in this study each year 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
New 
Zealand 
39 39 39 39 39 195 
Singapore 27 27 27 27 27 135 
 
3.4.2 Variables 
Dependent and independent (explanatory) variables used in this study are 
described in the following section. 
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3.4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
One well-known method of calculating cost of capital is weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC). This method was first introduced by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, 1963), and Miles and Ezzell (1980). Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1996) 
and other researchers argue that WACC is the most widely used method of 
calculating the cost of capital in the real world by far (Massari, 2007; Pierru, 
2009). The basic definition of WACC includes the cost of capital coming from 
both equity and debt. This advantage makes WACC one of the fundamental 
concepts in corporate finance (Farber, 2006). WACC equation for a firm which is 
using common share (equity) and bond (debt) financing will be: 
WACC = r = wdrd (1-t) + were                            (3.1) 
Where, rd represents the market rate on the firm’s outstanding debt as cost of debt 
and re represents cost of equity which is frequently calculated by CAPM method. 
Wd is the weights of debt and we is the weights of equity. Debt weights in a firm 
with both debt and equity is (value of debt / value of debt plus value of equity). 
Equity weight in a firm with both debt and equity is (value of equity / value of 
debt plus value of equity). In this equation wd + we =1. So, debt and equity are the 
only sources of finance in this equation. In this equation t represents tax rate on 
corporate income. The standard treatment in WACC in order to reflect the 
deductibility of interest payments is (1-t). By this procedure the interest cost of 
debt will reduce. The interest payments are not calculated in the prospective cash 
flows to avoid double counting the tax advantage of debt.  
WACC is the discount rate which is widely used in corporate finance. A correct 
WACC requires proper calculation of the value of tax shields which depends on 
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the company’s debt policy. Cooper (2006) and Farber (2006) argue that the only 
way to implement debt policy is maintaining a fixed market value debt ratio 
(Miles-Ezzell’s assumption). Massari, Roncaglio and Zanetti (2007) show that 
WACC approach is still widely used all around the world especially in Europe, by 
banks and financial analysts. One of the important issues in employing WACC is 
the method of measuring the cost of equity. Among different methods of 
calculating the cost of equity, Capital Asset Pricing Models are widely employed 
and accepted (Chen, 2009; Da, 2012). The most important difference in Asset 
Pricing Models is the way each aligns with risk proxies and risk factors.  
3.4.2.2 Cost of Debt 
The method of calculating cost of debt is not as complicated as that for cost of 
equity. Cost of debt refers to the amount of money a company should pay as the 
cost of its debts. The cost of debt is computed as the rate on a risk-free bond. This 
study employs the yield to maturity of bonds in companies as the cost of capital. 
In case the yield to maturity was not accessible through the released information, 
interest paid on long-term bonds was assumed as the cost of debt. In case of 
inaccessible information for the above items, interest paid on long-term borrowing 
is captured as the cost of debt.    
3.4.2.3 Cost of Equity 
Different studies suggest different shortcomings in the risk proxies of the Fama-
French Three Factor Model, the Momentum Model and the CAPM. To be more 
comprehensive, this study will employ FF3F and Momentum model. The cost of 
equity in these methods can be estimated through different equations as below 
(Chen, 2009): 
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Ri = Rf + [Rm – Rf] βim                                                                   (3.2) 
Rit – Rft = αi + βiM (RMt – Rft) + βisSMBt + βihHMLt + εit                  (3.3) 
Rit – Rft = αi + βiM (RMt – Rft) + βisSMBt + βihHMLt + βiwWMLt + εit    (3.4) 
where, Ri is the return on asset i, Rf is the risk-free rate, Rm is the return on 
market, (Rm – Rf) is the market risk premium, SMBt (small minus big) represents 
the difference between the returns of diversified portfolios of small and big 
shares. HMLt (high minus low) is the difference between the returns on diversified 
portfolios of high and low book to market ratio shares. WMLt represents the 
difference between the returns of diversified portfolios of winners and losers and 
betas are the slopes of multiple regression of Rit-Rft on RMt-Rft, SMBt and HMLt 
and WMLt.  
The correct way to estimate these models is linear regression which has been used 
in prior studies (Chen, 2009; Da, 2012). The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression model is employed to estimate these models. According to the 
literature, one of the major problems in estimating cost of capital through OLS is 
violation of its primary conditions. It is argued that White coefficient covariance 
matrix can be used as an instrument for OLS in order to eliminate OLS’s 
shortcomings (Garcia, 2001; Grandes, 2010).  
In the first step of the estimations Unit root test and Normality test are employed 
to assess the primary conditions of OLS method. Results of these tests confirm 
that there is no unit root problem. However, normality tests indicate problems in 
distribution of some variables. This shortcoming is covered through employing 
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Generalizes Least Square (GLS) method. This is explained in the following 
sections. 
One of the other OLS conditions which should be mentioned is absence of 
correlation between dependent variables. Correlation between independent 
variables may cause biased estimations. In order to prevent the multi-co-linearity 
problem, the independent variables were checked through E-views software and 
no significant correlations were found. 
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Table ‎3.2: Correlation of independent variables 
Covariance 
New Zealand companies Singapore companies Correlation 
t-Statistic 
 MARKET SMB HML WML MARKET SMB HML WML 
MARKET 
3.0325    8.0871    
1    1.000    
-----    -----    
SMB 
-0.1437 2.3462   0.7529 6.6959   
-0.0539 1   0.1023 1.000   
-1.0299 -----   1.9623 -----   
HML 
0.0028 -0.6808 3.2955  2.0846 6.2079 14.936  
0.0008 -0.2448 1  0.1896 0.6207 1.000  
0.0170 -4.8182 -----  3.6857 15.106 -----  
WML 
0.0136 -0.3438 -0.2658 14.387 -0.6319 -5.1751 -8.2885 18.085 
0.0020 -0.0591 -0.0386 1 -0.0522 -0.4702 -0.5043 1.000 
0.0394 -1.1311 -0.737 ----- -0.9983 -10.166 -11.142 ----- 
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Investigating high pair-wise correlation between variables is one of the famous 
methods to assess co-linearity. Eigemvaluips and Condition number also 
employed to check the co-linearity. The results were consistent with pair-wise 
correlation test and no co-linearity was detected.  
Along with these diagnostic tests, the Durbin-Watsons test was employed to 
assess the Auto Correlation between variables. No Auto Correlation was detected 
in samples from this test. Another important factor that investigated the in 
estimations was homoskedasticity. This condition indicates the constancy of 
variance of residuals in estimations. If variance of residuals changes during time 
then the results of estimations will show bias.  
Garcia and Bonomo (2001) indicate this issue in their study of the Brazil markets. 
As mentioned in literature, high inflation rates cause changes in the variance of 
residuals. According to Gujarati (1995) high inflation rates affect the value of 
firms and thus all aspects of firms are affected. He argues that that the 
heteroskedasticity problem does not exist, unless the economic situation affects 
the market.  
Heteroskedasticity of all firms was checked through different heteroskedasticity 
diagnostics the White test, Glejser test and Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. The 
results of these tests imply the existence of heteroskedasticity in some of the 
estimations. Further assessment showed that companies with relatively higher 
returns have heteroskedasticity problems. Different firms with different variance 
in their returns can cause the heteroskedasticity problem. 
Berry and Feldman (1985) indicate that a combination of large and small 
companies that have different variance in their costs and return may cause 
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heteroskedasticity. The Generalized Least Square model (GLS) was employed by 
this study to overcome the heteroskedasticity problem. Along with the generalized 
least square model, a white coefficient covariance matrix was employed by this 
study to remove the effects of heteroskedasticity from estimations.  
Another important issue in estimating the cost of capital is the number of 
observations required to have unbiased estimations (Jin, 2006). Prior studies 
suggest that it is not necessary to have a long period for estimations. Such studies 
document the employment of relevant information as the reason for this 
suggestion. Most studies used five years of monthly data although most suggest 
that weekly data would be more reliable than monthly data as weekly data 
includes more observations during the same number of years (DeJong, 1985). 
Some studies have used daily data (Cosemans, 2009) but recognise that a non-
synchronicity problem may arise when applying daily data because smaller firms 
do not trade every day (Scholes, 1977). Therefore this study will use weekly data 
for a period of two years which includes more than 100 observations. In the cases 
where less than two years of data were available, one year of daily data was used. 
Eviews 7.1 and Excel software were employed as the analysis software in the 
calculation process. 
Periods of two years are required in estimating betas of cost of capital. As the 
period of this study is 2006 to 2010 it means that data of 2004 and 2005 are 
required to calculate the beta for 2006. So in fact data from a 7-year period are 
required. Although in the primary proposal, the six-year period of 2005 to 2010 
was suggested, lack of required data to calculate beta for the year 2005 guided this 
study to omit year 2005 from the analysis.  
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Estimating cost of equity capital through CAPM, FF3F and Momentum models 
requires two other sources of data. These are risk free rate and market premium. 
Risk free rate in this study is the short term government bonds yield. This figure 
was extracted from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) institution database. Market 
Risk premium (MRP) in this study was employed according to the estimation of 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers on market risk premium which is based on a long term 
calculation. Thompson One Banker and Datastream database were employed to 
extract the required data such as: Market Capitalizations, Book to market ratios 
and share prices.  
The statistical significance of these coefficients was another concern. This was 
tested through evaluating the explanatory power of these dependent variables. In 
order to statistically check the estimations, a null hypothesis for each model was 
tested to check whether or not exclusion of any of these factors affect FF3F and 
Momentum model. The Wald test, which inspects the validation of coefficient, 
was employed to check the validity of coefficients. The Null hypothesis of Wald 
test is as below: 
                                               H0: βis = βih = 0                                               (3.5) 
                                               H0: βis = βih= βiw = 0                                        (3.6) 
Wald hypotheses indicate whether the independent variables have explanatory 
power or not. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that SMB, HML, WML or 
all of them are significant systematic risk factors. Therefore, the presence of these 
variables in pricing models is meaningful and these variables have explanatory 
power (related tables are attached in APPENDIX C). 
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Two other statistics have been employed to check the validation of coefficients 
along with Wald test. In comparing statistical models, the standard criteria are: 
coefficient of determination, R
2
and an estimate of the error variance, S
2
. However 
R
2 
measures the capability of model to fit the data and is not prediction 
oriented(Myers, 1990). Valuable information can be provided by estimation of 
error variance (S
2
) when selecting the best model for prediction. This estimation 
of error can be used both in assessing the suitability of fit and prediction. The 
model with the smallest S
2
 and the largest R
2
 is preferable. Another method is 
prediction oriented is employed in order to select the preferable model(Bello, 
2008). This method is PRESS (i.e. the prediction sum of squares). The PRESS 
statistic is calculated as below: 
      ∑    
 
         
2
                                   (3.7) 
where, Yi is the response and      (i=1, 2, …, n) is the prediction. This prediction 
is calculated by removing the first observation, then the second, then the third, and 
so on. Each time of fitting the model using the remaining observations, and then 
estimating the first observation (i.e.     ), then the second observation and so on. 
The model with smallest PRESS statistic is preferable. Table 3.4 shows the 
statistical properties of asset pricing model. 
Table ‎3.3: Statistical Properties of Asset Pricing Model (New Zealand) 
Measure of goodness of fit and prediction   
 CAPM  Three Factor Model Four Factor Model 
S
2
 16.368  16.224  16.220 
PRESS 16.370  16.228  16.226 
PRESS is calculated as defined in equation above divided by the number of data. 
115 
 
Table ‎3.4: Statistical Properties of Asset Pricing Model (Singapore) 
Measure of goodness of fit and prediction   
 CAPM  Three Factor Model  Four Factor Model 
S
2
 24.823  24.356  23.785 
PRESS 24.818  24.363  23.795 
PRESS is calculated as defined in equation above divided by the number of data. 
Based on the lowest S
2
 and PRESS statistic in both countries, the Four Factor 
Model is a better model not only in suitability of fit but also in prediction 
capability. Although the CAPM model is still being applied by researchers (Da, 
2012) and finance textbooks its shortcomings are obvious (Fama, 2004). Different 
researchers try to overcome these weaknesses by adding more state variables to 
the model to make it more realistic. Although size and BE/ME add more 
explanatory power to CAPM, the dominating factor in explaining the expected 
return is still the market factor. Thus, a comprehensive investigation is required to 
find out the best method of calculation that suits the sample of this study.   
3.4.2.4 Explanatory Variables 
Independent variables of this study are factors reported as corporate governance 
components by prior studies (see Table 3.6). These variables affect firm 
performance either positively or negatively. The variables are block ownership, 
insider ownership, board size, board independency, board diversity, CEO tenure 
and CEO duality. And the way that they are defined in this study are as follows: 
As already noted block holder ownership (BOWN) as designed in this study is the 
proportion of shares held by the top five shareholders in a company. Required 
data is extracted from the annual reports of each company. NZX Company 
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Research data base and SGX webpage were employed to extract the annual 
reports as all of the required data was accessible through these reports except for 
Hong Kong (Land, Jardine Matheson and Jardine) and strategic companies in 
Singapore. These companies only report the proportion of shares held by those 
shareholders with 5% of shares or more. Therefore, the proportion of shares held 
by shareholders who held 5% or more has been considered.       
In order to have a standard approach that could be applied to all firms this study 
considers ordinary shares held by insiders as insider ownership. As noted in 
previous chapter, insider ownership (IOWN) is the proportion of shares owned by 
directors of the board and also officers who are board members, divided by the 
total shares outstanding.  
Non-executive/Independent Directors (NED) is the proportion of outside directors 
(non-executive/independent) on boards. A non-executive director (NED) or 
outside director is a member of the board who is not part of the executive 
management team. They are not an employee of the company or affiliated with 
the company in any other way. Outside directors are differentiated from inside 
directors who serve or previously served as executive managers of the company. 
Board independence is an important issue in corporate governance practices but 
specifying what constitutes independency has its shortcomings. Some companies 
disclose their boards’ information as dependent and independent directors while 
some others employed executive and non-executive definitions in their annual 
reports. Comparing the independence between companies seems to be a problem 
for empirical studies. Some prior studies employed outside directors instead of 
independent directors in order to differentiate independent managers from others 
117 
 
or just consider the difference between executive and non-executive directors 
(Hossain, 2001). Other studies consider independence as separation from senior 
management of the company (Anderson, 2004).  
Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of outside or independent 
directors, this factor is still one of the most recommended practices of good 
corporate governance. Corporations should make every effort to improve their 
boards’ effectiveness by appointing more outside directors on their boards. In 
order to limit the bias that may arise from inconsistent reporting of independent 
directors, non-executive/independent directors (NED) are employed in this study. 
NED represents directors who are non-executive and independent. 
Board size (BDS) is the total number of directors on the board. Female director 
(FMD) is the number of female directors divided by total number of directors 
which is the percentage of female directors on boards. Separation of CEO and 
chairman is defined by CEO duality (DUALITY) which is one if the CEO and 
chairman are the one person and zero if chairman and CEO are different people. 
CEO tenure (TENURE) is the number of years that the CEO was in his/her 
position with the company. Leverage (LEV) is the total debt divided by the total 
equity. The proportion of debt is defined as long term and short term liabilities. 
The company size is the natural logarithm of total asset (Ln(S)) which is the proxy 
for the size of companies. And GDP growth rate is the growth rate of gross 
domestic product in each country. Anderson and Reeb (2004) also employed this 
proxy for measuring the firm size.  
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Table ‎3.5: Table of Variables 
Variables Measurement Technique 
Dependent  
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital. 
Independent   
BOWN Proportion of shares owned by top 5 shareholders. 
IOWN Proportion of shares owned by insider. 
NED Proportion of non-executive/independent directors on the board. 
BDS Total number of board’s members. 
FMD Proportion of female directors on the board. 
DUALITY CEO and chairman of the board is one person. 
TENURE Total number of years that the CEO works in his/her position. 
CONTORL  
LEV Leverage = Long-term liabilities plus short-term liabilities 
divided by total asset. 
LN(S) Proxy for size which is the LN of total assets. 
GDP Growth Gross Domestic Product Growth 
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3.5 Model specification 
3.5.1 Model specification for the relationship between explanatory variables and cost 
of capital 
3.5.1.1 Insider ownership 
Existing literature documents different relationships between insider ownership, 
firm performance and cost of capital. Some studies indicate a linear positive 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance (or linear negative 
relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital)(Coles, 2007; Loderer, 
1997). The second group of studies indicate a curvilinear relationship between 
insider ownership, firm performance and cost of capital (McConnell, 1990).  
The third group of studies indicate a cubic relationship between insider 
ownership, firm performance and cost of capital (Holderness, 1999; Short, 1999). 
Higher insider ownership increases the firm’s performance in primary levels of 
insider ownership (alignment of interests). When insider ownership passes a 
specific level of ownership, a negative relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance appears (entrenchment effect). And finally at high levels of 
insider ownership there is a positive relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance.  
In order to find the correct relationship between insider ownership and cost of 
capital, a panel data regression model is employed. Insider ownership, its square 
form and its cubic form are employed as independent variables. Some control 
variables such as firm size and leverage are also included in this equation. 
The related equation is as below: 
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WACCit = αi + β1(IOWNit) + β2(IOWNit)
2
 + β3(IOWNit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit)+ β6(GDP GROWTHt) +  εit                                (3.8) 
where WACC represents cost of capital for firm i in year t. IOWN represents 
insider ownership, (IOWNit)
2
 and (IOWNit)
3 
represents square and cubic form of 
insider ownership respectively. (LN(S)it) represents size of firm i in year t. αi is 
the intercept of equation. (LEVit) represents leverage of firm i in year t. (GDP 
GROWTHt) represents the gross domestic product of each country in each year 
and, εit is the residual of equation. 
Adding the second and third degree in the equation is just to track the potential 
pattern between that variable and cost of capital. This approach is consistent with 
prior research (Griffith, 1999; Henderson, 2006; Shen, 2002; Simsek, 2007). 
These variables should have explanatory power in the model. So, at each stage it 
needs to be tested. This was done and reported in Appendix D. Signs of β2 and β3 
indicate the shape of this equation. Negative sign of β2 and positive sign of β3 
indicate an up/down/up graph (Figure 3.2). The Positive sign of β2 and the 
negative sign of β3 indicate a down/up/down graph (Figure 3.3). Thus, the 
negative sign of β2 and positive sign of β3 indicate a cubic graph with a maximum 
and a minimum respectively as shown in Figure 3.2. In an opposite situation the 
negative sign of β3 and the positive sign of β2 indicate a cubic graph with a 
minimum and a maximum respectively (see Figure 3.3). Values of these 
maximum and minimum points will be achieved through solving the related 
equation and examining the second derivatives.  
 If f''(x) < 0, There is a maximum extremum. 
 If f''(x) > 0, There is a minimum extremum.        
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A sample of reaching to these values presented in part 4.4.    
 
Control variables like size and leverage of the firm and GDP growth rate of 
economy were entered into this equation in order to track the effects of firm size 
and leverage on cost of capital. In a situation where cubic relationship was 
rejected through the above estimations, a curvilinear equation was employed in 
order to find a curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and cost of 
capital. The related equation is as below: 
WACCit  = αi + β1(IOWNit) + β2(IOWNit)
2
 + β3(LN(S)it) + β4(LEVit) + 
β5(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                                                         (3.9) 
IOWN 
WACC 
Figure 3.2: Model specification for the relationship of IOWN and cost of capital (up/down/up) 
IOWN 
WACC 
Figure 3.3: Model specification for the relationship of IOWN and cost of capital (down/up/down) 
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Negative sign of β2 indicates a maximum point in the graph of this equation while 
a positive sign of β2 documents a minimum point in the graph of this equation. 
Related graphs are respectively as below: 
   
3.5.1.2 Block ownership 
Some prior studies indicate a cubic relationship between firm performance and 
block ownership (Gugler, 2004; Short, 1999). These studies believe that when 
block ownership is at the primary level, there is a positive relationship between 
block ownership and firm performance. When block ownership passes a specific 
level of ownership, there is a negative relationship between block ownership and 
firm performance, because block owners are not eager to accept the costs of 
interfering in the firm in order to increase the firm’s performance. In high levels 
of block ownership, there is a positive relationship between block ownership and 
firm performance again. This relationship causes a cubic relation that is illustrated 
in the equation below: 
WACCit = αi + β1(BOWNit) + β2(BOWNit)
2
 + β3(BOWNit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit) + β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                                 (3.10) 
IOWN IOWN 
WACC WACC 
Figure 3.4: Model specification for the relationship of explanatory variable and cost of capital 
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where WACCit represents cost of capital for firm i in year t. BOWN represents 
block ownership, BOWNit
2
 and BOWNit
3 
represent square and cubic form of 
block ownership respectively. LN(S) represents the size of the firm i in year t and 
LEVit represents the leverage in firm i in year t. GDP Growth represents the 
growth of gross domestic production of each economy. αi is the intercept of 
equation and εit is the residual of equation. 
Signs of β2 and β3 indicate the shape of the graph of this equation. Negative sign 
of β2 and positive sign of β3 indicate an up/down/up graph while positive sign of 
β2 and a negative sign of β3 document a down/up/down graph. Related graphs are 
shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.  
If the cubic relationship is rejected through the estimations, a curvilinear equation 
will be employed in order to find a curvilinear relationship between block 
ownership and cost of capital. The related equation is as below: 
WACCit = αi + β1(BOWNit) + β2(BOWNit)
2
 + β3(LN(S)it) + β4(LEVit) + β5(GDP 
GROWTHt) + εit                                                         (3.11)  
The negative sign of β2 indicates a maximum in the graph of this equation; while 
positive sign of β2 documents a minimum in the graph of this equation. The 
related graph is presented in Figures 3.4. The same methods of estimations as 
above however employed for exploring the relationship between board size, board 
diversity, board independence and CEO tenure with cost of capital in New 
Zealand and Singapore.  
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3.5.2 Model specification for the relationship between corporate governance and 
cost of capital 
In this study, panel data for years 2006 to 2010 is employed through an Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least Square (GLS) regression technique in 
order to measure the effect of corporate governance mechanisms and control 
variables on cost of capital measured by WACC. The problem of reverse causality 
in governance research can be resolved by panel data estimation (Borsch-Supan, 
2002). The model formulated will be as below: 
WACCit = αi + β1(BOWNit) + β2(IOWNit) + β3(NEDit) + β4(BDSit) + β5(FMDit) + 
β6(DUALITYit) + β7(TENUREit) + β8(LN(S)it) + β9(LEVit) + β10(GDP 
GROWTHt) + εit                                                   (3.12) 
In order to track the type of relationship between each corporate governance 
component and cost of capital and also the role of corporate governance on cost of 
capital in New Zealand and Singapore’s large listed companies, the above 
equations are employed for the New Zealand and Singapore market separately and 
the results will be reported in the following sections separately. 
3.6 Check for multicollinearity, endogeneity and heteroskedasticity 
Using the OLS estimation model could lead to biased results. Endogeneity and 
multicollinearity are two important problems that should be checked before 
applying the OLS. These problems are encountered when two or more variables 
are jointly endogenous. It means the explanatory variables are related to the 
residual of estimations. The Haussmann test will be employed to check for the 
endogeneity problem. Unit root test also conducted in this study and in case of 
having non-stationary in variables, cointegration test will be employed.  
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A multicollinearity problem arises when two or more explanatory variables are 
correlated with each other. High pair-wise correlation between variables is widely 
accepted method to assess multicollinearity. Eigemvaluips and Condition number 
are other methods of evaluating multicollinearity which are employed here. Along 
with these diagnostic tests, the Durbin-Watsons test is employed to assess the 
Auto Correlation in variables. 
According to Field (2005) pair-wise correlation above 0.8 should be mentioned as 
a potential problem. Field’s suggestion is one of the different approaches in this 
regard. Prior studies believed that the variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates the 
linear relationship between explanatory variables. Myers (1990) believes that at 
value of 10 this shortcoming arises while Bowrman and O’Connell (1990) argue 
that VIF greater than 1 may result in biased estimations. 
Ignorance of homoskedasticity can lead to bias in estimation. If variance of 
residuals changes in time then the results of estimations will be biased. Garcia and 
Bonomo (2001) point this out in their study of the Brazilian market. As mentioned 
in literature, a high inflation rate causes changes in variance of residuals, a high 
inflation rate affects the value of firms and thus all aspects of firms will be 
affected (Gujarati, 1995). White, Godfrey and Glejser tests will be employed to 
check for heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, in order to cover the bias in estimations 
that may arise because of heteroskedasticity, Generalized Least Square (GLS) 
model is also employed.  
3.7 Summary of Chapter 
The research framework and conceptual model of empirical analysis in this study 
have been described in this chapter along with the governance mechanisms, 
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sample, data and description of variables. Empirical methods of estimating the 
potential relationship between each corporate governance component and cost of 
capital were described. The Various hypotheses along with various empirical 
models to test them were presented. The empirical results of the relationship 
between corporate governance practices and cost of capital in New Zealand’s 
large listed companies will be provided in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COST OF 
CAPITAL IN NEW ZEALAND: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION 
4.0 Introduction 
Results of the empirical study regarding the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and cost of capital in large listed companies in New 
Zealand will be presented in this chapter. The required description of the sample 
size, corporate governance and cost of capital in New Zealand was provided in 
Chapter 3. This chapter consists of three sections which are: description of 
descriptive statistics of the sample, results of data analyses and conclusion. 
4.1 Empirical results 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
The sample of the New Zealand Stock Exchange companies comprised 50 large 
listed companies during the period 2006 to 2010. Companies that did not issue the 
required information were removed from the sample and a final sample of 39 
companies remained. Therefore, 78% of the companies in the sample remained in 
estimations.  
The summary of descriptive statistics for pooled data of New Zealand’s large 
listed companies including means, medians, minimum, maximum, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis and the number of observations is provided in Table 
4.1. The mean cost of capital (WACC) is 6.54%, with a median of 6.28%. These 
two values indicate that the cost of capital of large listed companies in New 
Zealand is distributed normally around 6% to 6.5%. The mean proportion of 
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insider ownership (IOWN) is 8.21% and the median is 1.1% which means half of 
the sample’s insider ownership is less than 1.1%. In this regards prior studies in 
the US and UK companies indicate that 58% of companies in the US and 48% of 
companies in the UK have an IOWN level of 5% or less (Morck, 1988; Short, 
1999). Hossain et al. (2001) in their comprehensive sample of New Zealand 
companies (633 companies) report that mean and median of insider ownership are 
6.8% and 0.6% respectively.  
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Table ‎4.1: Descriptive Statistics in New Zealand 
Variables 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis  Observations Dependent 
  
WACC 6.54 6.28 12.2 0.27 2.53 -0.04 2.62 195 
Governance         
IOWN 8.21 1.1 65 0 13.79 2.21 8.11 195 
BOWN 49.53 48.26 89.02 15.17 0.19 0.21 2.24 195 
BDS 6.88 7 12 3 1.47 0.25 3.73 195 
FMD 0.73 1 3 0 0.77 1.08 4.31 195 
NED 4.8 5 8 1 1.64 -0.21 2.08 195 
DUALITY 0.06 0 1 0    195 
TENURE 6.39 4 32 1 6.21 2.09 7.62 195 
Control          
LN(S) 13.25 13.23 15.99 8.57 1.26 -0.48 3.58 195 
LEV 2.27 0.93 51.29 0.12 6.21 5.88 38.64 195 
GDP Growth (%) 1.02 1.3 2.7 -2.1 1.78 -0.75 2.23 195 
 
130 
 
The mean and median of proportion of shares held by the top five shareholders 
(BOWN) is 49.53% and 48.26% respectively. Hossain et al. (2001) reports that 
the mean and median of block ownership (BOWN) in New Zealand were 76.3% 
and 78.3% respectively. The difference in results of this study and Hossain’s 
study is because of different samples in the two studies and also because different 
methods were used to measure block ownership. Average block ownership of 
76.3% during 1991/97 and 62% during 1999/2007 and 48.68% during 2006/10 
indicates that block ownership in New Zealand declined during previous years.  
And the figures for board size also show that the mean and median of board size 
in large listed companies in New Zealand are 6.88 and 7 respectively. Fox (1996) 
shows that board size declined in New Zealand from 7 to 6 during 1970s to 1980s. 
This indicates that the size of boards in large New Zealand companies is effective 
and boards in these companies manage to control the agency conflicts. 
The mean and median of non-executive/independent directors in New Zealand are 
4.8 and 5 respectively. This means that 69.76% of board members are non-
executive/independent directors. So, more than two third of directors on boards 
are non-executive/independent. The mean and median of female directors on 
boards are 0.73 and 1 which means 10.61% of board members are female 
directors. The number of female directors ranged from 0 to 3. Although duality is 
limited by New Zealand authorities, some companies have duality. Mean and 
(median) of CEO tenure are 6.39 and 4 years respectively. This means that CEOs 
remain in their position almost 6 years on average.  
The mean and median of company size are 13.25 and 13.23 respectively. Mean 
and median of Gross Domestic Product (GDP growth) in New Zealand economies 
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during 2006 to 2010 are 1.02 and 1.3 respectively. Mean and median of leverage 
are 2.27 and 0.93 respectively. These values indicate a significant employment of 
debt in large listed companies’ financing. Therefore, a substantial proportion of 
cash flow is employed to service debt. 
High standard deviation and difference between mean and median of some 
variables (especially ownership variables) indicate that the distributions of these 
variables are not normal. Along with high standard deviation, skewness of 
variables, which was reported in descriptive statistics, indicates that the 
distribution of variables have a tail on their right or left hand side. High kurtosis 
distribution reported in some variables shows that the distribution of these 
variables has a sharper peak and longer fat tails.  
Dealing with such unbalanced data requires some consideration. Excluding 
outliers in the presence of fat tails may mask effective variables from 
consideration. In order to prevent the exclusion of such variables in fat tails, the 
Grubbs test has been implemented in this study. Difference between true outliers 
from outliers in fat tails which contain important information is detectable through 
comparing the Grubbs test and its critical value. Implementing this test reveals 
two real outliers in insider ownership variables. These variables have been 
corrected by reconsidering the databases. Thus, the presence of a high standard 
deviation beside skewness and Kurtosis distribution of data in this study does not 
lead to the exclusion of more data because the Grubbs test reveals the importance 
of data in fat tails. The non-normal distribution of the variables indicates that an 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression will not be appropriate. An alternative is to 
use a Generalized Least Square (GLS) model which will provide more robust 
estimates (Olsson, 2000). 
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4.2 Correlation between independent variables 
Table 4.2 provides the correlation matrix of independent and control variables. 
The highest correlation is between DUALITY and LEV at 0.62. This means that 
companies with duality in their CEO positions tend to employ a higher amount of 
debt. The next high correlation is between BDS and NED correlated at 0.51 which 
means larger boards tend to employ more non-executive/independent directors. 
Other correlations range between -0.21 and 0.43. As the highest pairwise 
correlation between independent variables is 0.62, a low likelihood of 
multicollinearity was expected when applying OLS regressions.   
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Table ‎4.2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
 IOWN BOWN BDS NED FMD DUALITY TENURE SIZE LEVERAGE GDP GROWTH 
IOWN 
-----          
-----          
BOWN 
-0.055 -----         
(-0.760) -----         
BDS 
0.062 0.364*** -----        
(0.861) (5.428) -----        
NED 
0.075 0.069 0.511*** -----       
(1.038) (0.966) (8.252) -----       
FMD 
0.154** 0.148** 0.230*** 0.170** -----      
(2.167) (2.074) (3.288) (2.393) -----      
DUALITY 
0.102 -0.085 0.157** 0.153** 0.029 -----     
(1.423) (-1.182) (2.208) (2.145) (0.399) -----     
TENURE 
0.352*** -0.210*** -0.031 -0.068 0.063 0.433*** -----    
(5.225) (-2.986) (-0.429) (-0.952) (0.882) (6.676) -----    
SIZE 
-0.303*** 0.484*** 0.322*** 0.251*** 0.138* -0.063 -0.216*** -----   
(-4.419) (7.691) (4.732) (3.609) (1.941) (-0.877) (-3.073) -----   
LEV 
-0.109 -0.060 0.171** 0.270*** 0.262**** 0.619*** -0.104 -0.017 -----  
(-1.522) (-0.832) (2.412) (3.899) (3.776) (10.963) (-1.450) (-0.238) -----  
GDP 
GROWTH 
-0.022 0.021 -0.020 -0.062 -0.030 0.021 0.007 0.042 0.024 ----- 
(-0.310) (0.290) (-0.272) (-0.861) (-0.421) (0.293) (0.103) (0.581) (0.335) ----- 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); *denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-
tailed) 
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The following sections will present the relationship between corporate governance 
factors and cost of capital. 
4.3 OLS Regression of WACC on Corporate Governance Variables 
Table 4.3 presents the OLS and GLS (generalized least square) regression results 
of the equation regarding the relationship between cost of capital and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Table 4.3 provides coefficients of independent variables 
employed to illustrate WACC behaviour. The GLS method is employed in order 
to take into account the possibility of cross-section heterogeneity.   
Through the OLS estimation method, the independent variables IOWN, BOWN 
FMD, NED, LN(S), LEV and GDP growth have negative coefficients which mean 
that they negatively affect the cost of capital. Among these variables, IOWN and 
LEV are statistically significant at 5% and 1% level respectively. This means that 
higher levels of insider ownership negatively affect the cost of capital in 
companies. Thus, the presence of insider ownership in New Zealand’s companies 
decreases the cost of capital and helps companies to perform better. A negative 
sign of the relationship between leverage and cost of capital indicates that 
companies which employ more debt to equity in their financing have a lower cost 
of capital.  
Although the coefficient of BOWN (Block Ownership), NED (non-
executive/independent directors) and FMD (female directors) are statistically 
insignificant, the negative sign of BOWN indicates that block owners positively 
affect companies’ performance by decreasing the cost of capital. The negative 
signs of non-executive/independent directors and female directors’ coefficients 
indicate the important positive role of these directors in companies. 
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The outputs of the OLS method indicate positive coefficients for BDS, Duality 
and Tenure. Positive and statistically significant coefficients of CEO duality and 
CEO tenure show that appointing the same person as CEO and chairman increases 
the cost of capital while a longer tenured CEO increases the cost of capital.    
Slightly different results are tracked through the GLS method. Almost all of the 
coefficients are statistically meaningful at 1% and 5% levels. IOWN has a 
statistically significant and negative relationship with cost of capital at 0.01% 
level. Entrenchment and the expropriation effect of insiders at the present level of 
insider ownership could be the reason for this negative relationship. This will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
The results of this study document a negative relationship between NED and cost 
of capital which is statistically significant at 10% level. This means that the 
presence of more non-executive/independent directors negatively affect the cost of 
capital. There is a statistically insignificant and negative relationship between 
FMD and LN(S) and cost of capital.  
GLS method documents a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between GDP growth and cost of capital. There is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between leverage and cost of capital in the GLS method 
which is the same as the OLS method. BOWN, BDS, Duality and Tenure 
positively affect the cost of capital. Although the coefficients of block ownership 
and board size are positive, they are statistically insignificant. Longer tenured 
CEOs increase the cost of capital because the coefficient is positive.  
This finding is in line with literature that states larger boards negatively affect 
firm performance. The positive role of CEO duality indicates that the presence of 
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the same person in the CEO and chairman post on the board leads to an increase 
in cost of capital. Although CEO duality is legally prohibited by New Zealand 
authorities, presence of duality in some companies documents the negative role of 
CEO duality by increasing the cost of capital.  
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Table ‎4.3: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on Corporate Governance and Control Variables 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient 
Const. 
7.30*** 7.91*** 
(5.90) (5.23) 
IOWN 
-1.62** -1.83** 
(-2.18) (-2.07) 
BOWN 
-0.06 0.12 
(0.12) (0.58) 
BDS 
0.19 0.22 
(0.99) (1.21) 
FMD 
-0.03 -0.04 
(-0.17) (-0.23) 
NED 
-0.13 -0.13* 
(-1.14) (-2.13) 
DUALITY 
1.68*** 1.50*** 
(4.41) (5.25) 
TENURE 
0.04*** 0.05*** 
(3.57) (4.15) 
LN(S) 
-0.08 -0.17 
(-1.08) (-1.34) 
LEV 
-0.24*** -0.23*** 
(-6.24) (-6.45) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.02 0.05* 
(-1.42) (2.11) 
F 
7.78 
(0.00) 
8.18 
(0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.26 0.27 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
Based on Table 4.3 there is a significant negative relationship between insider 
ownership and cost of capital. This means higher insider ownership leads to lower 
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cost of capital which is consistent with Hossain et al. (2001) study in New 
Zealand. This estimation find no significant relationship between block ownership 
and cost of capital which is inconsistent with the prior studies that find significant 
role for block ownership (Gugler, 2004). No significant relationship was found 
between board size and board diversity with cost of capital. These findings are 
inconsistent with prior studies in New Zealand (Reddy, 2008a). That could 
happen because of different samples between these two studies. Based on table 
above, there is a significant negative relationship between outside directors and 
cost of capital. This positive role of outside directors is in line with prior studies in 
New Zealand (Prevost, 2002b). Table above indicate significant and positive 
relationship between CEO duality and CEO tenure and cost of capital. This is in 
line with prior studies (Hambrick, 1991; Millstein, 1992). Based on above table 
there is no significant relationship between company size and cost of capital but 
leverage in companies has significant and negative role on cost of capital. This 
means employing more debt in New Zealand companies leads to lower cost of 
capital. Findings of this estimation also suggest that DGP growth has significant 
and positive role on cost of capital. 
In the results table the adjusted R2 reported rather than R
2
. This is because the use 
of an adjusted R
2
 is an attempt to take account of the phenomenon of the R
2
 
automatically and spuriously increasing when extra explanatory variables are 
added to the model. It is a modification of R
2
 that adjusts for the number of 
explanatory terms in a model relative to the number of data points.   
The relationship between each of these explanatory variables and cost of capital is 
assessed in detail in the following sections. Some of these variables have a square 
or cubic relationship with cost of capital. The exact relationship between these 
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explanatory variables and cost of capital is assessed through different equations 
and estimation models. The role of these variables will be clarified in the 
following sections. 
4.3.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test were checked and no significant issue was detected (Appendix E). 
The endogeneity of independent variables were checked through the Hausman 
Test and no significant figure was found. The results are reported in Table 4.4 
below. These tables (e.g. Table4.4) are just the outcomes of Eviews 7.1 software. 
These tables are not the outcomes of regressions. They are the outcomes of 
Haussmann test.  
Unit root test added as Appendix E. These tables not only include the ordinary 
tests such as: ADF and pp test but also include: Levin, Lin and Chun test and Im, 
Pesaran and Shin W-statistic tests which are for panel data. 
Table ‎4.4: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed   Random  Prob.  
IOWN -1.92 -1.82 0.98 
BOWN 4.01 1.00 0.10 
BDS -0.14 0.06 0.30 
NED 0.12 -0.03 0.49 
FMD 0.99 0.44 0.13 
DUALITY 2.28 3.08 0.65 
TENURE -0.01 -0.00 0.92 
LN(S) -0.04 -0.18 0.58 
LEV -0.34 -0.30 0.47 
GDP GROWTH -0.01 -0.01 0.91 
 
Similar coefficients in the fixed effect model and the random effect model imply 
that these variables are not subject to endogeneity. The Null hypothesis in 
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Hausman test in Eviews is that the estimated coefficients will remain unchanged 
by moving from fixed effect model to random effect model. Acceptance of this 
null hypothesis indicates there is no endogeneity issue in variables. The presence 
of endogeneity is checked by tracking the probabilities reported in Table 4.4, 4.6 
and etc. When the probabilities are more than 0.1, there is no endogeneity issue at 
the 10% significance level. The generalized least square method which is robust 
to heteroskedasticity and not normally distributed data is employed in this study. 
4.4 OLS Regression of WACC on Insider Ownership (IOWN) to find 
the pattern of their relationship 
The results of estimating the relationship between insider ownership and cost of 
capital are reported in Table 4.5. In order to track the pattern of this relationship, 
square and cubic formats of insider ownership are entered into the equation. The 
equation is employed to track this relationship is: 
WACCit = αi + β1(IOWNit) + β2(IOWNit)
2
 + β3(IOWNit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit) + β6(GDP GROWTH t) +  εit                      (4.1) 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, signs of IOWN,(IOWNit)
2
 and 
(IOWNit)
3
reveal the pattern of relationship between IOWN and WACC. The 
coefficients of IOWN, its square and cubic versions are statistically significant at 
0.01% level in both OLS and GLS method. The statistically significant and 
positive sign of the coefficients of IOWN and IONW
3
 and the negative sign of 
IOWN
2
 indicate a cubic pattern of relationship between IOWN and WACC which 
is an up/down/up relationship.  
 
141 
 
Table ‎4.5: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on IOWN 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
5.59*** 4.31*** 
(-5.64) (-3.82) 
IOWN 
21.34*** 26.8*** 
(-4.17) (-11.51) 
IOWN
2
 
-102.12*** -128.38*** 
(-4.46) (-23.55) 
IOWN
3
 
106.71*** 135.61*** 
(-4.21) (-14.04) 
LN(S) 
0.08 0.15* 
(-1.2) (-1.94) 
LEV 
-0.19*** -0.17*** 
(-8.86) (-9.15) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.0005 0.07 
(-0.02) -1.38 
F 
11.76*** 16.64*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.25 0.33 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
The coefficients of IOWN indicate the levels of insider ownership where the 
pattern line changes direction. Although the coefficients of two different methods 
were slightly different, the limits they revealed were almost the same.  
Related equation to reach maximum and minimum points is as below: 
WACCit = αi + 26.8 (IOWNit) – 128.38(IOWNit)
2
 + 135.61 (IOWNit)
3
 + 0.15 
(LN(S)it) – 0.17 (LEVit) + 0.07(GDP GROWTH t)  
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The first derivative will be: 
WACCʹ = 26.8 – 128.38*2 (IOWN) + 135.61*3 (IOWN)2  
Roots of this equation are the maximum and minimum of primary equation. These 
roots will be calculated as below: 
The roots (zeroes) of the quadratic function: 
 
When the coefficients a, b, and c, are real or complex, the roots are 
 
where the discriminant is defined as 
 
 According to these estimations these two values are 13.16% and 50.63%. 
Therefore, an increase in IOWN up to 13.16% positively affects the cost of 
capital. After 13.16% and up to 50.63% of IOWN there is negative relationship 
between IOWN and cost of capital. After 50.63% of insider ownership there is a 
positive relationship between IOWN and WACC. The exact relationship between 
these variables is illustrated in the Figure 4.1 below: 
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The  
This figure indicates that when IOWN is less than 13.16% there is a positive 
relationship between IOWN and WACC. According to agency theory, 
opportunistic behaviour of insiders may cause this relationship.  
4.4.1 Robustness test 
The unit root of variables were checked and no significant issue was detected. In 
order to ensure that the results were not affected by the negative effects of 
heteroskedasticity white cross-section and diagonal standard errors & covariance 
method robust to heteroskedasticity was employed in this estimation. Generalized 
Least Square Method, robust to heteroskedasticity, and abnormally distributed 
data was also employed in this study. Endogeneity was checked through the 
Hausman test with no significant amount detected. The results are reported in 
Table 4.6 below: 
  
IOWN 
WACC 
13.16% 50.63% 
Figure 4.1: IOWN and WACC Pattern 
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Table ‎4.6: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
IOWN -13.771 9.938 0.15 
IOWN
2
 138.735 -46.875 0.17 
IOWN
3
 -308.038 46.064 0.22 
LN(S) -0.215 -0.037 0.68 
LEV -0.33 -0.231 0.39 
GDP GROWTH 0.015 -0.001 0.39 
 
As described in Table 4.6, the acceptance of null hypothesis indicates the rejection 
of the endogeneity problem. The Null hypothesis suggests the similar coefficients 
in two different fixed and random effects models.  
4.5 OLS Regression of WACC on Block Ownership (BOWN) to find 
the pattern of their relationship 
Table 4.7 documents the outcomes of OLS and GLS methods. In order to find the 
pattern of the relationship between BOWN and WACC, square and cubic forms of 
BOWN has been entered into the equation below. The equation employed to track 
this relationship is: 
WACCit = αi + β1(BOWNit) + β2(BOWNit)
2
 + β3(BOWNit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit)+ β6(GDP GROWTHt) +  εit                        (4.2) 
Signs of BOWN, BOWN
2
 and BOWN
3 
indicate the pattern of relationship 
between BOWN and WACC. If the signs of BOWN and BOWN
3
 are negative and 
the sign of BOWN
2 
is positive, it means that this relationship is a down/up/down 
relationship. If the signs of BOWN and BOWN
3 
are positive and sign of BOWN
2 
is negative it means there is an up/down/up relationship. In the case of statistically 
non meaningful coefficients for BOWN
2
 and BOWN
3
, the cubic version of 
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BOWN will be removed from the model and another model estimated without 
cubic version in order to track a square pattern. In the case of statistically non 
meaningful coefficient for BOWN
2
, the square version of BOWN will be removed 
from the model and a new model will be estimated in order to track a linear 
pattern.  
The results of employing OLS and GLS methods in estimating the above-
mentioned equation indicate statistically significant and negative coefficients for 
BOWN and BOWN
3
 and a statistically significant and positive coefficient for 
BOWN
2
. The coefficient of BOWN is statistically significant at the 5% level 
while other coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The outcomes of OLS 
method indicate a statistically significant and negative coefficient for leverage. 
The results of the OLS and the GLS are different in some parts.  
First, the coefficient of LN(S), firm size, is statistically significant in the GLS 
method while it is not significant in the OLS method. Coefficient of BOWN is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in the GLS method while statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the OLS method. The GLS method reveals a higher 
R
2
 which is 0.45 rather than 0.29 in the OLS method.  
The signs of BOWN, BOWN
2
 and BOWN
3 
document a cubic pattern between 
block ownership and cost of capital. The negative signs of BOWN and BOWN
3
 
and the positive sign of BOWN
2
 indicate a down/up/down pattern between block 
ownership and cost of capital. Critical values where the direction of this 
relationship changes will be calculated by the existing coefficients. As the 
coefficients of OLS and GLS are slightly different, they would be expected to 
have slightly different critical values. According to OLS coefficients, the critical 
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values of block ownership and cost of capital are 32.42% and 66.14%, 
respectively. These values, according to GLS, are 31.19% and 67.00%, 
respectively.  
Table ‎4.7: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on BOWN 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
13.609*** 16.406*** 
(4.34) (7.02) 
BOWN 
-41.357** -57.242*** 
(-2.58) (-4.64) 
BOWN
2
 
95.040*** 134.449*** 
(2.88) (5.39) 
BOWN
3
 
-64.287*** -91.277*** 
(-3.11) (-5.93) 
LN(S) 
-0.113 -0.213** 
(-0.79) (-2.11) 
LEV 
-0.195*** -0.183*** 
(-7.67) (-8.58) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.029 0.019 
(-0.33) (0.31) 
F 
12.985*** 25.355*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.27 0.43 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
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According to the OLS estimation method, the cost of capital decreases when 
block ownership is less than 32.42%. When block ownership is more than 32.42% 
and less than 66.14%, the cost of capital increases. When block ownership is more 
than 66.14%, cost of capital decreases again. Based on the agency theory, block 
owners’ interests and company interests align in the primary levels of block 
ownership. Thus, while block ownership is less than 32.42%, block owners are 
concerned about the company’s performance and do their best to improve it. This 
behaviour persists till block owners own more than 32.42%. After this level of 
ownership, expropriation effect negatively affects block owners’ behaviour and 
block owners put their efforts on opportunistic behaviour and expropriating the 
company’s wealth. The pattern of this relationship and critical values are reflected 
in the Figure 4.2 below: 
This attitude of block holders persists in a company until their percentage of 
ownership reaches 66.14%. Therefore, a positive relationship exists between 
block holders and cost of capital between the range of 32.42% and 66.14% of 
block ownership. This attitude of block holders changes when they own more than 
66.14% of the company.  
BOWN 32.42% 66.14% 
WACC 
Figure 4.2: BOWN and WACC Pattern 
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Based on the agency theory, when block holders own 66.14% of ownership they 
start to have concerns about the company’s performance again. At this level of 
ownership, block owners feel that their interests are tied to the company’s wealth. 
Thus, there is a negative relationship between block owners and cost of capital 
when block owners own 66.14% or more.  
4.5.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issues were detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of the heteroskedasticity problem when applying 
OLS, white cross-section standard errors and covariance method robust to 
heteroskedasticity were employed. The Generalized Least Square Method which 
is robust to heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data was also employed. 
Endogeneity was checked through the Hausman test and no significant value was 
detected. The results are reported in Table 4.8 below: 
Table ‎4.8: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
BOWN -32.79 -32.4663 0.98 
BOWN
2
 91.68554 80.95667 0.83 
BOWN
3
 -70.6271 -57.6751 0.75 
LNS 0.040186 -0.08634 0.6 
LEV -0.32533 -0.22999 0.1 
GDP GROWTH -0.01922 -0.02383 0.73 
 
The probabilities in this test indicate the acceptance of a null hypothesis which 
implies there is no endogeneity problem in these variables. 
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4.6 OLS Regression of WACC on Board Size (BDS) to find the pattern 
of their relationship 
A unique equation that contains board size variables and some control variables is 
employed in order to investigate the pattern and direction of the relationship 
between board size and cost of capital in New Zealand companies. As used earlier 
for investigating the role of ownership structure on cost of capital, square or cubic 
relationship of board size on cost of capital will be explored by entering square 
and cubic forms of board size into the equation. The possibility of cubic 
relationship between board size and firm performance has been indicated in prior 
studies (mentioned in chapter 2). In case the cubic relationship is rejected, an 
alternative scenario will explore the possibility of a square relationship between 
board size and cost of capital. If the square relationship coefficients are 
insignificant, the possibility of a linear relationship will be examined. The related 
equation will be: 
WACCit = αi + β1(BDSit) + β2(BDSit)
2
 + β3(BDSit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + β5(LEVit) + 
β6(GDP GORWTHt) +  εit                                          (4.3) 
As informed in previous sections regarding relationship between ownership 
structure and cost of capital; signs of BDS, BDS
2
 and BDS
3
 indicate the pattern 
between board size and coats of capital. Larger boards are more easily controlled 
by the CEO and these boards bring more skill to the company. The conflicting 
effects of board size on cost of capital indicate the presence of one or two changes 
in pattern between board size and cost of capital. There is a cubic up/down/up 
relationship when coefficients of BDS and BDS
3
 are positive and coefficient of 
BDS
2
 is negative. This cubic relationship will be down/up/down when the 
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coefficients of BDS and BDS
3
 are negative and coefficient of BDS
2
 is positive. 
The results of exploring the pattern between board size and cost of capital through 
two different, OLS and GLS, methods are reported in table 4.9. 
Table ‎4.9: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on BDS (Cubic Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
0.085 1.974 
(0.01) (0.39) 
BDS 
3.107 (2.492) 
(1.07) (1.12) 
BDS
2
 
-0.333 (-0.256) 
(-0.81) (-0.8) 
BDS
3
 
0.011 0.008 
(0.59) (0.57) 
LN(S) 
-0.153 -0.209* 
(-1.13) (-1.74) 
LEV 
-0.206*** -0.194*** 
(-7.9) (-8.63) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.004 0.072 
(-0.05) (1.02) 
F 
11.457*** 13.650*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.25 0.28 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
None of the coefficients of BDS, BDS
2
 and BDS
3
 are statistically significant as 
shown in Table 4.9. The results of employing OLS and GLS methods indicate a 
negative relationship between leverage and cost of capital. Firm size is also 
statistically significant in the GLS method at the 10% level. Along with 
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statistically insignificant coefficients, endogeneity problem exists in independent 
variables. Therefore, the alternative scenario, that is, assessing the square 
relationship will be explored. The related equation for square relationship is:  
WACCit = αi + β1(BDSit) + β2(BDSit)
2
 + β3(LN(S)it) + β4(LEVit)+ β5(GDP 
GROWTHt) +  εit                                                   (4.4) 
There is an up/down relationship when coefficient of BDS
2
 is negative and a 
down/up relationship when the coefficient of BDS
2
 is positive. Results of 
assessing square relationship through OLS and GLS methods are reported in 
Table 4.10 below:  
Table ‎4.10: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on BDS (Square Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
3.776 4.801** 
(1.48) (2.41) 
BDS 
1.431** 1.21** 
(2.17) (2.37) 
BDS
2
 
-0.091** -0.07* 
(-2.01) (-1.95) 
LN(S) 
(-0.157) -0.213* 
(-1.16) (-1.77) 
LEV 
-0.209*** -0.197*** 
(-8.09) (-8.80) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.0004 0.075 
(-0.004) (1.07) 
F 
13.725*** 16.355*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.25 0.30 
N 195 195 
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***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
OLS and GLS methods were employed in order to check the presence of a square 
relationship between board size and cost of capital. Statistically significant 
coefficients were documented based on these estimations. These estimations 
support the presence of a square relationship between board size and cost of 
capital. The pattern of this relationship is up/down. Coefficients of this estimation 
are statistically significant at the 5% level and 10% level. The negative sign of 
BDS
2 
indicates an inverse U-shape relationship between board size and cost of 
capital. According to the coefficients of OLS and GLS, the critical value where 
the direction of this pattern changes is 8.  
This means that boards of directors positively affect cost of capital when the 
number of directors is less than 8. There is a negative relationship between the 
number of directors and cost of capital when boards of directors include 8 or more 
members. The pattern of relationship between the number of directors on the 
board and cost of capital is shown in Figure 4.3 below: 
BDS 8 
WACC 
Figure 4.3: BDS and WACC Pattern 
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Figure 4.3 is based on the values in Table 4.10. Figure 4.3 indicates that while the 
number of directors is less than 8 there is a positive relationship between cost of 
capital and number of directors. So, small boards negatively affect company 
performance.  
4.6.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issue was detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of heteroskedasticity, white cross-section standard 
errors and covariance method that is robust to heteroskedasticity were employed. 
The Generalized least square method robust to heteroskedasticity and abnormally 
distributed data was employed. Endogeneity was checked and no significant value 
detected. The results are presented in the Table 4.11 below: 
Table ‎4.11: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
BDS 0.005 0.661 0.2 
BDS
2
 0.001 -0.039 0.22 
LN(S) -0.087 -0.136 0.85 
LEV -0.333 -0.237 0.1 
GDP GROWTH 0.001 -0.001 0.71 
 
In Table 4.11 the values of probabilities are above the 10% level which indicates 
the acceptance of null hypothesis. This means that the estimations of model are 
not biased because of endogeneity problems. The coefficients of explanatory 
variables in fixed and random models are similar. Thus, Hausman test documents 
no endogeneity problem.  
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4.7 OLS Regression of WACC on Non-Executive Directors (NED) to 
find the pattern of their relationship 
Non-executive independent directors play an important role in monitoring and 
controlling managers and companies. Therefore, the pattern and direction of the 
relationship between non-executive directors (NED) and cost of capital (WACC) 
are interesting issues for academics and practitioners. Finding the pattern between 
NED and WACC requires the specific equation presented below. According to 
prior studies, in the first step, the presence of a cubic relationship between the 
number of non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital should be 
assessed. In case of the rejection of a cubic relationship, assessing square and 
linear relationships is the alternative scenario.  
WACCit = αi + β1(NEDit) + β2(NEDit)
2
 + β3(NEDit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + β5(LEVit) + 
β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                                        (4.5) 
Results of estimating the above equation through OLS and GLS method are 
reported in Table 4.12. Investigating the pattern between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital documents a cube pattern. As 
mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, signs of NED, NED
2
 and NED
3
 
indicate whether the pattern is up/down/up or down/up/down.  
Signs of coefficients in Table 4.12 show an up/down/up relationship between 
NED and WACC. Thus, at the primary level of non-executive/independent 
directors’ presence on boards, there is a positive relationship between NED and 
WACC. This positive relationship indicates the negative role of outside directors 
on company performance. When the presence of non-executive/independent 
directors is more than a specific level, there is a negative relationship between 
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NED and WACC. This negative relationship exists while the number of non-
executive/independent directors is increasing. But, when the number of non-
executive/independent is too large, there is a positive relationship between NED 
and WACC again. 
Table ‎4.12: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on NED 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
3.198 0.681 
(1.04) (0.26) 
NED 
3.757* 6.06*** 
(1.88) (3.77) 
NED
2
 
-0.854* -1.431*** 
(-1.91) (-4.07) 
NED
3
 
0.058* 0.102*** 
(1.87) (4.21) 
LN(S) 
-0.071 -0.1 
(-0.53) (-1.02) 
LEV 
-0.2*** -0.194*** 
(-7.18) (-8.42) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.013 0.05 
(-0.14) (0.76) 
F 
11.164*** 16.597*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.24 0.33 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
OLS coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level and the GLS 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. R-squares of these 
estimations are different. The R-square in the OLS method is 0.26 and the R-
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square of GLS is 0.35. Coefficients in Table 4.12 indicate the critical values 
where the direction of pattern between NED and WACC changes.  
Table 4.12 shows that while the number of non-executive/independent directors is 
less than three, there is a positive relationship between NED and WACC. This 
means that presence of one or two non-executive/independent directors on boards 
will positively affect and increase the cost of capital.  
On the other hand, the presence of three or more non-executive/independent 
directors on boards will negatively affect the cost of capital. This means that the 
presence of three or more non-executive independent directors positively affect 
firm performance by diminishing the cost of capital. However positive role of 
non-executive/independent directors does not continue forever.  
Based on the findings of this study, the positive role of non-executive/independent 
directors ceases when the number of non-executive/independent directors exceeds 
8 in the OLS method and 6 in the GLS method. The different limits of the NED 
are due to different coefficients for NEDs in OLS and GLS. The pattern between 
NED and WACC is presented in Figure 4.4 below: 
NED 3 6 
WACC 
Figure 4.4: NED and WACC Pattern 
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It is evident that the presence of non-executive/independent directors on boards 
brings more control and monitoring to companies. This type of director also 
brings a wider pool of expertise and skills that positively affect companies by 
decreasing the cost of capital. However the positive roles of non-
executive/independent directors exist only if their presence is acknowledged and 
the boards are not dominated by them.  
4.7.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issue detected. In order to prevent 
the negative effects of heteroskedasticity when applying OLS, white diagonal 
standard errors and covariance method, which is robust to heteroskedasticity, was 
employed. The Generalized Least Square Method which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data was employed. Endogeneity 
was checked through the Hausman test and no significant value detected. The 
results are reported in the Table 4.13 below: 
Table ‎4.13: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
NED -0.27165 1.150721 0.27 
NED
2
 -0.03831 -0.31007 0.28 
NED
3
 0.008861 0.024555 0.32 
LN(S) -0.10233 -0.09486 0.98 
LEV -0.34628 -0.24207 0.1 
GDP GROWTH 0.010961 -0.00156 0.3 
 
In Table 4.13 the values of probabilities are above the 10% level which indicates 
the acceptance of null hypothesis. This means that the estimations of model are 
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not biased because of endogeneity problems. The Coefficients of explanatory 
variables in fixed and random models are similar. Thus, the Hausman test 
documents no endogeneity problem.  
4.8 OLS Regression of WACC on Number of Female Directors (FMD) 
to find the pattern of their relationship 
The role of female directors in companies is an important issue needing more 
investigation. Prior research reveals that appointing more female directors 
increases the monitoring and controlling power of boards (Adams, 2009). 
Therefore, a linear positive relationship would be expected between female 
directors and company performance. The existence of cube pattern between 
female directors and cost of capital will be assessed. In case of rejecting a cubic 
relationship between female directors and cost of capital, the possibility of square 
and linear relationships will be second and third scenarios. The equation related to 
cube pattern is: 
WACCit = αi + β1(FMDit) + β2(FMDit)
2
 + β3(FMDit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + β5(LEVit) + 
β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                                          (4.6) 
The results of employing OLS and GLS method in estimating the above equation 
are reported in Table 4.14 below: 
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Table ‎4.14: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on FMD (Cubic Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
7.592*** 8.3*** 
(8.43) (8.4) 
FMD 
-2.177 -0.078 
(-0.36) (-0.01) 
FMD
2
 
-10.794 -30.695 
(-0.26) (-0.64) 
FMD
3
 
39.128 73.235 
(0.68) (1.09) 
LN(S) 
-0.028 -0.104 
(-0.44) (-1.48) 
LEV 
-0.19*** -0.169*** 
(-7.17) (-7.99) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.017 0.046 
(-0.86) (1.79) 
F 
10.987*** 14.461*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.24 0.3 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
Results of the estimations reported in Table 4.14 indicate that coefficients of 
FMD, FMD
2
 and FMD
3 
are not statistically significant either in the OLS method 
or the GLS method. Therefore, there is a cube pattern between female directors 
and cost of capital. The equation evaluating square relationship is: 
 WACCit = αi + β1(FMDit) + β2(FMDit)
2
 + β3(LN(S)it) + β4(LEVit)+ β5(GDP 
GROWTHt) + εit                                                                    (4.7) 
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The sign of FMD
2 
indicates the pattern between female directors and cost of 
capital. If the sign of FMD
2
 is positive there is a U-shape pattern between female 
directors and cost of capital. If the sign of FMD
2 
is negative there is an inverse U-
shape pattern between female directors and cost of capital. Results of estimating 
the above equation through OLS and GLS methods are reported in Table 4.15. 
Table ‎4.15: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on FMD (Square Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
7.474*** 8.06*** 
(7.75) (5.58) 
FMD 
-5.715*** -6.62** 
(-3.94) (-2.36) 
FMD
2
 
14.857*** 17.41** 
(3.01) (2.17) 
LN(S) 
-0.017 -0.083 
(-0.25) (-0.74) 
LEV 
-0.192*** -0.172*** 
(-7.63) (-8.03) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.017 0.037 
(-0.79) (0.52) 
F 
13.180*** 17.621*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.24 0.3 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
Coefficients in the Table 4.15 are statistically significant at the 1% level and the 
5% level. The positive sign of the FMD
2
 coefficient indicates a U-shape 
relationship between female directors and cost of capital. This relationship is 
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down/up which means as the number of female directors increases in primary 
levels, the cost of capital will decrease to a specific level. When the proportion of 
female directors on boards is more than that specific number, the pattern between 
female directors and cost of capital will change. This means that 19% of boards 
are dominated by female directors. The Figure below shows this relationship. 
Figure 4.5 indicates that at primary levels of presence of female directors on 
boards, cost of capital decreases. This means that female directors positively 
affect company performance when their presence is not too high.  
4.8.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issues were detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of heteroskedasticity problem when applying OLS, 
white cross-section standard errors and covariance method that is robust to 
heteroskedasticity were employed. The Generalized least square is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data were employed. Endogeneity 
was checked through the Hausman test and no significant value detected. Results 
of the Hausman tests are reported in the Table 4.16 below: 
FMD 1.3 (or 19%) 
WACC 
Figure 4.5: FMD and WACC pattern 
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Table ‎4.16: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
FMD 8.91648 1.338681 0.36 
FMD
2
 -4.11856 2.973723 0.79 
LN(s) -0.20957 -0.09749 0.39 
LEV -0.33995 -0.24106 0.1 
GDP GROWTH 0.017592 -0.00333 0.1 
 
In Table 4.16 the values of probabilities are above the 10% level. These values 
indicate the acceptance of null hypothesis in Hausman test. This means that the 
estimations of model employed to assess the relationship between FMD and 
WACC are not biased because of endogeneity problems. The coefficients of 
explanatory variables in fixed and random models are similar. Thus, the Hausman 
test documents no endogeneity problem. Related results are reported in Table 
4.16. 
4.9 OLS Regression of WACC on CEO Tenure (TENURE) to find the 
pattern of their relationship 
Investigating the relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital reveals a 
cubic pattern. The related equation in this regard that evaluates the existence of a 
cubic relationship is:   
WACCit = αi + β1(TENUREit) + β2(TENUREit)
2
 + β3(TENUREit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit)+ β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                          (4.8) 
Signs of TENUREit, TENUREit
2
 and TENUREit
3 
indicate the pattern between 
CEO tenure and cost of capital. Related results of estimating the above equation 
through OLS and GLS methods are reported in Table 4.17. 
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Table ‎4.17: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on TENURE 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
6.668*** 6.630*** 
(5.14) (4.6) 
TENURE 
0.600 1.015*** 
(0.59) (3.28) 
TENURE
2
 
-0.580 -0.788*** 
(-0.9) (-5.29) 
TENURE
3
 
0.174 0.203*** 
(1.56) (6.65) 
LN(S) 
0.0001 -0.029 
(0.00) (-0.32) 
LEV 
-0.196*** -0.179*** 
(-8.55) (-8.33) 
GDP GROWTH 
-0.014 0.055* 
(-0.65) (1.67) 
F 
11.761 14.002 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.25 0.29 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
Estimations based on OLS and GLS reveal different results. Both of these 
methods indicate a cubic relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. 
Relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital has an up/down/up pattern. 
The Figure 4.6 below shows the relationship between CEO tenure and cost of 
capital. 
According to results of this study CEOs should remain in their positions for 
between 3.3 years and 4 years to negatively affect the cost of capital. As indicated 
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in the Figure 4.6 below, when CEOs stay less than 3.3 years in their positions they 
positively affect the cost of capital. When CEOs stay more than 4 years in their 
positions, there is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. 
The related pattern between CEO tenure and cost of capital is presented in the 
Figure 4.6 below.  
The results of this study support the presence of a cubic relationship between 
CEO tenure and cost of capital. When CEOs are newly appointed or when they 
spend a long time in their positions, there is a positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and cost of capital. When CEOs are mid-term in their career there is a 
negative relationship between them. 
4.9.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issue was detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of heteroskedasticity problem when applying OLS, 
white cross-section standard errors and covariance method, which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity, were employed. The Generalized Least Square which is robust 
to heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data were employed. 
Endogeneity was checked through Hausman test and no significant issue detected. 
Results of Hausman tests are reported in the Table 4.18 below: 
TENURE (years) 3.3 4 
WACC 
Figure 4.6: TENURE and WACC Pattern 
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Table ‎4.18: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed   Random  Prob.  
TENURE 1.995783 1.63708 0.52 
TENURE
2
 -1.99658 -1.59926 0.51 
TENURE
3
 0.456235 0.377173 0.59 
LN(S) -0.01008 -0.0622 0.83 
LEV -0.31454 -0.23058 0.15 
GDP GROWTH 0.001414 -0.00486 0.46 
 
In Table 4.18 the values of probabilities are above 10% level. These values 
indicate the acceptance of null hypothesis in the Hausman test. This means that 
the estimations of model employed to assess the relationship between CEO tenure 
and WACC are not biased because of endogeneity problem. The coefficients of 
explanatory variables in fixed and random models are similar. Thus, Hausman test 
documents no endogeneity problem. 
4.10 OLS Regression of WACC on CEO DUALITY to find the pattern 
of their relationship 
CEO duality is banned by New Zealand authorities (Code of Best Practice of 
Corporate Governance in New Zealand in 2003). But some companies still 
employ the same person as chairman and CEO. The variables of CEO duality are 
entered as a dummy variable in related equation. 
WACCit = αi + β1(DUALITYit) + β2(LN(S)it) + β3(LEVit) + β4(GDP GROWTHt) 
+ εit                                                                (4.9) 
Results of this estimation are reported in the Table 4.19. 
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Table ‎4.19: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on CEO DUALITY 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
-5.847*** -5.774*** 
(-33.86) (-53.18) 
DUALITY 
0.188*** 0.153* 
(3.04) (1.86) 
LN(S) 
6.605*** 6.547*** 
(78.09) (124.93) 
LEV 
0.312*** 0.310*** 
(17.73) (21.4) 
GDP GROWTH 
0.027*** 0.002 
(3.37) (0.40) 
F 
1363.684*** 2121.649*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.97 0.98 
N 195 195 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
The positive sign of DUALITY coefficient in estimations indicates a positive 
linear relationship between CEO duality and cost of capital. This means that CEO 
duality increases the cost of capital. Conversely, companies who do not have CEO 
duality experience a decrease in their cost of capital.  
Estimations of this study checked through different tests. Unit root test was 
checked and no significant issues detected. In order to prevent the negative effects 
of heteroskedasticity problem when applying OLS, white cross-section standard 
errors & covariance method, which is robust to heteroskedasticity, were 
employed. The Generalized Least Square robust to heteroskedasticity and 
abnormally distributed data were employed. 
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4.11 Summary of Chapter 
Relationship between corporate governance and cost of capital in large listed 
companies in New Zealand has been investigated in this chapter. The first part of 
this chapter has documented the descriptive statistics of variables. The next 
section of this chapter investigated the relationship between all of the corporate 
governance variables and cost of capital. The pattern between each corporate 
governance variable and cost of capital was investigated in the last part. Important 
questions addressed in this chapter were: 
1) Whether corporate governance practices affect cost of capital in large listed 
companies in New Zealand? 2) What is the pattern of relationship between insider 
ownership and cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand? 3) What 
is the pattern between block ownership and cost of capital in large listed 
companies in New Zealand? 4) What is the pattern between board size and cost of 
capital in large listed companies in New Zealand? 5) What is the pattern between 
non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital in large listed companies 
in New Zealand? 6) What is the pattern between board diversity (female directors) 
and cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand? 7) What is the 
pattern between CEO tenure and cost of capital in large listed companies in New 
Zealand? 8) What is the pattern between CEO duality and cost of capital in large 
listed companies in New Zealand? 
The findings of this study indicate the important role of corporate governance 
practices on cost of capital in large listed companies. It has been shown that 
insider ownership and block ownership negatively affect cost of capital. In this 
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relationship the coefficient of insider ownership is statistically significant but, the 
coefficient of block ownership is not statistically significant. 
Results of this study support the findings of prior studies about the positive role of 
non-executive/independent directors and female directors on company 
performance. This study also shows a negative role for female directors and non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital. Beside that a positive 
relationship between board size and cost of capital is indicated while its 
coefficient is not statistically significant. This study also finds that a positive 
relationship is evident between CEO tenure, CEO duality and cost of capital in 
large listed companies in New Zealand.  
Findings of this study reveal a cube pattern between insider ownership and cost of 
capital. This cubic relationship is an up/down/up relationship. In this pattern, cost 
of capital increases while insider ownership is less than 13.16%. But, when 
insider ownership is more than 13.16% the cost of capital starts to decrease. This 
decrease lasts until the insider ownership is less than 50.63%. So, when insider 
ownership is more than 50.63%, cost of capital starts to increase again. According 
to descriptive statistics in this chapter, the average insider ownership is 8.2% 
which is less than 13.16%. Thus, it was expected to see a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and cost of capital. But, estimations of this study 
indicate a negative relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital. As 
mentioned in descriptive statistics, insider ownership data is not normally 
distributed and has a fat-tailed shape. This means that data in tails of distribution 
are important and they are not easily excludable.  
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This study reveals a cubic (down/up/down) pattern between block ownership and 
cost of capital. In this pattern, cost of capital decreases while block ownership is 
less than 32.42%. But when block ownership is more than 32.42% and less than 
66.14%, the cost of capital starts to increase. This positive relationship changes 
when block ownership passes the 66.14% level.  
The pattern indicated in this study regarding the relationship between board size 
and cost of capital is an up/down. This means that the cost of capital increases 
while the board size is less than 8. But when boards have more than 8 members, 
the relationship between board members and cost of capital is negative. 
Descriptive statistics document 7 members as the average board size in this study. 
So there is a positive relationship between board size and cost of capital which is 
supported by findings of Table 4.3.  
A cube (up/down/up) pattern between non-executive/independent directors and 
cost of capital reveal in this study. In this pattern, while the number of non-
executive/independent directors is less than 3, the cost of capital increases. But, 
when the number of non-executive/independent directors is more than 3 and less 
than 8, there is a positive relationship between non-executive/independent 
directors and cost of capital. And finally when the number of outside directors is 
more than 8, there is a positive relationship between non-executive/independent 
directors and cost of capital. The average number of non-executive/independent 
directors was reported to be 5 in descriptive statistics. Thus, the relationship 
between non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital is in negative 
part. Table 4.3 supports this pattern.  
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A quadratic pattern was revealed by this study between the number of female 
directors and cost of capital. This pattern shows a negative relationship between 
female directors and cost of capital while the percentage of female directors is 
below 19%. When the number of female directors passes 1.3 (or 19%), there is a 
positive relationship between female directors and cost of capital. As the average 
of female directors is 0.73% in descriptive statistics, female directors negatively 
affect the cost of capital. Findings of the Table 4.3 support this pattern.  
This study reveals a cube (up/down/up) pattern between CEO tenure and cost of 
capital. This pattern shows that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and cost of capital when CEO tenure is less than 3.3 years. But, when the 
CEO tenure is between 3.3 and 4 years, there is a negative relationship between 
CEO tenure and cost of capital. And there is a positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and cost of capital again when CEO tenure exceeds 4 years. The 
descriptive statistics report that the average CEO tenure in large listed companies 
in New Zealand is 6.39 years which is more than 4 years. Thus, it is expected to 
have a positive relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. 
Although duality is prohibited by New Zealand authorities, existence of duality in 
some companies guides this study to take this variable into consideration. Table 
4.3 documents a positive relationship between CEO duality and cost of capital. 
This study reveals a positive relationship between CEO duality and cost of capital.  
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Chapter 5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COST OF 
CAPITAL IN SINGAPORE: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION 
5.0 Introduction 
Results of the empirical study about the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and cost of capital in large listed companies in Singapore 
are documented in this chapter. Required descriptions of corporate governance 
cost of capital and sample size were provided in Chapter 3. This chapter consists 
of three sections: description of descriptive statistics, results of data analyses and 
estimations and at last, conclusion. 
5.1 Empirical results 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
The sample of the Singapore Stock Market comprised 30 large listed companies 
(Straight Time Index) during the period 2006 to 2010. Companies that did not 
prepare the required information were removed from the sample and a final 
sample of 27 companies remained. Therefore, 90% of the companies in the 
sample remained in the estimation.  
A summary of descriptive statistics for pooled data of Singapore’s large listed 
companies is presented in Table 5.1. These statistics include: means, medians, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and number of 
observations. The mean and median of the cost of capital (WACC) are 4.49% and 
4.85%, respectively. Thus, costs of capital of large listed companies in Singapore 
were distributed normally around 4% to 5%.  
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The mean and median of insider ownership (IOWN) are 1.88% and 0.13%, 
respectively which means insider ownership in half of the Singapore sample is 
less than 1%. Mak and Li (2001) indicate that mean and median of insider 
ownership in all listed companies in Singapore are 22% and 4%, respectively. 
Their findings indicate that insider ownership is high in medium and small sized 
companies in Singapore. Minimum and maximum of insider ownership in 
Singapore’s large listed companies are 0% and 27.8%, respectively. This means 
that insider ownership in these companies range from 0 to 27.8%. 
Difference in the values of mean and median which presented in table 5.1 
indicates that the distribution of insider ownership data is not statistically normal. 
High levels of skewness and kurtosis values also document the possibility of 
presence of fat-tailed distribution. Presence of fat-tailed distribution checked 
through the Grubbs test. Fat-tailed distribution includes data whose omission 
could damage the estimation. Comparing the Grubbs test values and its critical 
values detect the difference between true outliers and outliers in fat tails that 
include important information.  
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Table ‎5.1: Descriptive Statistics in Singapore 
Variables   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Observations 
Dependent         
WACC 
4.75 4.9 17.31 0.21 2.68 0.83 5.55 135 
Governance         
IOWN 1.88 0.13 27.80 0 6.20 3.49 13.59 135 
BOWN 71.87 75.37 93.23 39.39 14.47 -0.52 2.07 135 
BDS 10.70 11 14 8 1.58 -0.02 2.39 135 
FMD 0.50 0 2 0 0.70 1.03 2.74 135 
NED 8.21 8 12 1 2.34 -0.53 3.02 135 
DUALITY 0.13 0 1 0    135 
Tenure 6.13 5 30 1 4.74 1.40 6.48 135 
Control         
LN(S) 15.80 15.78 17.97 12.09 1 -0.58 4.59 135 
LEV 2.54 0.87 32.2 -2.80 4.11 3.67 22.50 135 
GDP Growth (%) 6.64 8.80 14.80 -1 5.66 0 1.68 135 
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The mean and median of block ownership in large listed companies in Singapore 
are 71.87% and 75.37% respectively. Mak and Li (2001) indicated that the mean 
and median of block ownership in all listed companies in Singapore are 62% and 
63% respectively. Higher block ownership in this study is due to different block 
ownership structures between large listed companies and other listed companies. 
Maximum and minimum of block ownership in large listed companies in 
Singapore are 93.23% and 39.39%, respectively. Median of 75.37% and 
maximum of 93.23% indicate that block owners in half of the companies own 
between 75.37% and 93.23%. 
The mean and median of board size in large listed companies in Singapore are 
10.7 and 11, respectively. Mak and Li (2001) find that  the mean and median of 
board size in all listed companies in Singapore are 8.04 and 8 respectively. 
Comparison between this study and Mak and Li’s study reveals an increase in 
company board size in Singapore. Maximum and minimum numbers of directors 
on boards of large listed companies in Singapore are 14 and 8, respectively. Fama 
(1980) documents that appropriate board size is between six and eight. Thus, 
based on the findings of this study, average board size in large listed companies in 
Singapore is higher than the range of board size indicated in prior studies.  
The mean and median of non-executive/independent directors in large listed 
companies in Singapore are 8.21 and 8, respectively. Thus, almost 80% of boards 
consist of non-executive/independent directors. The mean and median of female 
directors on boards are 0.5 and 0, respectively which means that almost 5% of 
boards consist of female directors. Different countries and authorities recommend 
that at least one third of boards should be allocated to female directors. But, 
female directors in Singapore play a minor role in large listed companies. 
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Maximum and minimum of female directors range between 0 and 2 which 
indicates their low presence on boards.  
CEO duality as another factor in this study which is not recommended in large 
companies, existence of duality in some companies in Singapore guided this study 
to mention duality as one of the factors affecting corporate governance. The mean 
and median of CEO tenure in large listed companies in Singapore are 6.13 and 5 
years, respectively. Thus, CEOs are in their positions for almost 6 years on 
average.  
The mean and median of company size are 15.8 and 15.78, respectively. 
Comparing firm size in New Zealand and Singapore indicates the presence of 
larger companies in Singapore. The Mean and median of Gross Domestic Product 
growth (GDP growth) of the Singapore economy are 6.64 and 8.8 percent. And 
the mean and median of leverage found in this study are 2.54 and 0.87. This 
reflects the significant employment of debt in large listed companies in Singapore. 
Therefore, a sizable proportion of cash flows are employed to service the debt. 
High standard deviation and difference between mean and median of some 
variables (especially ownership variables) indicate that the distributions of these 
variables are not normal. Along with high standard deviation, skewness of 
variables documents that variables have tails on their right or left hand side. The 
high kurtosis distribution reported in some variables indicates that the distribution 
of these variables has a sharper peak and longer fat tails.  
Dealing with unbalanced data requires some consideration. Excluding outliers in 
the presence of fat tails may lead some effective variables are not considered. This 
study employed Grubbs test to halt the exclusion of significant variables in fat 
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tails. Difference between true outliers and outliers in fat tails include important 
information, is detectable through comparing the Grubbs test and its critical value. 
Thus, the presence of a high standard deviation beside skewness and Kurtosis 
distribution of data in this study does not lead to exclusion of more data because 
the Grubbs test reveals that all of the data in fat tails are important. 
5.2 Correlation between independent variables 
Table 5.2 provides the correlation matrix of independent and control variables. 
The highest correlation between independent variables relates to NED and 
DUALITY which is -0.51. This means that companies with CEO duality tend to 
employ less non-executive/independent directors. Next high correlation is 
between BDS and NED which is 0.40. This means that larger boards tend to 
employ more non-executive/independent directors. Correlations between other 
independent variables are between -0.30 and 0.33. As the highest pair wise 
correlation between independent variables is -0.51, low likelihood of multi-
collinearity issues is expected when applying OLS regressions. This study 
employed the Generalized Least Square Model (GLS) in order to cover the 
shortcomings of employment of abnormally distributed data. 
177 
 
Table ‎5.2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
 IOWN BOWN BDS NED FMD DUALITY TENURE SIZE LEV GDP GROWTH 
IOWN 
-----          
-----          
BOWN 
-0.302*** -----         
(-3.659) -----         
BDS 
0.023 -0.006 -----        
(0.266) -(0.072) -----        
NED 
-0.224*** 0.178** 0.401*** -----       
(-2.646) (2.083) (5.053) -----       
FMD 
-0.193** 0.146* -0.117 0.191** -----      
(-2.267) (1.705) (-1.354) (2.240) -----      
DUALITY 
-0.011 -0.147* -0.252*** -0.512*** -0.146* -----     
(-0.124) (-1.712) (-3.006) (-6.882) (-1.702) -----     
TENURE 
-0.008 0.031 -0.141 0.028 -0.052 0.334*** -----    
(-0.094) (0.354) (-1.638) (0.328) (-0.599) (4.093) -----    
SIZE 
0.285*** -0.036 0.060 -0.048 0.064 -0.057 0.008 -----   
(3.426) (-0.418) (0.693) (-0.556) (0.742) (-0.661) (0.093) -----   
LEV 
0.239*** -0.116 0.282*** 0.315*** -0.100 -0.132 0.023 0.110 -----  
(2.843) (-1.347) (3.392) (3.822) (-1.162) (-1.539) (0.260) (1.273) -----  
GDP GROWTH 
-0.006 -0.022 0.095 0.043 0.006 0.017 0.053 0.068 0.026 ----- 
(-0.066) (-0.253) (1.104) (0.494) (0.069) (0.202) (0.613) (0.790) (0.305) ----- 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); *denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-
tailed) 
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The following section will present the relationship between corporate governance 
factors and cost of capital. 
5.3 Regression of WACC on Corporate Governance Variables 
Outcomes of regression regarding the relationship between cost of capital and 
corporate governance mechanisms through OLS and GLS methods are presented 
in Table 5.3. The GLS (Generalized Least Square) method is employed in order to 
control the shortcomings of heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data. 
OLS method documents negative coefficients for independent variables such as: 
IOWN, BDS, NED, TENURE, LN(S) and LEV. This means that they negatively 
affect the cost of capital (WACC). Among these variables, NED, TENURE, 
LN(S) and LEV are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Thus non-executive/independent directors in Singapore’s large listed 
companies decrease the cost of capital and help companies to perform better. 
Another factor which is CEO tenure negatively affects the cost of capital. This 
means longer tenured CEOs helps companies decrease the cost of capital. 
Outcomes of this study show a negative relationship between firm size and cost of 
capital which means bigger companies have a lower cost of capital. This study 
also finds a negative relationship between leverage and cost of capital which 
indicates that companies that employ more debt to equity, have lower costs of 
capital. 
Outcomes of estimations indicate positive coefficients for BOWN, FMD, Duality 
and GDP growth rate through OLS method. Among these variables BOWN and 
DUALITY are statistically significant. The statistically significant and positive 
relationship between BOWN (block ownership) and cost of capital indicates that 
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higher levels of block ownership positively affect the cost of capital. Beside block 
ownership, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of CEO duality 
shows that appointing the same person as CEO and chairman increases the cost of 
capital. 
Although the coefficients of IOWN (insider ownership), BDS (number of 
directors) and FMD (female directors) are statistically insignificant, the negative 
sign of IOWN means that higher levels of insider ownership decrease the cost of 
capital. The negative sign of board size coefficient also indicates that larger 
boards decrease the cost of capital. Although the coefficient of female directors is 
statistically insignificant, its positive sign indicates the positive role of female 
directors on the cost of capital. GDP growth and cost of capital have a positive 
and statistically insignificant relationship which means that higher levels of GDP 
growth increase the cost of capital in Singapore’s companies.  
Slightly different results were tracked through the GLS method. Most of the 
coefficients are statistically meaningful at 1% and 5% and 10% levels. IOWN has 
a negative but statistically insignificant relationship with cost of capital. The exact 
role of insider ownership will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
Beside insider ownership, BDS (number of directors on board) has a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with cost of capital. This means that larger 
boards decrease the cost of capital in Singapore’s large listed companies. The 
exact relationship between board’s size and cost of capital will be assessed in the 
following sections of this chapter.  
NED has a negative relationship with cost of capital. This relationship is 
statistically significant at 1% level. This means that more non-
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executive/independent directors negatively affect cost of capital. Another 
important factor of boards which is FMD (female directors) has a negative but 
statistically insignificant relationship with cost of capital. GDP growth also has a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect on cost of capital through the GLS 
method. Leverage has a negative and statistically significant relationship with cost 
of capital in this method. In GLS method, longer tenured CEOs decrease the cost 
of capital just like the size of company. This implies that larger firms have lower 
costs of capital. 
Independent variables such as: BOWN and Duality have positive relationships 
with cost of capital in GLS method. Higher levels of block ownership positively 
affect cost of capital and increase it. Beside block ownership, positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of DUALITY indicates the negative role of 
duality on company performance by increasing the cost of capital.  
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Table ‎5.3: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on Corporate Governance and Control Variables 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
Const. 
12.792*** 9.466*** 
(9.390) (5.093) 
IOWN 
-0.610 -0.308 
(-0.204) (-0.115) 
BOWN 
2.944*** 3.200*** 
(4.347) (4.870) 
BDS 
-0.055 -0.084* 
(-0.939) (-1.769) 
NED 
-1.866* -1.500*** 
(-1.715) (-3.104) 
FMD 
1.665 -0.451 
(1.345) (-0.472) 
DUALITY 
2.138*** 2.893*** 
(4.923) (6.251) 
TENURE 
-0.068** -0.114*** 
(-2.549) (-4.295) 
LN(S) 
-0.468*** -0.252** 
(-6.672) (-2.239) 
LEV 
-0.335*** -0.376*** 
(-5.417) (-9.523) 
GDP GROWTH 
2.969 2.265 
(1.502) (1.594) 
F 
14.283 43.9 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5 0.76 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
Based on Table 5.3 there is a no significant relationship between insider 
ownership and cost of capital. This is inconsistence with prior studies in 
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Singapore (Phan, 2000) and that could because of very low insider ownership in 
large listed companies in Singapore. This estimation find significant positive 
relationship between block ownership and cost of capital which is consistent with 
the prior studies in Singapore (Y. T. Mak, Li, Y, 2001). Significant negative 
relationship was found between board size, outside directors and cost of capital. 
These findings are inconsistent with prior studies in Singapore (Phan, 2000). 
Based on table above, there is no significant relationship between board diversity 
and cost of capital. Table above indicate significant and positive relationship 
between CEO duality and cost of capital. Based on above table there is significant 
negative relationship between CEO tenure, company size, leverage and cost of 
capital. This is consistent with prior studies (Murphy, 1986). This means 
employing more debt in Singapore companies leads to lower cost of capital. 
Findings of this estimation also suggest that DGP growth has no significant role 
on cost of capital.   
The exact relationship between each of these explanatory variables and cost of 
capital will be assessed in the coming parts of this chapter. Some of these 
variables have quadratic or cubic relationships with cost of capital. Thus, correct 
understanding of the relationship between each of these variables and cost of 
capital needs a separate estimation. Through different equations and estimation 
models, the exact relationship of these explanatory variables with cost of capital 
will be assessed. The role of these variables will be clarified in the following 
parts. 
5.3.1 Robustness Test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issue was detected (Appendix F). 
The endogeneity of independent variables was checked through the Hausman Test 
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and no significant figure was found. Results of the Hausman test are reported in 
the Table 5.4 below: 
Table ‎5.4: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
IOWN 16.917 5.207 0.277 
BOWN 15.846 9.463 0.121 
BDS -0.349 -0.344 0.934 
NED 0.945 -1.335 0.158 
FMD -4.494 -3.029 0.291 
DUALITY 0.776 1.174 0.263 
TENURE -0.105 -0.120 0.255 
LN(S) -0.486 -0.612 0.261 
LEV -0.128 -0.177 0.134 
GDP GROWTH 4.634 4.367 0.277 
 
Similar values of independent variables in the fixed effect model and random 
effect model imply the fact that these variables are not subject to endogeneity. 
Probabilities of variables indicate the acceptance of null hypothesis which 
indicates the presence of similar coefficients in fixed and random effect model. 
The Generalized least square method which is robust to heteroskedasticity and 
abnormally distributed data was employed in this study. 
5.4 Regression of WACC on Insider Ownership (IOWN) to find the 
pattern of their relationship 
The results of estimating the relationship between insider ownership and cost of 
capital are reported in Table 5.5. Different equations were checked in order to 
track the pattern of the relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital. 
These patterns could be in linear, quadratic and cubic formats. The equation 
employed to track this relationship is: 
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WACCit = αi + β1(IOWNit) + β2(IOWNit)
2
 + β3(IOWNit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit)+ β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                  (5.1) 
Signs of IOWN, IOWN
2
 and IOWN
3 
reveal the pattern of relationship between 
IOWN and WACC. The coefficients of IOWN and its square and cubic versions 
are statistically significant at the 10% level in both OLS and GLS methods. The 
coefficients of IOWN and IONW
3
 are statistically significant and negative and 
coefficient of IOWN
2 
is statistically significant and positive. These positive and 
negative signs show a cubic pattern for the relationship between IOWN and 
WACC which is a down/up/down relationship.  
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Table ‎5.5: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on IOWN 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
13.506*** 8.425*** 
(5.592) (4.434) 
IOWN 
-0.260* -0.212* 
(-1.770) (-1.789) 
IOWN
2
 
0.015* 0.012* 
(1.762) (1.762) 
IOWN
3
 
-0.0002* -0.0002* 
(-1.960) (-1.916) 
LN(S) 
-0.493*** -0.161 
(-3.126) (-1.352) 
LEV 
-0.387*** -0.490*** 
(-4.575) (-13.339) 
GDP GROWTH 
0.029 0.006 
(1.442) (0.294) 
F 
17.552 39.39 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.43 0.63 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
The coefficients of IOWN indicate the levels of insider ownership where the 
directions of the pattern change. Although the coefficients of two different 
methods were slightly different, the limits they revealed were almost the same. 
Based on the estimations’ outcomes, two limits where the directions of 
relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital change are -21.57% 
and 20.07%.  
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Based on this pattern, when insider ownership is less than -21.57%, there is a 
negative relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital. When insider 
ownership is more than -21.57% and less than 20.07%, there is a positive 
relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital. In a case where insider 
ownership is more than 20.07% there is a negative relationship between insider 
ownership and cost of capital. It is obvious, that negative values for insider 
ownership are not logical. The exact relationship between these variables is 
presented in the Figure 5.1 below: 
 
This figure shows that when IOWN is less than -21.57%, there is a negative 
relationship between IOWN and WACC. Parts of this pattern that include the 
positive values of insider ownership are acceptable but negative values for insider 
ownership are not acceptable. Therefore, it is logical to assume a quadratic 
relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital. This pattern shows a 
positive relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital when insider 
ownership is less than 20.07%. A possible reason for the presence of this pattern 
could be the low levels of insider ownership in large listed companies in 
Singapore. The average insider ownership in these companies is less than 2%.   
IOWN 
WACC 
-21.57% 20.07% 
Figure 5.1: IOWN and WACC Pattern 
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When insiders own more than 20.07% of ownership, the figure shows a negative 
relationship between IOWN and WACC. Based on agency theory, alignment of 
interests between insiders and company may be the reason. Thus, 20.07% of 
insider ownership is the minimum amount of ownership where the interests of 
insiders and companies are in line. The pattern between insider ownership and 
cost of capital in the Singapore market indicates the low level of insider 
ownership in companies. When the average insider ownership is 1.88% and the 
median is 0.13%, it is not surprising to detect a negative relationship between 
insider ownership and company performance.  
5.4.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test of variables was checked and no significant issue was detected. In 
order to prevent the negative effects of the heteroskedasticity problem when 
applying OLS, White cross-section and diagonal standard errors & covariance 
method, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, were employed. The Generalized 
least square method which is robust to heteroskedasticity and abnormally 
distributed data were employed. Endogeneity was checked through the Hausman 
test and no significant value was detected. Results are reported in the Table 5.6 
below: 
Table ‎5.6: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
IOWN -0.197 -0.267 0.639 
IOWN
2
 0.014 0.014 0.985 
IOWN
3
 0.000 0.000 NA 
LN(S) -0.957 -0.759 0.219 
LEV -0.156 -0.266 NA 
GDP GROWTH 0.031 0.030 0.951 
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The NA (No Answer) mentioned for IOWN
3
 and LEV is because of the negative 
variance of these variables. The coefficients of fixed effect and random effect 
models are almost similar in these variables so the null hypothesis is accepted. 
The null hypothesis states that coefficients in fixed and random effects are similar. 
As described in Table 5.6, the acceptance of null hypothesis of similar coefficients 
in fixed and random models indicate the rejection of endogeneity problem.  
5.5 Regression of WACC on Block Ownership (BOWN) to find the 
pattern of their relationship 
In order to find the pattern of relationship between block ownership (BOWN) and 
cost of capital (WACC) in Singapore companies, a unique equation containing 
block ownership variables and some control variables was employed The related 
equation is: 
WACCit = αi + β1(BOWNit) + β2(BOWNit)
2
 + β3(BOWNit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit)+ β6(GDP GROWTHt) +  εit                                   (5.2) 
Signs of BOWN, BOWN
2
 and BOWN
3
 indicate the pattern of the relationship 
between block ownership and cost of capital. According to agency theory, 
alignment of interest and entrenchment effect influences the role of ownership on 
company. So, it is expected to find one or two extremes in the relationship of 
block ownership and cost of capital where the direction of their relationship 
changes. Results of exploring the pattern between block ownership and cost of 
capital through two different methods (OLS and GLS regression methods) are 
reported in Table 5.7.  
Table ‎5.7: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on BOWN (Cubic Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
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 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
25.335 4.253 
0.981 0.370 
BOWN 
-150.276 -17.783 
-1.263 -0.314 
BOWN
2
 
269.445 52.969 
1.502 0.595 
BOWN
3
 
-151.938* -37.146 
-1.724 -0.814 
LN(S) 
0.397 0.050 
1.664 0.424 
LEV 
-0.365*** -0.391*** 
-6.222 -11.564 
GDP GROWTH 
0.002 0.022 
0.039 1.584 
F 
8.155*** 119.786*** 
0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R
2
 0.24 0.84 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
As described in Table 5.7, none of the coefficients of BDS, BDS
2
 and BDS
3
 are 
statistically significant except BOWN
3
 in OLS which is significant at 10%. OLS 
and GLS results indicate that the relationship between leverage and cost of capital 
is negative. Along with statistically insignificant coefficients, endogeneity 
problem exists in independent variables. Therefore, this study moves toward the 
alternative scenario which is square relationship. The related equation for square 
relationship is:  
WACCit = αi + β1(BOWNit) + β2(BOWNit)
2
 + β3(LN(S)it) + β4(LEVit)+ β5(GDP 
GROWTHt) +  εit                                         (5.3) 
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Related results of assessing square relationship through OLS and GLS ate 
presented in the Table 5.8 below:  
Table ‎5.8: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on BOWN (Square Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
-17.741*** -9.615*** 
-2.681 -3.477 
BOWN 
52.771*** 41.594*** 
3.016 6.071 
BOWN
2
 
-39.116*** -29.755*** 
-3.057 -5.690 
LN(S) 
0.390 0.064 
1.622 0.523 
LEV 
-0.347*** -0.360*** 
-5.967 -13.114 
GDP GROWTH 
0.007 0.019 
0.159 1.179 
F 
9.052*** 89.283*** 
0 0 
Adjusted R
2
 0.23 0.77 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
Investigating the square relationship between block ownership and cost of capital, 
through OLS and GLS methods, shows statistically significant coefficients. These 
coefficients support the presence of a square relationship with an up/down pattern. 
The coefficients of this estimation are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
According to the coefficients of OLS and GLS, the critical value of block 
ownership where the direction of this pattern changes is 83.77%. This means that 
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the block ownership positively affects the cost of capital since the block owners 
own less than 83.75%. When block owners own 83.77% or more, there is a 
negative relationship between block owners and cost of capital. The pattern of 
relationship between block owners and cost of capital is presented in the Figure 
5.2 below:   
  
Average block ownership in large listed companies in Singapore is 71.57%. This 
level of block ownership shows that block owners are not interested in getting 
involved into company issues when they own less than 83.77% or they prefer to 
focus on expropriation activities instead of improving company performance. But, 
when block owners own more than 83.77%, they get interested in company 
performance and cost of capital starts to decrease.   
5.5.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issue was detected. The Generalized 
least square method robust to heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data 
were employed. Endogeneity is another issue that was checked through the 
BOWN 83.77% 
WACC 
Figure 5.2: BOWN and WACC Pattern 
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Hausman test and no significant value was detected. The results are reported in 
the Table 5.9 below: 
Table ‎5.9: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
BOWN 117.311 99.063 0.2 
BOWN
2
 -97.221 -78.262 0.1 
LN(S) 1.150 1.290 0.43 
LEV -0.069 -0.118 0.16 
GDP GROWTH -0.004 -0.004 0.95 
 
In the Table 5.9, the values of probabilities are above 10%. These values indicate 
the acceptance of null hypothesis of the Hausman test. This means that the 
estimations of the model which was employed to assess the relationship between 
BOWN and WACC are not biased because of endogeneity problem. The 
coefficients of explanatory variables in fixed and random models are similar. 
Thus, the Hausman test shows no endogeneity problem.  
5.6 Regression of WACC on Board Size (BDS) to find the pattern of 
their relationship 
In order to find the pattern of relationship between board size and cost of capital 
in large listed companies in Singapore, a unique equation containing board size 
variables and some control variables was employed. Prior studies found a cubic 
pattern between board size and firm performance. In case of cubic relationship 
rejection, the alternative scenario will be exploring the square relationship. And if 
the coefficients of square relationship were insignificant, a linear relationship 
would be explored. The related equation will be as below: 
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WACCit = αi + β1(BDSit) + β2(BDSit)
2
 + β3(BDSit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + β5(LEVit)+ 
β6(GDP GROWTHt) +  εit                                     (5.4) 
The same as previous sections regarding the relationship between ownership and 
cost of capital, signs of BDS, BDS
2
 and BDS
3
 indicate the pattern of relationship 
between board size and cost of capital. Results of exploring the pattern between 
board size and cost of capital through two different OLS and GLS method are 
reported in Table 5.10. 
Table ‎5.10: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on BDS (Cubic Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
33.362 30.829 
(0.518) (1.089) 
BDS 
-8.854 -6.990 
(-0.489) (-0.870) 
BDS
2
 
0.685 0.525 
(0.406) (0.695) 
BDS
3
 
-0.017 -0.013 
(-0.326) (-0.537) 
LN(S) 
0.541** 0.270* 
(2.123) (1.932) 
LEV 
-0.343*** -0.445*** 
(-5.416) (-10.458) 
GDP GROWTH 
0.001 0.008 
(0.034) (0.404) 
F 
5.995*** 27.055*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.18 0.54 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
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None of the coefficients of BDS, BDS
2
 and BDS
3
 are statistically significant as 
described in Table 5.10. OLS and GLS results indicate a negative relationship 
between leverage and cost of capital. The coefficient of firm size is also 
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels.  
Along with statistically insignificant coefficients, an endogeneity problem exists 
in independent variables. Therefore, the alternative scenario which is square 
relationship between board size and cost of capital will be investigated. The 
related equation for square relationship is:  
WACCit = αi + β1(BDSit) + β2(BDSit)
2
 + β3(LN(S)it) + β4(LEVit)+ β5(GDP 
GROWTHt) +  εit                                               (5.5) 
There is an up/down pattern between board size and cost of capital when 
coefficient of BDS
2
 is negative. This relationship has a down/up pattern when the 
coefficient of BDS
2
 is positive. The related results of investigating the square 
relationship through OLS and GLS methods are presented in Table 5.11 below:  
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Table ‎5.11: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on BDS (Square Relationship) 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
12.629* 14.594*** 
(1.894) (4.452) 
BDS 
-2.982*** -2.451*** 
(-3.703) (-5.681) 
BDS
2
 
0.136*** 0.109*** 
(3.525) (5.506) 
LN(S) 
0.551 0.269*** 
(0.985) (3.001) 
LEV 
-0.344*** -0.444*** 
(-4.258) (-6.991) 
GDP GROWTH 
0.002 0.006 
(0.071) (0.553) 
F 
7.223*** 28.886*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.19 0.51 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
Statistically significant coefficients are documented by investigating the square 
relationship between board size and cost of capital. These coefficients are 
estimated through OLS and GLS methods. The results of this estimation support 
the presence of a square relationship between board size and cost of capital. This 
square relationship has a down/up pattern.  
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Coefficients of this estimation are statistically significant at 5% level and 10% 
level. The positive sign of BDS
2 
indicates the U-shape relationship between board 
size and cost of capital. According to the coefficients of OLS and GLS, the critical 
value where the direction of this relationship changes is 10.96. This means that 
there is a negative relationship between board size and cost of capital while the 
number of directors on the boards is less than 11. When a board of directors 
includes 11 or more directors, there is a positive relationship between board size 
and cost of capital. The pattern of relationship between board size and cost of 
capital is presented in the Figure 5.3 below: 
The average board size in large listed companies in Singapore is 11. Companies 
with more than 11 members on their boards positively affect their cost of capital. 
Based on the average board size of large listed companies in Singapore and the 
minimum board size of 5.3, the existing board size seems optimal.  
5.6.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant issue was detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of heteroskedasticity when applying OLS, White 
cross-section standard errors and a covariance method robust to heteroskedasticity 
were employed. The Generalized least square method which is robust to 
BDS 11 
WACC 
Figure 5.3: BDS and WACC Pattern 
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heteroskedasticity and the abnormally distributed data were employed. 
Endogeneity is another issue that was checked through the Hausman test and no 
significant value was detected. The related results are presented in the Table 5.12 
below: 
Table ‎5.12: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
BDS 2.586 0.271 0.491 
BDS
2
 -0.091 0.002 0.496 
LN(S) 2.118 1.783 0.479 
LEV -0.012 -0.106 NA 
GDP GROWTH -0.048 -0.031 0.510 
 
Values of probabilities are above 1% that shows the acceptance of null hypothesis 
in the Hausman test. The Null hypothesis assumes that the coefficients of 
dependent variables in fixed and random models are similar. If the coefficients are 
similar, there is no endogeneity problem. Probability of leverage variable is not 
specified because of negative variance of this variable. But, almost all similar 
coefficients of this variable in fixed and random effects document the acceptance 
of null hypothesis. This means that the estimations of model are not biased 
because of an endogeneity problem 
5.7 Regression of WACC on Non-Executive Directors (NED) to find the 
pattern of their relationship 
Non-executive/independent directors play an important role in monitoring and 
controlling managers and companies. The pattern of relationship between non-
executive/independent directors (NED) and cost of capital (WACC) is an 
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interesting topic for academics and practitioners. Investigating the pattern between 
NED and WACC requires a specific equation which is presented below.  
WACCit = αi + β1(NEDit) + β2(NEDit)
2
 + β3(NEDit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + β5(LEVit)+ 
β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                                                               (5.6) 
Results of estimating the above equation through OLS and GLS methods are 
reported in the Table 5.13. Investigating the relationship between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital documents a cubic pattern 
between them. Signs of NED, NED
2
 and NED
3 
coefficients indicate whether the 
pattern between non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital has an 
up/down/up or a down/up/down pattern.  
Signs of coefficients in Table 5.13 show that there is an up/down/up relationship 
between NED and WACC. This means that when non-executive/independent 
directors have a low presence on boards, there is a positive relationship between 
NED and WACC. There is a negative relationship between NED and WACC 
when non-executive/independent directors are neither in minority nor majority. 
And finally when boards are dominated by non-executive/independent directors, 
there is a positive relationship between NED and WACC again. 
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Table ‎5.13: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on NED 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
-23.572*** -14.437*** 
(-5.390) (-2.806) 
NED 
139.906*** 89.874*** 
(6.702) (4.068) 
NED
2
 
-225.735*** -140.087*** 
(-6.001) (-4.056) 
NED
3
 
112.791*** 67.415*** 
(5.425) (3.840) 
LN(s) 
0.216 0.192 
(1.012) (1.488) 
LEV 
-0.355*** -0.451*** 
(-6.926) (-12.010) 
GDP GROWTH 
0.013 0.016 
(0.368) (0.881) 
F 
17.484*** 45.670*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.43 0.67 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
The OLS and GLS coefficients are statistically significant at 1%. R-squares of 
these estimations are different. R-square of OLS method is 0.45 and R-square of 
GLS is 0.68. The values of NED where the direction of pattern between NED and 
WACC changes can be calculated through the coefficients presented in Table 
5.13. Based on these values, when there are less than 5 non-executive directors 
(48.77% of boards) on boards, there is a positive relationship between NED and 
WACC. This means that presence of one to five non-executive/independent 
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directors on boards will positively affect and increase the cost of capital. But 
presence of 5 or more non-executive/independent directors on boards negatively 
affects the cost of capital. The negative relationship between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital will change when boards are 
dominated by non-executive/independent directors. According to findings of this 
study, the negative relationship between non-executive/independent directors and 
cost of capital changes when there are 9 or more non-executive/independent 
directors on boards. The pattern between NED and WACC is presented below: 
When non-executive/independent directors are a minority, they do not have 
enough power to effectively monitor managers or they are not interested in 
becoming involved in company issues. So, non-executive/independent directors 
cannot positively affect performance. When boards are dominated by non-
executive/independent directors, they have high monitoring power but they may 
focus on opportunistic behaviour. This behaviour could negatively affect 
companies and raise the cost of capital again.  
5.7.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant relation was detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of heteroskedasticity problem when applying OLS, 
NED 84.95% or 9 48.77% or 5 
WACC 
Figure 5.4: NED and WACC Pattern 
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White diagonal standard errors and covariance method which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity were employed. The Generalized least square method which is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data were employed. 
Endogeneity is another issue that was checked through the Hausman test and no 
significant value was detected. The related results are presented in the Table 5.14 
below: 
Table ‎5.14: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
NED 157.13 151.52 0.70 
NED
2
 -210.89 -231.49 0.32 
NED
3
 92.82 111.51 0.11 
LN(S) 0.78 0.82 0.85 
LEV -0.06 -0.14 0.11 
GDP GROWTH 0.00 0.00 0.90 
 
The values of probabilities are above the 1% level. This indicates the acceptance 
of null hypothesis in the Hausman test. This means that the estimations of the 
model that investigates the relationship between NED and WACC are not biased 
because of endogeneity problem.  
5.8 OLS Regression of WACC on Number of Female Directors (FMD) 
to find the pattern of their relationship 
The role of female directors in companies is an important issue. Prior studies 
document that female directors raise the monitoring and controlling power of 
boards.  
Existence of a cubic pattern between female directors and cost of capital will be 
investigated in the first step. Investigating square and linear relationships will be 
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second and the third scenario. The equation related to cubic pattern is presented 
below: 
WACCit = αi + β1(FMDit) + β2(FMDit)
2
 + β3(FMDit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + β5(LEVit)+ 
β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                                             (5.7) 
Results of employing OLS and GLS methods indicate that there is no cubic 
relationship between the number of female directors and cost of capital in large 
listed companies in Singapore. The proportion of female directors on boards and 
the number of female directors were employed separately as independent 
variables. The presence of a square relationship was investigated after rejection of 
cubic relationship. The square relationship between female directors (board 
diversity) and cost of capital in large listed companies in Singapore was checked 
through the equation below: 
 WACCit = αi + β1(FMDit) + β2(FMDit)
2
 + β3(LN(S)it) + β4(LEVit)+ β5(GDP 
GROWTHt) + εit                                              (5.8) 
Sign of FMD
2 
indicates the pattern between female directors and cost of capital. 
Results of estimating the above equation through OLS and GLS methods indicate 
that there is no quadratic relationship between board diversity and cost of capital 
in large listed companies in Singapore. 
Linear relationship between female directors and cost of capital was investigated 
as the third scenario. Presence of linear relationship between female directors and 
cost of capital was investigated through the equation below: 
WACCit = αi + β1(FMDit) + β2(LN(S)it) + β3(LEVit)+ β4(GDP GROWTHt) + εit       
(5.9) 
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The equation above reveals statistically insignificant coefficients for female 
directors. Thus, there is no linear relationship between board diversity and cost of 
capital in large listed companies in Singapore.  
The insignificant role of female directors in large listed companies in Singapore is 
not strange as long as the presence of female directors on boards is very low. 
Based on Table 5.1, the mean and median of female directors in large listed 
companies in Singapore are 0.5 and 0 respectively. Descriptive statistics indicate 
that each board has less than one female director on average. Participation of 
female directors in Singapore’s large listed companies seems to be dramatically 
low after the enactment of laws that require a specific proportion of female 
directors on boards.  
Large board size in large listed companies in Singapore diminishes the percentage 
of female directors on boards. The proportion of female directors in Singapore 
large listed companies is 4.67% based on average board size of 10.7. The presence 
of 4.67% of female directors on boards in Singapore’s large listed companies does 
not affect company performance and cost of capital. 
5.9 OLS Regression of WACC on CEO Tenure (TENURE) to find the 
pattern of their relationship 
Prior studies revealed different ideas about the premium number of years that a 
CEO should be at his/her position. It is argued that newly appointed CEOs need 
time to settle in and become familiar with company procedures. Some studies 
believe that long tenured CEOs become more interested in expropriation 
behaviour. In these cases CEOs have a negative effect on company performance. 
This relationship may have cubic or square patterns. The equation that will 
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investigate the existence of a cubic relationship between CEO tenure and cost of 
capital is:   
WACCit = αi + β1(TENUREit) + β2(TENUREit)
2
 + β3(TENUREit)
3
 + β4(LN(S)it) + 
β5(LEVit) + β6(GDP GROWTHt) + εit                          (5.10) 
The signs of TENURE, TENURE
2 
and TENURE
3
 reveal the pattern between 
CEO tenure and cost of capital. Related results of estimating the above equation 
through OLS and GLS methods are presented in the Table 5.15. 
Table ‎5.15: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on TENURE 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC WACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
14.207*** 9.830*** 
(4.902) (5.444) 
TENURE 
-0.518** -0.364** 
(-2.357 (-2.486 
TENURE
2
 
0.050** 0.034** 
(2.312) (2.288) 
TENURE
3
 
-0.001** -0.001** 
(-2.238) (-2.163) 
LN(S) 
-0.479*** -0.216** 
(-2.627) (-2.050) 
LEV 
-0.396*** -0.479*** 
(-9.016) (-14.171) 
GDP GROWTH 
0.035 0.019 
(1.099) (0.998) 
F 
17.151*** 36.584*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.42 0.62 
N 135 135 
205 
 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
OLS and GLS methods reveal almost similar results. Both of these methods 
indicate a cubic relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. This cubic 
relationship has a down/up/down pattern. This means that when CEOs are newly 
appointed, there is a negative relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. 
When CEOs gain more experience in their positions there is a positive 
relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. And finally CEOs negatively 
affect the cost of capital when they have long background in that company. This 
relationship is presented in Figure 5.5. 
The best period for CEOs is when they have tenure of less than 6.5 years or when 
they have tenure of more than 26.89 years based on the coefficients above. As 
indicated in the Figure 5.5 below, there is a negative relationship between CEO 
tenure and cost of capital when the CEO’s tenure is less than 6.5 years. Thus, it is 
logical to track a positive relationship between CEO tenure and company 
performance considering that the CEO has less than 6.5 years tenure. When a 
CEO has more than 6.5 years and less than 26.89 years tenure, there is a positive 
relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital.  
TENURE 6.5 26.89 
WACC 
Figure 5.5: Tenure and WACC pattern 
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The results of this study support the cubic relationship between CEO and cost of 
capital. This can be explained through agency theory. Although a newly appointed 
CEO needs time to get familiar with the company, new expertise and skills that 
he/she brings to the company will positively affect the company and reduce its 
cost of capital.  
After some years, the opportunistic behaviour of the CEO leads him/her to focus 
on his/her interests and start to expropriate company wealth. Therefore, 
opportunistic behaviour of the CEO can negatively affect company performance. 
Based on the findings of this study, when the CEO spends a long time in the 
company (more than 26.89 years), he/she gets involved in company issues enough 
to care about company performance. In this situation, he/she has more than 
enough experience to run the company. Consequently, they will positively affect 
company performance and reduce the cost of capital.  
5.9.1 Robustness test 
Unit root test was checked and no significant relation was detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of heteroskedasticity problem when applying OLS, 
White cross-section standard errors and covariance method which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity were employed. The Generalized least square method which is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and not normally distributed data was employed. 
Endogeneity is another issue that was checked through the Hausman test and no 
significant value was detected. Related results are presented in the Table 5.16 
below: 
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Table ‎5.16: Hausman test results for endogeneity 
Variable Fixed Random Prob. 
TENURE -0.293 -0.407 0.169 
TENURE
2
 0.015 0.031 0.105 
TENURE
3
 0.000 -0.001 0.093 
LN(S) -0.928 -0.776 0.173 
LEV -0.181 -0.282 0.12 
GDP GROWTH 0.036 0.037 0.685 
 
Values of probabilities are above 1% in the Table 5.16 above. This indicates the 
acceptance of null hypothesis in the Hausman test. This means that the 
estimations of the model employed to assess the relationship between CEO tenure 
and WACC are not biased because of endogeneity problem.  
5.10 OLS Regression of WACC on CEO DUALITY to find the pattern 
of their relationship 
Although it is not common in large companies, some companies still appoint the 
same person as chairman and CEO. This study will investigate the effect of CEO 
duality on cost of capital. Through this investigation, companies that obey the 
academic theories and separate CEO and chairperson can check whether their 
decision on separating CEO and chairperson was correct or not. CEO duality enter 
as a dummy variable, the related equation will be: 
WACCit = αi + β1(DUALITYit) + β2(LN(S)it) + β3(LEVit) + β4(GDP GROWTHt) 
+ εit                                                                     (5.11) 
The results of this estimation are reported in the Table 5.17. 
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Table ‎5.17: OLS and GLS Regression of WACC on CEO DUALITY 
 OLS GLS 
 WACC EACC 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 
12.755*** 7.983*** 
(4.665) (4.340) 
DUALITY 
2.076*** 1.715*** 
(4.003) (6.839) 
LN(S) 
-0.473*** -0.163 
(-2.726) (-1.393) 
LEV 
-0.376*** -0.473*** 
(-8.916) (-15.066) 
GDP GROWTH 
0.026 0.012 
(0.844) (0.726) 
F 
30.567*** 112.314*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.47 0.77 
N 135 135 
***denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); **denotes correlation is significant at 
0.05 level (2-tailed); * denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are 
also provided for each variable. 
A positive sign of DUALITY coefficient in these estimations indicates the 
positive linear relationship between CEO duality and cost of capital. This means 
that CEO duality increases cost of capital.  
Unit root test was checked and no significant problem was detected. In order to 
prevent the negative effects of heteroskedasticity problem when applying OLS, 
White cross-section standard errors and covariance method which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity were employed. The Generalized least square method which is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and abnormally distributed data were employed. 
Endogeneity is another issue that was checked through the Hausman test and no 
significant value was detected. 
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5.11 Summary of Chapter 
The relationship between corporate governance practices and cost of capital in 
large listed companies in Singapore has been investigated in this chapter. 
Descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables and cost of capital in large 
listed companies in Singapore were presented in the first part of this chapter. 
Second part of this chapter described the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and cost of capital in large listed companies in Singapore. 
And the pattern between each of these corporate governance variables and cost of 
capital was presented in the third part of this chapter.  
The important questions that were investigated in this chapter are: 1) whether 
corporate governance practices affect cost of capital in large listed companies in 
Singapore? 2) What is the pattern of relationship between insider ownership and 
cost of capital in large listed companies in Singapore? 3) What is the pattern of 
relationship between block ownership and cost of capital in large listed companies 
in Singapore? 4) What is the pattern of relationship between board size and cost of 
capital in large listed companies in Singapore? 5) What is the pattern of 
relationship between non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital in 
large listed companies in Singapore? 6) What is the pattern of relationship 
between board diversity (female directors) and cost of capital in large listed 
companies in Singapore? 7) What is the pattern of relationship between CEO 
tenure and cost of capital in large listed companies in Singapore? 8) What is the 
pattern of relationship between CEO duality and cost of capital in large listed 
companies in Singapore? 
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The findings of this study indicate the important role of corporate governance 
practices on cost of capital in large listed companies. Outcomes of this study 
indicate a negative relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital and 
a positive relationship between block ownership and cost of capital. While the 
coefficient of insider ownership is not statistically significant, the coefficient of 
block ownership is statistically significant.  
Results of this study also reveal a negative relationship between the number of 
directors and number of non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital. 
OLS estimation indicates a positive relationship between female directors and cost 
of capital. But estimation through GLS method indicates a negative relationship 
between female directors and cost of capital. Coefficients of CEO tenure and CEO 
duality in estimations are negative and positive, respectively.  
Findings of this study indicate a cube pattern between insider ownership and cost 
of capital. This cubic relationship is a down/up/down relationship where cost of 
capital decreases while insider ownership is less than -21.57%. Cost of capital 
starts to increase when insider ownership is more than -21.57%. This increase in 
cost of capital exists while insider ownership is less than 20.07%. When insider 
ownership is more than 20.07%, cost of capital starts to decrease again. Based on 
the descriptive statistics in this chapter, average insider ownership is 1.88% which 
is less than 20.07%. Negative values of insider ownership are not meaningful. 
Therefore, it is logical to accept a square (up/down) relationship between insider 
ownership and cost of capital. 
Estimations of this study indicate a negative relationship between insider 
ownership and cost of capital. As mentioned in the descriptive statistics, the data 
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of insider ownership are not normally distributed. This study works with not 
normally distributed data because of fat-tailed distribution. This means the data on 
tails are not excludable. Therefore, the real average of insider ownership is not 
1.88%.  
Findings of this study reveal a quadratic pattern between block ownership and 
cost of capital which is an up/down relationship. In this relationship when block 
ownership is less than 83.77% cost of capital increases. When block ownership is 
more than 83.77%, there is a negative relationship between block ownership and 
cost of capital. Fat-tail distribution problem exists in block ownership estimations 
as well. The mean and median of block ownership in Singapore’s large listed 
companies are 71.87% and 75.37%, respectively.  
A down/up pattern between board size and cost of capital emerged in this study. 
Therefore, cost of capital decreases when board size is less than 11. When board 
size is more than 11, a positive relationship between board size and cost of capital 
was indicated. Descriptive statistics document that the average board size is 10.7 
members. Therefore, when boards have more than 11 members, there is a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance. 
Findings of this study indicate a cubic relationship between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital. This cubic relationship is an 
up/down/up relationship where cost of capital increases while the number of non-
executive/independent directors is less than 5 (or 48.77% of board). When the 
number of non-executive/independent directors is more than 5 and less than 9, 
there is a negative relationship between non-executive/independent directors and 
cost of capital. And finally when more than 9 outside directors (or 84.95% of 
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boards) exist on boards, there is a positive relationship between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital. Based on the descriptive 
statistics, the average number of non-executive/independent directors on boards is 
8 which is between 5 and 9. Thus, the relationship between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital is negative. The finding in 
Table 5.3 supports this pattern.  
The findings of this study reveal no significant role for female directors on cost of 
capital in Singapore large listed companies. Mean and median of female directors 
are 0.5 and zero, respectively. Based on descriptive statistics in Table 5.1, the 
average number of female directors on boards is 4.67%. Thus, the limited number 
of female directors on relatively large boards of Singapore’s large listed 
companies restricts their effectiveness on boards. Consequently no significant 
relationship was detected between female directors and cost of capital. 
The pattern between CEO tenure and cost of capital is a cube pattern which is a 
down/up/down relationship. This means that while the tenure of CEOs is less than 
6.5 years, there is a negative relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. 
When CEO tenure is more than 6.5 years and less than 26.89 years, there is a 
positive relationship between CEO tenure and cost of capital. And finally, when 
CEO tenure passes 26.89 years, there is a negative relationship between CEO 
tenure and cost of capital again. Descriptive statistics in this study indicate that the 
average CEO tenure in Singapore large listed companies is 6.13 years which is 
less than 6.5 years. Thus a negative relationship exists between CEO tenure and 
cost of capital which is supported by Table 5.3. The kurtosis value of CEO tenure 
shows that there is a long tail in distribution of this data. This kurtosis value 
indicates that the real average of CEO tenure is something more than 6.13 years. 
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Although the duality is not recommended by academics and authorities, existence 
of duality in some companies leads this study to take this variable into 
consideration. The pattern between CEO duality and cost of capital and Table 5.3 
document a positive relationship between CEO duality and cost of capital. This 
study supports the findings of other studies about the negative effect of CEO 
duality in companies. This negative effect on companies is presented as a positive 
relationship between CEO duality and cost of capital.  
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Chapter 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of findings regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance practices and cost of capital in large listed companies in 
New Zealand and Singapore. The empirical studies reported in chapters 4 and 5 
will also be interpreted to provide guides  for any area in which governance 
practices play an important role such as policy makers and authorities. Finally, 
some possible suggestions for future governance research are provided in this 
chapter.  
6.1 Focus of this study 
Corporate governance changes are often the response to exogenous factors. Low 
changes regulates in response to a perceived need. High profile corporate failure 
and scandals (Enron (US), Tyco (US), WorldCom (US), British & 
Commonwealth (UK), Maxwell (UK), OneTel (Australia), Parmalat (Italy)) 
occurred internationally arousing practitioners and academics interest in managing 
the situation by focusing on corporate governance practices all around the world. 
The necessity for greater accountability and transparency in controlling and 
managing corporations play a significant role in company performance.  
Therefore, various laws, rules and regulations were passed in different countries 
in order to control corporate governance. In recent years, adoption of ‘soft laws’ 
(Morth, 2004) or ‘soft regulations’ (Sahlin-Andersson, 2004) in the form of codes, 
principles and guidelines have attracted much attention. Weil & Manges (2003) 
define these codes, principles and regulations as ‘a non-binding set of principles 
and guidelines, standards or best practices, issued by a collective body and related 
to the internal governance of corporations’. The main idea was that governance 
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practices based on these codes and principles help companies and/or industries to 
manage better development.        
Authorities in New Zealand and Singapore also defined principles and guidelines 
for corporate governance in order to improve efficiency, transparency and 
accountability. Nine high-level statements or principles were issued by the NZSC 
in 2004 for New Zealand’s market. These statements and principles were 
accompanied by suggestions as to how these should be implemented. Achieving 
better corporate governance practices along with controlled cost of capital and 
were assumed to be the result of adopting these principles and guidelines in New 
Zealand. For example, the important role of board of directors as one of the 
internal governance mechanisms in controlling cost of capital has been recognized 
in these principles and guidelines. In this regard, NZSC recommends a higher 
presence of independent directors and managers by having an independent 
chairman and more non-executive/independent directors. 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) also released an updated version of 
the Singapore code of corporate governance. This guideline includes six 
principles with each of these principles has a number of strategies and statements 
for implementation. The Monetary Authority of Singapore believes that 
implementing these governance performance guidelines will improve companies’ 
performance. Similar to the NZSC in New Zealand, the MAS in Singapore 
emphasizes that more independent boards and managers along with a large 
number of independent and non-executive directors in boards will improve 
financial performance based on MAS guidelines.  
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As a first step, this study explored the outcomes of compliance with principals and 
guidelines of corporate governance practices in companies. In this thesis, 
relationship between corporate governance practices and cost of capital was 
investigated in large listed companies in New Zealand and Singapore. Secondly, 
the pattern of relationship between each corporate governance variable and cost of 
capital was investigated in this thesis.  
Different corporate governance variables have been employed in this thesis. These 
variables were presented by prior studies as effective factors in mitigating agency 
problems. These variables include: insider ownership, block ownership, board 
size, board independency, board gender diversity, CEO duality and CEO tenure. 
The size of companies, leverage and economic growth rate were employed as 
control variables in this study. 
6.2 Summary of Empirical Results 
Findings of this study indicate that large listed companies have complied with 
corporate governance practice guidelines. This study reveals that large listed 
companies in New Zealand and Singapore have good governance practices such 
as separation of board and management and employing non-
executive/independent directors.  
Different theories can explain the present situation of corporate governance in 
these two countries. Agency theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency 
theory believe that separation of ownership and control is required in companies. 
Differing number of directors on boards, presence of non-executive independent 
directors along with separation of CEO and chairman of the board are 
characteristics of the boards in these countries that comply with present theories. 
Insider ownership in companies reflects the interpretation of stewardship theory 
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that emphasizes the similar interests between managers and owners. A high 
proportion of non-executive/independent directors in these companies protect 
boards from domination by one party. Empirical results of this study reveal 
different outcomes in different markets and economies. Different corporate 
governance conditions in New Zealand and Singapore may be the reason for 
differing empirical results. Difference in board size, block ownership and insider 
ownership are examples of difference in corporate governance situations.  
Different theories, such as Agency Theory, Resource Dependency Theory and 
Stakeholder Theory, each offer a different view on structuring the most 
efficient/best boards in companies. But prior studies believe that larger companies 
require more supervision of control and monitoring (Coles, 2008; Guest, 2008; 
Linck, 2008). Therefore, a suggestion for large companies is to have large boards 
along with more independent directors. Based on Tables 4.1 and 5.1, the average 
board size in New Zealand is 7 while this number is 11 in Singapore.  
Boone at al. (2007) mention that company size and diversity are effective factors 
in board size and board independency. The descriptive statistics presented in 
Tables 4.1 and 5.1 indicate that companies in Singapore are larger than companies 
in New Zealand. Tables 4.2 and 5.2 also indicate a positive correlation between 
board size and firm size in both countries. Some other factors such as ownership 
concentration, state ownership, rules and regulations, debt and firm age were also 
presented by prior studies as affecting factors on board size (Chen, 2012).   
Tables 4.1 and 5.1 indicate that large companies in Singapore have higher 
leverage. Therefore, the rate of debt usage in these companies is higher. Also 
block owners have a higher percentage of ownership in Singapore in compare 
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with New Zealand. This could be another reason of having larger boards. 
Abundant percentage of state ownership in Singapore is another issue that could 
affect board structure (Ang, 2006; Y. T. Mak, Li, Y, 2001). The empirical results 
of examination of the hypotheses are presented below. 
6.2.1 Board characteristics and cost of capital 
6.2.1.1 Board Size 
Results of this study indicate that board size does not have a statistically 
significant effect on cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand. 
Although small and efficient boards have been highly recommended in prior 
studies, the average board size of seven in large listed companies in New Zealand 
seems inefficient (Lipton, 1992). The potential pattern between board size and 
cost of capital was extracted in this thesis. Results of this thesis reveal a square 
(inverse U-shape) relationship between board size and cost of capital. Based on 
this inverse U-shape relationship, when a board of directors includes less than 8 
members, there is a positive relationship between board of directors and cost of 
capital.  
Findings of this study indicate that there is a negative relationship between board 
size and cost of capital when there are more than 8 board members. According to 
descriptive statistics, average board size in large listed companies in New Zealand 
is seven. Thus, larger boards are required in companies in order to have a negative 
relationship between board size and cost of capital. Therefore, the monitoring 
power of larger boards is required in large listed companies of New Zealand.  
Outcomes of this study about the relationship between board size and cost of 
capital in large listed companies in Singapore indicate that board size has 
statistically significant and negative effect on cost of capital. Results of this study 
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reveal a U-shape pattern between board size and cost of capital in large listed 
companies in Singapore. Based on this U-shape relationship, as long as a board of 
directors has less than 11 members, there is a negative relationship between board 
of directors and cost of capital. When the board of directors has more than 11 
members there is a positive relationship between board size and cost of capital. 
Based on descriptive statistics, the average board size in large listed companies in 
Singapore is 11. Thus, it is recommended to have smaller boards in Singapore. 
Boards with less than 11 members can negatively affect cost of capital. 
Comparing two different sets of companies in two different economies reveals 
interesting results. New Zealand is a relatively smaller economy with a unique 
geographical situation. Companies in New Zealand have small boards with an 
average of seven directors. Although smaller boards have different benefits such 
as flexibility, it seems that larger boards could help companies to diminish the 
cost of capital.  
In contrast to New Zealand’s market, where larger boards are recommended, 
Singapore is experiencing a different situation. Singapore is a larger economy 
compared to New Zealand and contains larger companies. Boards of directors in 
large listed companies in Singapore average 11 members. Results of this study 
indicate that boards of directors with more than 11 members could harm 
companies through increasing cost of capital.  
Therefore, smaller boards of directors that include less than 11 members are 
recommended for Singapore’s large listed companies. Higher supervision and 
support and different ideas on boards were mentioned respectively by agency 
theory, resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory. These benefits are 
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achievable through smaller boards in Singapore and larger boards in New 
Zealand.  
6.2.1.2 Board Independency 
Results of this thesis indicate that there is a statistically significant and negative 
relationship between board independency and cost of capital in large listed 
companies in New Zealand. This negative relationship indicates that the NZSC’s 
recommendation of appointing at least one third of board members from non-
executive/independent directors has positive effects on companies. The average of 
non-executive/independent directors is 5 members which is equal to 70% of 
boards in large listed companies in New Zealand. 
This much independency of boards makes them more efficient and effective in 
controlling the cost of capital. Investigating the pattern of relationship between 
non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital in this study reveals a 
cubic pattern which is an up/down/up relationship. Based on this pattern, when 
boards include less than 3 non-executive/independent directors, there is a positive 
relationship between non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital. The 
small proportion of independent directors may be the reason for this positive 
relationship.  
There is a negative relationship between number of non-executive/independent 
directors and cost of capital when there are more than 3 and less than 8 non-
executive/independent directors on boards. So, as long as the number of non-
executive/independent directors is between 3 and 8, this type of directors 
positively affects their company. When more than 8 non-executive/independent 
directors are on boards there is a positive relationship between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital. Thus, the efficient range of 
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non-executive/independent directors in New Zealand large listed companies is 
between 3 to 8 directors. As the present number of non-executive/independent 
directors in large listed companies in New Zealand is 5, it is sensible to expect 
positive roles for them. 
Results of this thesis, regarding the effect of non-executive/independent directors 
on cost of capital in Singapore’s large listed companies, reveal statistically 
significant and negative relationship between non-executive/independent directors 
and cost of capital. This means that the present level of board independency in 
large listed companies in Singapore helps companies to diminish their cost of 
capital. Average board size of large listed companies in Singapore is relatively 
large which leads to appointing larger numbers of non-executive/independent 
directors on their boards.  
In large listed companies in Singapore, the pattern between non-
executive/independent directors and cost of capital was found to be a cubic pattern 
with an up/down/up shape. When less than 5 non-executive/independent directors 
are on boards, there is positive relationship between non-executive/independent 
directors and cost of capital. When the number of non-executive/independent 
directors is more than 5 and less than 9, there is a negative relationship between 
non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital. When more than 9 non-
executive/independent directors are on boards, there is a positive relationship 
between non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital. Thus, the 
efficient range of non-executive/independent directors is between 5 and 9 
members. As the present number of non-executive/independent director on boards 
is 8, it is reasonable to expect positive roles from non-executive/independent 
directors on company performance. 
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New Zealand, as a relatively smaller economy with unique geographical situation, 
has small boards with an average of 5 non-executive/independent directors. 
Although boards are relatively smaller in New Zealand, the proportion of boards 
occupied by non-executive/independent directors is high. The high proportion of 
non-executive/independent directors positively affects company performance. 
While there are more than 3 and less than 8 non-executive/independent directors 
on boards, there is a negative relationship between non-executive/independent 
directors and cost of capital. However, in Singapore, this range is more than 5 and 
less than 9 non-executive/independent directors where there is a negative 
relationship between non-executive/independent directors and cost of capital. 
Results of this study indicate that the existing number of outside directors on 
boards in large listed companies in New Zealand and Singapore is efficient and 
staying in the range mentioned, which will guarantee efficiency. 
6.2.1.3 Board Diversity 
Outcomes of this study indicate that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between board diversity and cost of capital in New Zealand, although 
prior studies pointed out that board diversity will improve company efficiency. 
Any negative role of board diversity on cost of capital is not obvious (Adams, 
2009). Relatively small boards in large listed companies in New Zealand limit the 
opportunity for female directors to sit on boards.  
Average employment of female directors on boards of large listed companies in 
New Zealand is less than one. The ineffective role of female directors on boards 
may be the result of this low presence. Investigating the pattern between board 
diversity and cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand indicate 
that there is a U-shape pattern between board diversity and cost of capital. Based 
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on this pattern, when there are less than 2 female directors on boards, there is 
negative relationship between board diversity and cost of capital. Boards with 
more than 2 female directors positively affect cost of capital. Regarding the 
ineffective role of female directors or the harmful effect of board diversity, the 
situation in New Zealand’s large listed companies is in line with the findings of 
prior studies such as Adams (2007) and Almazan (2003).  
Outcomes of this study indicate that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between board diversity and cost of capital in large listed companies 
in Singapore. Relatively large boards in Singapore’s companies may be one of the 
reasons for this insignificant relationship. On average, every two boards have one 
female director which reflects the limited board diversity in Singapore’s 
companies. Investigating the pattern between board diversity and cost of capital in 
large listed companies in Singapore shows no pattern. The small proportion of 
female directors on boards may be one possible reason for this ineffectiveness 
while no obvious pattern indicates that an ineffective role is likely for board 
diversity on cost of capital.  
Comparing two different countries, along with prior studies regarding 
effectiveness of board diversity, indicates that diversity in large listed companies 
in New Zealand and Singapore plays no effective role in companies’ cost of 
capital. Along with the positive role of board diversity on company performance, 
some studies reveal that female directors negatively affect company performance. 
This study documents that board diversity cannot add value to companies through 
affecting cost of capital.  
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6.2.2 Ownership and cost of capital 
6.2.2.1 Block Ownership 
Results of this study indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between block ownership and cost of capital in large listed companies in New 
Zealand. Based on prior studies, the positive role of block ownership was 
expected to be tracked in companies’ efficiency. Investigating the pattern between 
block ownership and cost of capital reveals a cubic pattern. This cubic pattern is 
in the form of a down/up/down relationship.  
Prior studies named two different effects regarding the role of block ownership on 
companies (Gugler, 2004). These two effects are alignment of interests and 
entrenchment effect. The pattern between block ownership and cost of capital in 
large listed companies in New Zealand supports the presence of alignment and 
entrenchment effects. Based on the findings of this study, block owners negatively 
affect cost of capital in large listed companies while they have less than 32% of 
ownership. In such a situation, block owners’ interests and companies’ interests 
are in line.  
When block owners own more than 32%, the entrenchment effect and 
opportunistic behaviour of block owners negatively affect companies. This 
happens as long as block owners have less than 66% of ownership. Finally, the 
interests of block owners and companies will be in line again when block owners 
have more than 66% of ownership. Thus, there is a negative relationship between 
block ownership and cost of capital when block owners own more than 66%. 
Findings of this thesis suggest that when block owners own less than 32% and 
more than 66%, they can positively affect companies through decreasing cost of 
capital. 
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Based on the findings of this thesis, block owners have statistically significant and 
positive effects on cost of capital in large listed companies in Singapore. 
Singapore has a unique situation in block ownership. In this country, block 
ownership in large listed companies seems relatively too high. The average block 
ownership in these companies is 72%. Assessing the pattern between block 
ownership and cost of capital reveals an inverse U-shape pattern.  
Relatively high levels of block ownership in these companies limit the probability 
of tracking cubic relationship. Based on the findings of this study, there is a 
positive relationship between block ownership and cost of capital when block 
owners have less than 84% of ownership. Agency theory can explain this situation 
through entrenchment effect. Block owners either are not interested in company 
issues or prefer to focus on expropriation behaviour rather than becoming 
involved in company issues. When block owners have 84% of ownership or more, 
they negatively affect cost of capital. So, when block owners own more than 84% 
of shares, they positively affect their companies. Based on agency theory, they 
feel that their interests are in line with company interests. Therefore, a block 
ownership of more than 84% is recommended in Singapore. 
Comparing the situation between New Zealand and Singapore reveals different 
aspects of block ownership. Average block ownership is not relatively high in 
New Zealand. It is assumed to track a cubic pattern where alignment of interests 
exists in primary and at a high level of block ownership. But in the medium level, 
entrenchment effect leads block holders to negatively affect companies. Findings 
of this study indicate that when block owners hold a relatively high proportion of 
ownership in companies, it is hard to track various changes in their behaviour. 
Consequently, Singapore’s large listed companies have experienced a square 
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pattern between block ownership and cost of capital. Block owners positively 
affect cost of capital at primary levels but at a relatively high level of block 
ownership, they start to negatively affect the cost of capital. 
6.2.2.2 Insider Ownership 
Results of this thesis reveal statistically significant and negative relationship 
between insider ownership and cost of capital in large listed companies in New 
Zealand. The average insider ownership is 8% in New Zealand. This insider 
ownership encourages insiders to get involved in company’s issues and positively 
affect their companies.  
Agency theory explains this behaviour through alignment of interests between 
insiders and the company. Investigating the pattern between insider ownership 
and cost of capital reveals a cubic pattern between them. Based on the outcomes 
of this study, while insiders own less than 13.16% of ownership, there is a 
positive relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital. Entrenchment 
effect in this range of ownership negatively affects insiders’ performance.  
When insiders own more than 13.16% up to 50.63%, there is a negative 
relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital. Based on agency 
theory, interests of insiders are in line with the company’s interests during this 
range. When insiders own more than 50.63% of ownership, they start to positively 
affect cost of capital again. Findings of this study indicate that when insiders own 
more than 50.63% of ownership, the opportunistic behaviour of insiders 
negatively affects their performance and leads to negative role of insiders on 
company’s interests. The average insider ownership in New Zealand is reported to 
be 8% in Table 5.1. It was expectable to track positive relationship between 
insider ownership and cost of capital but abnormal distribution of data leads to 
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high skewness and kurtosis values. High positive values of these statistical 
variables indicate that these variables have long and fat tail distribution. Thus, it is 
sensible to accept that the real average of this variable is not 8% and that it should 
be more.  
Results of this study reveal complicated relationship between insider ownership 
and cost of capital in large listed companies in Singapore. Based on the results of 
this study, there is no significant relationship between insider ownership and cost 
of capital. Relatively low percentage of insider ownership in large listed 
companies in Singapore may be the reason of this ineffectiveness. 2% ownership 
was reported as the average insider ownership in Singapore’s large listed 
companies where high values of skewness and kurtosis statistics represent 
abnormal distribution of this variable.  
Investigating the pattern between insider ownership and cost of capital reveals a 
cubic pattern between these variables. This cubic pattern is in the form of a 
down/up/down relationship. Dramatically small insider ownership affects the 
pattern between insider ownership and cost of capital. Almost half of the pattern 
of relationship stays in negative parts of ownership which is not acceptable. 
Ignoring that part, the remaining parts indicate an inverse U-shape relationship. 
Based on the acceptable part, when insiders own less than 20.07%, there is a 
positive relationship between insider ownership and cost of capital.  
In fact, insiders are not interested in company’ issues when they own less than 
20.07%. They prefer to focus on opportunistic behaviour rather than involving in 
company’s issues while they own less than 20.07%. Results of this study show 
that insiders negatively affect cost of capital when they own more than 20.07%. 
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Therefore insiders’ interests and company’s interests are in line above 20.07% of 
insider ownership. 
In New Zealand, where insider ownership is relatively higher than Singapore, a 
cubic pattern exists between insider ownership and cost of capital. Based on this 
cubic pattern, insider ownership positively affects companies when they own 
more than 13.16% and less than 50.63%. The situation in Singapore, where 
insiders own a small proportion of ownership, is different. In Singapore, insiders 
positively affect their companies when they own more than 20.07% of shares. In 
fact in primary levels of ownership, insiders are not interested in company’s 
issues. They prefer to focus on opportunistic behaviour rather than getting 
involved in company’s issues because they believe that the present level of 
ownership is not high enough to result in improvement of the company.  
6.2.3 CEO characteristics and cost of capital 
6.2.3.1 CEO tenure 
Results of this thesis reveal statistically significant and positive relationship 
between CEO tenure and cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand. 
This means that CEOs who stay in their position for longer periods negatively 
affect their companies and increase the cost of capital. A cubic relationship is 
documented between CEO tenure and cost of capital based on the results of this 
study. Based on this cubic pattern, newly appointed CEOs positively affect the 
cost of capital during their first 3.3 years of employment. It is obvious that newly 
appointed CEOs need time to become familiar with company procedures and time 
to settle down.  
CEOs with more than 3.3 years tenure positively affect their company by 
decreasing cost of capital. Based on the data obtained from large listed companies 
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in New Zealand, CEOs who are in the third year of their tenure negatively affect 
cost of capital. CEOs that stay longer than 4 years in their jobs start to negatively 
affect their company. Results of this study indicate that CEOs with more than 4 
years tenure, positively affect the cost of capital. Focusing on opportunistic 
behaviour and expropriation of company wealth may be reasons for this behaviour 
from CEOs. 
Through investigating large listed companies in Singapore, the results of this 
thesis reveal different insights to CEO tenure. Based on the results of this study, 
there is a statistically significant and negative relationship between CEO tenure 
and cost of capital in Singapore. Thus, longer tenured CEOs positively affect 
companies. Results of this study indicate a cubic relationship between CEO tenure 
and cost of capital. Based on this pattern, CEOs negatively affect cost of capital 
while they have less than 6.5 years tenure. When CEOs have more than 6.5 years 
tenure, they start to positively affect the cost of capital. After a while, they start to 
expropriate company wealth and negatively affect their company. CEOs continue 
to increase company cost of capital when they pass their 27th year of career. After 
spending long periods in their position, they negatively affect the cost of capital 
again. Therefore, CEOs who have long tenures finally take care of their company 
and positively affect their company by diminishing cost of capital.  
The average number of years that CEOs stay in their position is almost the same 
in New Zealand and Singapore (both around 6 years). Median, maximum, 
minimum and other statistics are almost the same in the two countries. It is 
assumed that size and other characteristics of their companies lead to these 
different results.  
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The best period of CEO performance in New Zealand is between 3.3 and 4 years 
while in Singapore this period is before 6.5 years and after 27 years. Results of 
this study indicate that CEOs perform better while they have less than 6.5 years 
tenure in relatively large and more internationalized companies. CEOs in these 
companies perform better after spending more than 27 years in their job. But, in a 
relatively smaller economy, CEOs perform to their best after spending 3.3 years at 
the job. Capability of big companies in employing experienced and well-known 
CEOs may be the reason for these varying time spans. Small economies have a 
smaller pool of expertise and companies should select from these pools. So, in 
small economies, it is more likely that CEOs spend more time becoming familiar 
with company procedures and business issues.  
6.2.3.2 CEO duality 
Although appointing the same person as CEO and chairman of the board is not 
recommended by authorities in both New Zealand and Singapore, presence of 
CEO duality in some companies guides this thesis to investigate the effect of this 
duality on cost of capital. Regarding the relationship between CEO duality and 
cost of capital in large listed companies in New Zealand, results of this thesis 
reveal a statistically significant and positive effect. This study indicates that 
appointing the same person as CEO and chairman of the board in large listed 
companies in New Zealand increases the cost of capital. Assessing the role of 
CEO duality in Singapore’s large listed companies reveals a statistically 
significant and positive effect on cost of capital. Thus, CEO duality in Singapore’s 
large listed companies is not recommended. Appointing same person as CEO and 
chairman of the board increases the cost of capital and negatively affects company 
performance in Singapore.  
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Therefore, comparing the situation of New Zealand as a relatively smaller 
economy and Singapore as a larger and more internationalized economy reveals 
the same role for CEO duality. In both economies CEO duality negatively affects 
the large listed companies’ efficiency through raising their cost of capital. 
6.3 Contributions 
The major contributions to this study involving new knowledge are presented 
below. 
This research investigates the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and cost of capital. There is a clear indication in the findings that components of 
corporate governance do impact the cost of capital. As an example in both New 
Zealand and Singapore non-executive/independent directors impact the cost of 
capital favourably. Lower cost of capital provides better opportunities for 
companies to empower themselves and increase their profit. Therefore, 
implementing corporate governance guidelines based on relevant empirical 
research will assist companies to lower cost of capital and increase the value of 
the businesses. This in turn contributes positively to GDP growth. 
Investigating the pattern between corporate governance practices and cost of 
capital in New Zealand and Singapore prepare good opportunity for academics 
and practitioners to understand the role of corporate governance principles in 
economies which are apart from big economies such as US, UK and other 
European countries. For example, optimally seven to eight board members 
suggested by prior studies (Jensen, 1993). Findings of this research indicate that 
more than eight board members required to negatively affecting cost of capital in 
New Zealand. 
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Comparing an isolated economy with an open economy indicate that an 
agricultural base economy with high geographical distance from the world such as 
New Zealand experienced less harmful effects of financial crisis. A more 
internationalized economy like Singapore that well-known as the financial hub of 
its region experienced great effects of financial crisis on its economy during and 
after financial crisis. 
Results of this research indicate different recommendations in an open economy 
like Singapore which include larger companies in compare with local economy 
like New Zealand. For example, 11 or less board members required in large listed 
companies in Singapore while large listed companies in New Zealand require 8 or 
more board members. Results of this study recommend lower number of non-
executive/independent directors in boards in Singapore while the present number 
of these directors in New Zealand seems optimal. Different recommendations 
suggested while the presence of non-executive/independent directors is almost 
similar in both countries (71% in New Zealand and 77% in Singapore).    
Outcomes of this study indicate the best method of calculating cost of capital. 
Three different methods such as CAPM, FF3F and Momentum model were 
investigated in this study. Outcomes of this study document that the Momentum 
model has a better explanatory power than CAPM and FF3F in New Zealand and 
Singapore. 
6.4 Implications 
The findings of this study have policy implications in New Zealand and 
Singapore, for larger listed companies. Companies should be able to foresee the 
effects of their decisions on cost of capital when they are modifying or changing 
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corporate governance characteristics. A summary of suggestions drawn from the 
findings of this study are listed in table 6.1 below: 
Table ‎6.1: Summary of recommendations by this study 
 New Zealand Singapore 
 It is recommended to … 
IOWN Increase Increase 
BOWN Increase/Decrease Increase 
BDS Increase Maintain/Decrease 
NED Maintain Maintain/Decrease 
FMD Maintain N.A. 
TENURE Decrease Decrease/Increase severely 
DUALITY NO Duality NO Duality 
 
Outcomes of this study have implications for education, Institute of Directors 
(IODs), Stock exchange market, investor and managers. Distinct 
recommendations of this study determine that academics need high investigations 
in this area. Insider ownership more than 13% and 20% recommended in New 
Zealand and Singapore respectively. Based on this recommendation academics 
understand that insiders need more incentives to get involve with a company’s 
issues. The present form of insider ownership does not motivate insiders and 
potential methods to enhance the attractiveness of expanding insider activity 
should be investigated by academics. No significant role of diversity in boards is 
another issue that is not completely in line with what gender balance advocates 
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would wish to see. Diversity on boards is not positively correlated with the cost of 
capital.  
The need for more qualified directors which should positively impact the cost of 
capital suggests there is a key role for the IOD in developing professional skills. 
Policies of increasing or decreasing the number of directors in companies are 
important for IOD members because of numerous demands of professional 
directors. The small pool of directors in New Zealand and an indicated need to 
increase board size signals a higher demand for professional directors in the 
future.  
Outcomes of this study indicate the importance of the stock market in disclosure 
of information. Based on the outcomes of this research a relatively small and 
isolated economy can offer a smaller pool of directors to companies compared 
with larger and more internationalised economies. The stock market should focus 
on training more directors and editing rules and regulations.   
Institutional and larger investors appraise their holding in companies and look to 
their future positions in a structured manner. Investors may alter their perspective 
after considering the findings in Table 6.1 about the role of insider ownership and 
block ownership. There is an issue about the international flow of funds with 
lenders and owners wanting boards to have sound policy for cost of capital and 
capital structure. Higher levels of control over management require building larger 
block ownerships in both Singapore and New Zealand. Higher levels of insider 
ownership, in both countries, are positively related to the cost of capital.   
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6.5 Limitation of Research 
There are various limitations impacting this research arising from data 
availability.  
1) The statistical distribution of some data reflects significant skewness and long 
tails.  Statistical estimations need an acceptable number of observations in order 
to lead to unbiased results. Elimination of outliers was not an even process which 
could be applied to all data uniformly. It became necessary in the case of some 
companies and just some variables.  
2) Missing data which result from limited transactions of companies in small 
economies were another limitation affected this study. Many companies in New 
Zealand have a transaction on just some days of a week. Therefore, this study 
faced a thin market with sporadic of transactions in New Zealand market. 
3) The renaming of companies and changes to reporting periods result in gaps in 
the data set. 
4) The time period for the study commenced in 2006 due primarily to the non-
availability of data in New Zealand prior to this date. A longer series would have 
provided the opportunity to have experienced more boom and bust events and 
more changes to the regulatory environment impacting corporate governance.  
5) Only large listed companies are investigated in this research. Clearly it is 
perilous to generalise the outcomes of this study to all listed or unlisted companies 
in these countries or other countries but it nevertheless build understanding based 
on robust findings.  
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6.6 Directions for future research 
Further studies could focus on extending this research in various directions. Some 
of these are identified as follow. 
Firstly, the focus of this study was on the outcome when complying with New 
Zealand and Singapore authorities’ recommendations and guidelines about 
corporate governance practices in large listed companies. Although large listed 
companies play important roles in each economy, the role of other companies 
can’t be ignored. Future studies could clarify these effects in small, medium and 
public companies.   
Secondly, undertaking similar studies in other economies could help to clarify the 
exact role of corporate governance characteristics on cost of capital. Each 
economy has its own characteristics, so it is hard to inscribe standard guidelines 
for all companies and countries. Recommendations and guidelines should rely on 
the particular characteristics of each economy and country. Therefore, each 
economy should undertake its own studies and investigations. 
Thirdly, further studies could focus on evaluating the ethical and moral behaviour 
of board members. Comparing the behaviour of non-executive independent 
directors with other directors could clarify the difference between directors. 
Fourthly, employing more specific periods in future studies could help them to 
develop an insight into corporate governance. Focusing on crisis periods and 
tracking the performance of boards, established according to guidelines during 
those periods, and comparing their performance with other times could better 
clarify board dimensions 
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Appendix A 
Granger Causality Tests in New Zealand Market 
Lags  2 20 
Null Hypothesis Obs. Chi-sq. Prob. Chi-sq. Prob. 
IOWN does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
193 
1.210 0.546 32.993 0.033 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause IOWN 0.538 0.763 14.195 0.82 
BOWN does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
193 
2.881 0.236 32.697 0.036 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause BOWN 0.374 0.829 39.038 0.007 
BDS does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
193 
4.801 0.09 35.894 0.016 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause BDS 0.017 0.991 56.446 0 
NED does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
193 
8.294 0.015 33.762 0.028 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause NED 0.623 0.732 27.689 0.117 
FMD does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
193 
1.531 0.465 44.418 0.001 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause FMD 3.981 0.136 34.783 0.021 
Tenure does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
193 
2.703 0.258 42.998 0.002 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause TENURE 1.863 0.394 16.533 0.683 
Duality does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
193 
3.379 0.184 42.18 0.003 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause Duality 0.62 0.733 33.609 0.029 
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Appendix B 
Granger Causality Tests in Singapore Market 
Lags  2 6 
Null Hypothesis Obs. Chi-Sq. Prob. Chi-Sq. Prob. 
IOWN does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
133 
9.791 0.00 23.05 0.01 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause IOWN 3.62 0.16 5.69 0.45 
BOWN does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
133 
1.088 0.58 5.46 0.48 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause BOWN 0.622 0.73 2.619 0.85 
NED does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
133 
2.621 0.26 2.614 0.85 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause NED 0.352 0.83 10.657 0.1 
BDS does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
133 
2.357 0.30 5.534 0.47 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause BDS 0.454 0.79 6.177 0.40 
FMD does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
133 
1.934 0.38 12.754 0.04 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause FMD 0.25925 0.87 2.569 0.86 
Duality does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
133 
0.022 0.98 8.097 0.23 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause Duality 3.191 0.20 11.876 0.06 
Tenure does not Granger Cause Cost of capital 
133 
1.314 0.51 6.425 0.37 
Cost of capital does not Granger Cause Tenure 1.504 0.47 4.596 0.59 
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Appendix C 
Results of employing Wald test reported in separate tables as below: 
Wald Test Results, Fama-French Three Factor and Fama-French Four Factor 
(New Zealand) 
Name SMB HML Prob.  Name SMB HML WML Prob. 
AIA -0.4091 -0.105 0  AIA -0.4091 -0.105 -0.0103 0 
AIR -0.8214 1.0669 0  AIR -0.8214 1.0669 0.0048 0 
AMP 0.1556 0.5271 0.09  AMP 0.1556 0.5271 -0.1183 0.11 
ANO 
(PCT) 0.3575 0.1212 0  
ANO 
(PCT) 0.3507 0.1165 -0.0373 0 
ARG 0.327 0.2399 0  ARG 0.3317 0.2431 0.0257 0 
CAV 0.4395 0.1243 0.01  CAV 0.4577 0.1367 0.1003 0 
CEN -0.1355 0.015 0.24  CEN -0.1295 -0.0109 0.033 0.26 
EBO 0.252 -0.0157 0.01  EBO 0.259 -0.0108 0.0388 0.02 
FBU -0.1077 -0.008 0.49  FBU -0.099 -0.002 0.048 0.36 
FPA 1.2734 1.2157 0  FPA 1.2652 1.21 -0.0456 0 
FPH -0.6395 -0.4741 0  FPH -0.6462 -0.4787 -0.0367 0 
FRE 0.509 -0.1217 0  FRE 0.5103 -0.1208 0.0071 0 
GMT 0.2954 0.0992 0  GMT 0.2903 0.0957 -0.0283 0 
HLG 0.3151 -0.1623 0  HLG 0.322 -0.1576 0.0382 0 
IFT 0.0401 0.0395 0.84  IFT 0.0312 0.0335 -0.0489 0.55 
KIP 0.1714 0.1008 0.02  KIP 0.1685 0.0988 -0.0161 0.05 
MFT 0.2825 0.1376 0.03  MFT 0.2868 0.1405 0.0236 0.06 
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MHI 0.4306 0.0429 0  MHI 0.4343 0.0455 0.0207 0.01 
NPX 0.6301 1.2575 0  NPX 0.6023 1.2385 -0.1533 0 
NZO 0.7794 0.1859 0  NZO 0.7843 0.1892 0.0267 0 
NZR -0.274 -0.3619 0.01  NZR -0.2752 -0.3627 -0.0066 0.03 
NZX 0.4435 -0.0181 0  NZX 0.4495 -0.014 0.0327 0 
PFI 0.3849 0.2132 0  PFI 0.3884 0.2156 0.0195 0 
PGW 1.4323 0.3323 0  PGW 1.465 0.3553 0.1846 0 
POT 0.186 0.1711 0.02  POT 0.1871 0.1719 0.0061 0.06 
RBD 0.2869 -0.2063 0  RBD 0.2987 -0.1982 0.0653 0 
RYM 0.5353 0.0356 0  RYM 0.5373 0.037 0.011 0 
SKC -0.325 -0.28 0  SKC -0.3178 -0.275 0.0401 0 
SKL 0.5999 0.3367 0  SKL 0.6342 0.3602 0.1896 0 
SKT -0.0846 -0.1964 0.01  SKT -0.0831 0.1974 0.0085 0.02 
STU 0.5326 -0.149 0  STU 0.5505 -0.1367 0.09889 0 
TEL -0.1578 -0.0474 0.17  TEL -0.1626 -0.0507 -0.0266 0.24 
TPW 0.0409 0.0258 0.87  TPW 0.0389 0.0244 -0.0111 0.94 
TWR 0.7257 0.3745 0  TWR 0.7192 0.3701 -0.0356 0 
VHP 0.2222 0.096 0.01  VHP 0.2185 0.0935 -0.0201 0.02 
WHS -0.6887 -0.6152 0  WHS -0.6832 -0.6114 0.0302 0 
MVN 0.7047 0.1454 0  MVN 0.7087 0.148 0.0298 0 
PPL 0.8948 -0.4299 0  PPL 0.9018 -0.4256 0.0389 0 
VCT -0.4017 0.2327 0  VCT -0.4023 0.2325 -0.003 0 
 
Probability of rejecting null hypothesises are as below: 
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FF3F P<0.1% 
87.1794
9  
Momentu
m model 
P<0.1
% 
84.6153
8 
  
P<0.05
% 
84.6153
8   
P<0.5
% 
76.9230
8 
 
In FF3F variables which are SMB and HML, almost 85 percent of sample 
rejectsthe null hypothesis at 5% level and 87 percent of them reject the null 
hypothesis at 10% level. In Momentum model variables which are SMB, HML 
and WML almost 77 percent of sample rejects the null hypothesis at 5% level 
while almost85 percent of sample rejects the null hypothesis at 10% level. 
So the null hypothesises rejected and the coefficients of FF3F and Momentum 
model have explanatory power to explain the firm’s excess return in New Zealand 
market. 
Wald Test Results, Fama-French Three Factor and Fama-French Four 
Factor (Singapore) 
Name 
SM
B 
HM
L 
F-
Prob.  Name 
SM
B 
HM
L 
WM
L 
F-
Prob. 
Capitaland 0.36 0.06 0  Capitaland 0.47 0.16 0.26 0 
CapitaMall 0.15 0.09 0.01  CapitaMall 0.25 0.18 0.24 0 
CITYDEV 0.41 
-
0.07 0  CITYDEV 0.52 0.03 0.26 0 
ComfortDel
Gro 0.39 
-
0.11 0  
ComfortDel
Gro 0.45 
-
0.05 0.15 0 
DBS - 0.10 0.18  DBS 0.02 0.16 0.15 0 
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0.04 
F&N 0.52 
-
0.08 0  F&N 0.60 0.00 0.20 0 
GoldenAgr 0.58 
-
0.13 0  GoldenAgr 0.76 0.04 0.44 0 
HKLand 
US$ 0.24 0.18 0  
HKLand 
US$ 0.32 0.25 0.19 0 
Jardine C&C 0.53 
-
0.11 0  Jardine C&C 0.64 
-
0.01 0.25 0 
JMH 
400US$ 
-
0.67 0.72 0  
JMH 
400US$ 
-
0.58 0.81 0.22 0 
JSH 500US$ 
-
0.48 0.51 0  JSH 500US$ 
-
0.39 0.60 0.24 0 
Kep Corp 
-
0.14 
-
1.14 0  Kep Corp 0.11 
-
0.90 0.61 0 
Noble Grp 1.18 
-
0.29 0  Noble Grp 1.37 
-
0.12 0.43 0 
NOL 0.61 
-
0.22 0  NOL 0.77 
-
0.07 0.38 0 
OCBC Bk 0.03 0.07 0.13  OCBC Bk 0.10 0.14 0.18 0 
Olam 1.29 
-
0.61 0  Olam 1.32 
-
0.57 0.09 0 
Semb Corp 0.76 
-
0.32 0  Semb Corp 0.83 
-
0.25 0.17 0 
SembMar 0.95 - 0  SembMar 1.08 - 0.31 0 
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0.46 0.34 
SGX 0.57 
-
0.27 0  SGX 0.67 
-
0.17 0.24 0 
SingTel 
-
0.04 
-
0.04 0.26  SingTel 
-
0.08 
-
0.07 
-
0.08 0.08 
SIA 0.02 0.09 0.07  SIA 0.08 0.14 0.14 0 
SIA Engg 0.39 
-
0.24 0  SIA Engg 0.44 
-
0.19 0.12 0 
SPH 0.14 
-
0.06 0.07  SPH 0.12 
-
0.08 
-
0.03 0.1 
StarHub 0.39 
-
0.20 0  StarHub 0.39 
-
0.20 0.01 0 
ST Engg 0.35 0.17 0  ST Engg 0.37 
-
0.16 0.04 0 
UOB 0.06 0.05 0.18  UOB 0.12 0.11 0.15 0 
Wilmar 0.75 
-
0.47 0  Wilmar 0.90 
-
0.34 0.35 0 
 
Probability of rejecting null hypothesises are as below: 
 
FF3F P<0.1 
85.1851
8  
Momentu
m model P<0.1 100 
  P<0.05 
77.7777
7   P<0.5 
96.2962
9 
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Consistent with prior studies and findings in New Zealand market, FF3F and 
Momentum model risk factors cannot be omitted from estimations because they 
have explanatory power. FF3F Wald’s results imply that almost 78 percent of 
sample rejects the null hypothesis at 5% level and 85 percent of sample rejects the 
null hypothesis at 10% level. Momentum model Wald’s results imply that almost 
96 percent of sample rejects the null hypothesis at 5% level while 100 percent of 
sample rejects the null hypothesis at 10% level. These results confirm the existing 
literature about the explanatory power of FF3F and Momentum model in 
estimating cost of capital even though their effects are not significant(Grandes, 
2010). 
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Appendix D 
 
Wald coefficient test for second and third degree form of dependent variables 
which added into the models. 
 
 New Zealand 
  
Singapore 
 
F-statistic Prob. Related Table  F-statistic Prob. Related Table 
BDS2 3.809 0.0525 Table 4.10 BDS2 8.400 0.0044 Table 5.11 
NED2 97.075 0 Table 4.12 NED2 36.037 0 Table 5.13 
NED3 97.075 0 Table 4.12 NED3 36.037 0 Table 5.13 
FMD2 4.332 0.0388 Table 4.15 Tenure2 19.503 0 Table 5.15 
Tenure2 3.332 0.0378 Table 4.17 Tenure3 19.503 0 Table 5.15 
Tenure3 3.332 0.0378 Table 4.17 BOWN2 9.422 0.0002 Table 5.8 
BOWN2 6.253 0.0023 Table 4.7 IOWN2 2.653 0.0743 Table 5.5 
BOWN3 6.253 0.0023 Table 4.7 IOWN3 2.653 0.0743 Table 5.5 
IOWN2 3.401 0.0354 Table 4.5 
    
IOWN3 3.401 0.0354 Table 4.5 
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Appendix E 
Unit Root tests results for New Zealand sample. 
Pool unit root test: Summary  
  Series: I_AIR, I_AMP, I_ANO, I_ARG, I_AIA, I_CAV, I_CEN, I_EBO, I_FBU, 
        I_FPA, I_FPH, I_FRE, I_GMT, I_HLG, I_IFT, I_KIP, I_MFT, I_MHI, I_NZO, 
        I_NZR, I_NPX, I_NZX, I_PFI, I_PGW, I_POT, I_RBD, I_RYM, I_SKC, 
        I_SKL, I_SKT, I_STU, I_TEL, I_TPW, I_TWR, I_VHP, I_WHS, I_MVN, 
        I_PPL, I_VCT, L_AIR, L_AMP, L_ANO, L_ARG, L_AIA, L_CAV, L_CEN, 
        L_EBO, L_FBU, L_FPA, L_FPH, L_FRE, L_GMT, L_HLG, L_IFT, L_KIP, 
        L_MFT, L_MHI, L_NZO, L_NZR, L_NPX, L_NZX, L_PFI, L_PGW, L_POT, 
        L_RBD, L_RYM, L_SKC, L_SKL, L_SKT, L_STU, L_TEL, L_TPW, 
        L_TWR, L_VHP, L_WHS, L_MVN, L_PPL, L_VCT, BN_AIR, BN_AMP, 
        BN_ANO, BN_ARG, BN_AIA, BN_CAV, BN_CEN, BN_EBO, BN_FBU, 
        BN_FPA, BN_FPH, BN_FRE, BN_GMT, BN_HLG, BN_IFT, BN_KIP, 
        BN_MFT, BN_MHI, BN_NZO, BN_NZR, BN_NPX, BN_NZX, BN_PFI, 
        BN_PGW, BN_POT, BN_RBD, BN_RYM, BN_SKC, BN_SKL, BN_SKT, 
        BN_STU, BN_TEL, BN_TPW, BN_TWR, BN_VHP, BN_WHS, BN_MVN, 
        BN_PPL, BN_VCT, OD_AIR, OD_AMP, OD_ANO, OD_ARG, OD_AIA, 
        OD_CAV, OD_CEN, OD_EBO, OD_FBU, OD_FPA, OD_FPH, OD_FRE, 
        OD_GMT, OD_HLG, OD_IFT, OD_KIP, OD_MFT, OD_MHI, OD_NZO, 
        OD_NZR, OD_NPX, OD_NZX, OD_PFI, OD_PGW, OD_POT, OD_RBD, 
        OD_RYM, OD_SKC, OD_SKL, OD_SKT, OD_STU, OD_TEL, OD_TPW, 
        OD_TWR, OD_VHP, OD_WHS, OD_MVN, OD_PPL, OD_VCT, FD_AIR, 
        FD_AMP, FD_ANO, FD_ARG, FD_AIA, FD_CAV, FD_CEN, FD_EBO, 
        FD_FBU, FD_FPA, FD_FPH, FD_FRE, FD_GMT, FD_HLG, FD_IFT, 
        FD_KIP, FD_MFT, FD_MHI, FD_NZO, FD_NZR, FD_NPX, FD_NZX, 
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        FD_PFI, FD_PGW, FD_POT, FD_RBD, FD_RYM, FD_SKC, FD_SKL, 
        FD_SKT, FD_STU, FD_TEL, FD_TPW, FD_TWR, FD_VHP, FD_WHS, 
        FD_MVN, FD_PPL, FD_VCT, DU_AIR, DU_AMP, DU_ANO, DU_ARG, 
        DU_AIA, DU_CAV, DU_CEN, DU_EBO, DU_FBU, DU_FPA, DU_FPH, 
        DU_FRE, DU_GMT, DU_HLG, DU_IFT, DU_KIP, DU_MFT, DU_MHI, 
        DU_NZO, DU_NZR, DU_NPX, DU_NZX, DU_PFI, DU_PGW, DU_POT, 
        DU_RBD, DU_RYM, DU_SKC, DU_SKL, DU_SKT, DU_STU, DU_TEL, 
        DU_TPW, DU_TWR, DU_VHP, DU_WHS, DU_MVN, DU_PPL, 
        DU_VCT, CT_AIR, CT_AMP, CT_ANO, CT_ARG, CT_AIA, CT_CAV, 
        CT_CEN, CT_EBO, CT_FBU, CT_FPA, CT_FPH, CT_FRE, CT_GMT, 
        CT_HLG, CT_IFT, CT_KIP, CT_MFT, CT_MHI, CT_NZO, CT_NZR, 
        CT_NPX, CT_NZX, CT_PFI, CT_PGW, CT_POT, CT_RBD, CT_RYM, 
        CT_SKC, CT_SKL, CT_SKT, CT_STU, CT_TEL, CT_TPW, CT_TWR, 
        CT_VHP, CT_WHS, CT_MVN, CT_PPL, CT_VCT 
   
Cross- 
 Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs. 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t -542.691 0 140 560 
     Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -46.8486 0 140 560 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 359.905 0.0009 140 560 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 400.155 0 137 548 
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Appendix F 
Unit root tests results for Singapore sample. 
Pool unit root test: Summary  
  Series: I_CAPITALAND, I_CAPITAMALL, I_CITYDEV, I_COMFORTDELGRO, 
        I_DBS, I_FN, I_GOLDENAGR, I_HKLAND_US, I_JARDINE_CC, 
        I_JMH_400US, I_JSH_500US, I_KEP_CORP, I_NOBLE_GRP, I_NOL, 
        I_OCBC_BK, I_OLAM, I_SEMB_CORP, I_SEMBMAR, I_SGX, 
        I_SINGTEL, I_SIA, I_SIA_ENGG, I_SPH, I_STARHUB, I_ST_ENGG, 
        I_UOB, I_WILMAR, L_CAPITALAND, L_CAPITAMALL, L_CITYDEV, 
        L_COMFORTDELGRO, L_DBS, L_FN, L_GOLDENAGR, 
        L_HKLAND_US, L_JARDINE_CC, L_JMH_400US, L_JSH_500US, 
        L_KEP_CORP, L_NOBLE_GRP, L_NOL, L_OCBC_BK, L_OLAM, 
        L_SEMB_CORP, L_SEMBMAR, L_SGX, L_SINGTEL, L_SIA, 
        L_SIA_ENGG, L_SPH, L_STARHUB, L_ST_ENGG, L_UOB, L_WILMAR, 
        BN_CAPITALAND, BN_CAPITAMALL, BN_CITYDEV, 
        BN_COMFORTDELGRO, BN_DBS, BN_FN, BN_GOLDENAGR, 
        BN_HKLAND_US, BN_JARDINE_CC, BN_JMH_400US, 
        BN_JSH_500US, BN_KEP_CORP, BN_NOBLE_GRP, BN_NOL, 
        BN_OCBC_BK, BN_OLAM, BN_SEMB_CORP, BN_SEMBMAR, 
        BN_SGX, BN_SINGTEL, BN_SIA, BN_SIA_ENGG, BN_SPH, 
        BN_STARHUB, BN_ST_ENGG, BN_UOB, BN_WILMAR, 
        OD_CAPITALAND, OD_CAPITAMALL, OD_CITYDEV, 
        OD_COMFORTDELGRO, OD_DBS, OD_FN, OD_GOLDENAGR, 
        OD_HKLAND_US, OD_JARDINE_CC, OD_JMH_400US, 
        OD_JSH_500US, OD_KEP_CORP, OD_NOBLE_GRP, OD_NOL, 
        OD_OCBC_BK, OD_OLAM, OD_SEMB_CORP, OD_SEMBMAR, 
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        OD_SGX, OD_SINGTEL, OD_SIA, OD_SIA_ENGG, OD_SPH, 
        OD_STARHUB, OD_ST_ENGG, OD_UOB, OD_WILMAR, 
        FD_CAPITALAND, FD_CAPITAMALL, FD_CITYDEV, 
        FD_COMFORTDELGRO, FD_DBS, FD_FN, FD_GOLDENAGR, 
        FD_HKLAND_US, FD_JARDINE_CC, FD_JMH_400US, 
        FD_JSH_500US, FD_KEP_CORP, FD_NOBLE_GRP, FD_NOL, 
        FD_OCBC_BK, FD_OLAM, FD_SEMB_CORP, FD_SEMBMAR, 
        FD_SGX, FD_SINGTEL, FD_SIA, FD_SIA_ENGG, FD_SPH, 
        FD_STARHUB, FD_ST_ENGG, FD_UOB, FD_WILMAR, 
        DU_CAPITALAND, DU_CAPITAMALL, DU_CITYDEV, 
        DU_COMFORTDELGRO, DU_DBS, DU_FN, DU_GOLDENAGR, 
        DU_HKLAND_US, DU_JARDINE_CC, DU_JMH_400US, 
        DU_JSH_500US, DU_KEP_CORP, DU_NOBLE_GRP, DU_NOL, 
        DU_OCBC_BK, DU_OLAM, DU_SEMB_CORP, DU_SEMBMAR, 
        DU_SGX, DU_SINGTEL, DU_SIA, DU_SIA_ENGG, DU_SPH, 
        DU_STARHUB, DU_ST_ENGG, DU_UOB, DU_WILMAR, 
        CT_CAPITALAND, CT_CAPITAMALL, CT_CITYDEV, 
        CT_COMFORTDELGRO, CT_DBS, CT_FN, CT_GOLDENAGR, 
        CT_HKLAND_US, CT_JARDINE_CC, CT_JMH_400US, 
        CT_JSH_500US, CT_KEP_CORP, CT_NOBLE_GRP, CT_NOL, 
        CT_OCBC_BK, CT_OLAM, CT_SEMB_CORP, CT_SEMBMAR, 
        CT_SGX, CT_SINGTEL, CT_SIA, CT_SIA_ENGG, CT_SPH, 
        CT_STARHUB, CT_ST_ENGG, CT_UOB, CT_WILMAR 
   
Cross- 
 Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
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Levin, Lin & Chu t -183.227 0 105 420 
     Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im,  Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -20.6932 0 105 420 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 312.565 0 105 420 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 348.681 0 104 416 
   
